Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Bonds and the Post-Election Environment (November 25, 2024)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

The election results are in and, contrary to expectations, voters rendered a quick and clear outcome, with Donald Trump set to return to the White House. The central case prior to the election was that the outcome would be drawn out and contentious — an outcome that would tend to support flight-to-safety assets, such as long-dated Treasurys. However, in the wake of the actual outcome, a reassessment is in order.

Our analysis of the long end of the yield curve starts with our yield model.

The model’s independent variables include the level of fed funds, the 15-year average of CPI yearly inflation, the five-year standard deviation of inflation, WTI oil prices, the yields on German and Japanese 10-year sovereign bonds, the yen/dollar exchange rate, the fiscal deficit scaled to GDP, and a binary variable for government control. As the model shows, yields are running below fair value but are within the expected range of outcomes.

As the election approached, despite the general consensus of a close race among the political pundits, the markets began to expect a GOP presidential win with a strong possibility of legislative control as well. In mid-September, the constant maturity 10-year T-note yield was 3.63%; it has increased to 4.45% in the wake of the election results.

A key issue is whether the yields will continue to rise in the coming weeks. Here are the factors we are watching:

  1. Our model’s government binary variable adds 30 bps to the fair value yield when there is a unified government. Since 1983, a situation where a single party controls both the executive and legislative branches usually results in greater spending and potentially higher deficits. We don’t apply that variable until the new legislature is seated, so we have not activated that variable quite yet. This variable will be in effect in January, though, which suggests there will be a bias toward higher yields.
  1. When yields peaked above 5% in late October 2023, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve acted in concert to bring yields lower. The Treasury adjusted its borrowing to the short end of the yield curve and Chair Powell signaled that the policy rate had peaked and was poised to decline. These actions sent yields lower to around 3.8% by late December 2023. Given that the current government is in “lame duck” status, we doubt that the Treasury will engage in similar behavior now. Thus, there will likely be greater tolerance for rising 10-year yields. In other words, although the Fed and the Treasury had signaled earlier that a 10-year yield above 5% was intolerable, that likely isn’t the case now.
  1. Since the recent FOMC decision to cut 25 bps, another similar cut at the mid-December meeting is mostly expected by the markets. The unknown is what future policy will look like in the wake of recent political developments. A model based on the difference between overall yearly CPI and unemployment (an approximation of the Phillips curve) would suggest that the current policy rate is near neutral.

Anything beyond the anticipated 50 bps of cuts before year’s end will begin to move monetary policy into easing mode, which will be difficult to justify without a rapid weakening of the labor market or a drop in inflation. Without further cuts, it will be difficult for long-term yields to decline significantly.

Once President-elect Trump assembles his team at the Treasury, we could see action similar to what occurred in October 2023 to bring down long-duration Treasury yields. However, until then, there is a window where yields could rise to uncomfortable (e.g., >5%) levels. Thus, we believe investors should exercise care in extending on the yield curve into next year.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Implications of North Korean Soldiers in the Ukraine War (November 18, 2024)

by Daniel Ortwerth, CFA  | PDF

In late October, the world learned that North Korean soldiers had deployed to Russia to assist their allies in the Ukraine war. This dramatically changed the geopolitical profile of the conflict. Allies and partners of both Ukraine and Russia have been providing material and financial support to both countries since virtually the beginning of the war. North Korea itself (formal name Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been contributing large quantities of arms and ammunition to Russia; however, this is the first known instance of another country sending combat troops to join the fight on either side. This precedent-setting action marks a clear escalation and raises the question of how this development might further accelerate the conflict.

This report addresses that question. We begin with a review of the known facts concerning troop numbers, types, locations, etc. We continue with an assessment of the likely impact of DPRK forces on the course and outcome of the Ukraine war and culminate with considerations of how this development might affect the broader geopolitical landscape beyond the conflict. As always, we conclude with investment implications. Since this report addresses a newly emerging and rapidly evolving development, its status may materially change post-publication. We encourage readers to monitor our Daily Comment for emerging updates.

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Don’t miss our accompanying podcasts, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify 

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Let’s Talk About Tariffs! (November 11, 2024)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

In recent years, tariffs have made a surprising comeback. Once widely condemned as a relic of the protectionist past, tariffs reemerged in 2016 as a policy tool against China and are now being considered for implementation on goods from all other countries. Populists tend to believe that these tariffs can be used to address a range of domestic economic issues, including persistent trade and fiscal deficits. They also generally believe that by leveling the playing field for domestic industries, tariffs can ultimately boost living standards for American households.

