Business Cycle Report (February 29, 2024)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index increased from the previous month, suggesting that economic conditions are improving. The January report showed that six out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. Last month, the diffusion index increased from a revised +0.0303 to +0.0909,[1] slightly above the recovery signal of -0.1000.

  • Hawkish Fed talk led to an increase in interest rates in long-term bonds.
  • Consumer confidence remains buoyant despite elevated inflation.
  • Jobs data reinforces views that the labor market is tight.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.


[1] The index has been revised due to a discontinued dataset. Under the old methodology, the value would have increased from -0.1515 to -0.03030. While the change is significant, the unrevised value is still above the contraction indicator.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Posen vs. Pettis (February 26, 2024)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

Michael Pettis is a professor of finance at Guanghua School of Management at Peking University in Beijing and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  He is a well-known analyst of China’s economy and financial system.  Adam Posen is currently the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.  He has worked for numerous central banks, including the New York Federal Reserve and the Deutsche Bundesbank.  He was a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee from 2009 to 2012.

Posen and Pettis have differing views on what ails the Chinese economy.  Which view is correct is important in instituting a fix for China’s economy and establishing what response the US and other nations should take toward China.  In this report, we will outline the respective positions of both Posen and Pettis on China’s economy and discuss who we believe is more correct.  The latter issue is crucial.  If Posen is correct, the answer may be as simple as removing Chinese President Xi from office and returning to the policies that preceded him.  If Pettis is correct, fixing the issues will be far more challenging.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Who Wants US Treasurys? (February 20, 2024)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Before August 2023, the Treasury’s quarterly refunding rarely raised eyebrows. Investors readily snapped up US debt, and announcements were largely ignored by markets. However, Fitch Ratings’ surprise downgrade of the US credit rating from AAA to AA that month, just days after a $6 billion increase in the planned quarterly debt issuance, sparked investor concerns. Now, the question looms: Will there be enough demand to absorb the growing supply of US debt?

The downgrade by Fitch triggered a sharp rise in Treasury yields, especially long-term yields, which hit their highest levels since 2007. The 10-year and 30-year benchmarks spiked to multi-decade highs, reflecting lukewarm participation at Treasury auctions. Higher borrowing costs and weak auction participation sent the S&P 500 Index tumbling. In response to the market’s negative reaction, the Federal Reserve signaled an end to its hiking cycle and a potential cut in policy rates for the coming year, and the Treasury Department tilted its borrowing toward shorter-term maturities.

While the coordinated efforts of the Fed and Treasury successfully reduced borrowing costs and improved overall risk appetites, investors remained uncertain about the government’s plans to finance its burgeoning debt. This year, $8.9 billion of US Treasury bonds will mature, while the budget deficit is expected to be $1.4 trillion, meaning there will be $10 trillion of bonds coming to the market. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office projects that the deficit could expand to $2.6 trillion by 2025. This leaves a gaping hole in financing, and without a significant change in market conditions, it is unclear who will step up to buy these bonds.

The US Treasury market boasts a unique blend of buyers, each with distinct goals. Central banks, the guardians of global monetary systems, buy Treasurys to secure their reserves and stabilize currencies. Similarly, pension funds prioritize stable, long-term income to fulfill their liability obligations. For the Fed, Treasurys become instruments of monetary policy, influencing interest rates and economic activity. Asset managers diversify their portfolios with these secure assets, reducing risk and volatility. Even households directly participate in holding a portion of the national debt, seeking a safe place for their investments.

The Fed’s shift toward tighter monetary policy in 2022 and 2023 reshaped the allocation of Treasurys. By not rolling over its maturing Treasury holdings, the Fed is now absorbing less of any new supply. Simultaneously, interest rate hikes have incentivized some corporations and foreign central banks to moderate their holdings, creating a demand gap. Households, pension funds, and insurance companies have stepped in to fill this gap, becoming the primary buyers of Treasurys. However, the central bank’s recent suggestion that it will phase in monetary easing later this year introduces uncertainty about who will buy debt going forward.

The high concentration of interest-sensitive investors like households, pension funds, and insurance companies in the bond market raises concerns about the potential impact of future interest rate cuts. Lower short-term rates typically decrease the appeal of risk-free assets like long-term bonds, potentially dampening demand. Households seeking higher returns in an accommodative monetary policy environment may consider diversifying into riskier assets. However, while pensions and insurance companies hold a significant portion of Treasurys, their demand for longer-term bonds is limited by their need to match their obligations.

Historically, broker-dealers have played a key role in stabilizing markets by absorbing available assets, but they face constraints that limit their ability to act as the buyer of last resort when the Fed doesn’t step in and provide liquidity. Broker-dealers, unlike central banks, hold limited inventory as they are primarily focused on facilitating client transactions rather than large-scale asset purchases. This limited capacity restricts their ability to absorb significant volumes of assets during periods of stress. To compensate for the inherent liquidity risk involved in holding large inventories, broker-dealers would require higher premiums, therefore pushing up yields on Treasurys.

With limited demand from traditional buyers putting pressure on long-term Treasury yields, concerns have risen that the Fed may need to intervene to prevent higher borrowing costs for businesses and consumers. Yet, policymakers remain reluctant to increase the balance sheet due to inflation concerns. Chair Powell reiterated during the January FOMC press conference that the committee will discuss slowing QT at their March meeting, suggesting that the committee is not ready to stop reducing its balance sheet.

 While potential rate cuts and future reductions could increase demand for Treasurys, limited impact on yields is expected due to persistent inflation concerns and lukewarm investor sentiment. Given the continued supply-demand imbalance, we believe short-to-intermediate-term securities offer a more attractive risk-reward profile compared to long-duration bonds due to their lower interest rate sensitivity and potentially higher returns.

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Back to the Future: The Advantages of Dividend Income Over Interest Income (February 2024)

Insights from the Value Equities Investment Committee | PDF

Over the past 15 years, dividend income has often exceeded what could be earned in a money market account. But as seen in the chart below, with the fed funds rate now at 5.5%, the relationship between dividend income and interest income has gone back to what was common before 2008 — where the S&P 500 dividend yield (the blue line) is 2-3% below what could be earned in a money market account invested in U.S. Treasury bills (the red line).

This begs the question:

Why should an income-oriented client still invest in a dividend income-focused stock portfolio yielding 3% when they can now earn 5% in a low-risk money market account?

 

Higher inflation is causing interest rates to rise on short-term fixed income and money market instruments, and now investors have more choices in generating income returns. While current yields are appealing, we believe it would be short-sighted for long-term investors to abandon the compounding benefits of a growing income stream that can protect purchasing power while also providing for growth of principal.

In this Value Equity Insights report, we highlight some of the potential advantages of growing dividend income through a portfolio of quality, growing businesses — factors which might be underappreciated in the current environment.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Thinking About Deterrence (February 12, 2024)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA, and Daniel Ortwerth, CFA | PDF

In his book Leviathan, published in 1651, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbs argued that human society in the state of nature would be marked by conflict and mistrust, as each person would be free to attack his or her neighbor to acquire needed resources. According to Hobbs, government evolved to end this chaotic, violent state by providing security and order to society. Without a powerful central government, Hobbs posited, life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

But what about the community of nations, where each country could be tempted to attack its neighbor for political, economic, or other reasons? No world government has evolved to provide order and security in international relations, even if the UN has been given some powers aimed at helping it keep the peace. As we’ve written before, the more typical source of international security and order has been when a powerful country gained hegemony over much of the globe, as the United States did in the decades after World War II. As US voters now question the costs and benefits of that hegemony, and as the US hesitates to enforce order, rival countries have begun to