Under the new proposal, the US would impose a blanket tariff of 10% to 20% on all imports, with additional tariffs of 60% to 100% on goods from China. This would significantly increase the US’s average tariff rate to its highest level in nearly eight decades. The primary goal would be to protect US manufacturers and incentivize foreign companies to shift factory operations to the US, thereby creating domestic jobs. Furthermore, proponents believe that the increased tariff revenue could help reduce the US federal budget deficit. This proposed strategy has resonated with a substantial portion of the American electorate.

Despite its popularity with certain segments of the population, the proposal has faced significant opposition as it contradicts conventional economic wisdom. A tariff is a tax imposed on imported goods. Typically, it is levied as an ad valorem tax, which means it is calculated as a percentage of a good’s value. For instance, if the tariff rate were 10%, then importing a car valued at $10,000 would require paying a tariff of $1,000.

The potential increase in import costs has raised concerns about the proposal’s impact on price inflation. While businesses initially bear the cost of import tariffs, they can often pass a significant portion of this cost onto consumers in the form of higher prices. This economic phenomenon, known as tariff pass-through, is particularly prevalent for goods where businesses have significant pricing power. However, the extent to which tariffs can contribute to inflation and impact the overall economy varies.

When US consumers and businesses purchase foreign goods by paying in dollars, the foreign seller typically will exchange the greenbacks received for their own currency in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, increased US demand for foreign goods should lead to increased demand for foreign currencies, which in turn could weaken the US dollar. However, foreign countries often recycle their dollar holdings back into the US economy, in which case the foreign inflow can paradoxically buoy the dollar and widen the US trade deficit, or at least limit the dollar depreciation and the narrowing of the deficit.

For a flat tariff to successfully reduce trade and fiscal deficits without exacerbating inflation, the US would need to transition from a consumption-driven economy to an export-oriented one. US consumers would need to scale back their demand for tariff-laden imports and/or US producers would need to increase their exports. This shift would require the US to reduce its reliance on borrowing and become a net lender to the global economy. By increasing exports, the US could offset the negative impacts of tariffs and strengthen its economic position. Countries, like China, have achieved this transformation by implementing policies that encourage saving and discourage consumption, often at the expense of social safety nets.

The US dollar’s dominance as the global reserve currency could hinder an export-led growth strategy. Historically, large US trade deficits have supported the dollar’s role as other countries have relied on it for international transactions. To shift this dynamic, the US might need to diminish the dollar’s appeal. This could involve implementing capital controls, as many developing countries do, in order to restrict cross-border capital flows. Alternatively, the US could sacrifice monetary policy autonomy, either by pegging the dollar to another currency or by joining a currency union with other nations.

Because we don’t expect the US to make all the necessary adjustments to become more export-oriented, we believe that potential tariffs could induce foreign countries to devalue their currencies to offset the impact of the tax levy. Accommodative monetary policy could make this possible. This scenario would benefit US companies with limited foreign revenue, such as small and mid-cap companies, as their revenues would likely remain unaffected by currency depreciation. However, this could negatively impact US exporters that rely on foreign sales as the price of their goods could become less competitive.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Rising US & Global Debt: A Perspective Check (November 4, 2024)

by Daniel Ortwerth, CFA  | PDF

Concern has been rising across American society and throughout much of the world about the level of United States government debt. An increasing number of voices are sounding the alarm that the debt level is unsustainable, and crisis is on the way. Debates rage about how such a crisis will begin and when it will happen, but according to the alarmist view, the country will inevitably face financial catastrophe, with grave consequences for the security of the nation and the welfare of its citizens. Is this true? Are we really on a critical path, and is a catastrophic outcome inevitable? It is time to gather the facts and apply sound analysis to give ourselves a well-founded perspective.

This report uses standardized, internationally recognized data for 43 of the largest countries, from the beginning of the century to the present, to analyze US and global debt levels according to broadly accepted methods. It assesses the progression of debt levels across the period, between countries and country groups (i.e., developed and emerging) and between sectors of society (i.e., government and private). Our goal is to provide a fact-based sense of the situation and its trends. The report pays particular attention to the comparison between US and Chinese debt levels, since this plays a role in the geopolitical competition that has emerged. As always, we finish with implications for investors.

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Don’t miss our accompanying podcasts, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify 

Business Cycle Report (October 31, 2024)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index remained in contraction. The September report showed that six out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. Last month, the diffusion index improved slightly from -0.2152 to -0.1515 but is still below the recovery signal of -0.1000.

  • A drop in interest rate expectations helped to loosen financial conditions.
  • The Goods-Producing sector is improving, but overall activity remains weak.
  • The labor market continues to show resilience.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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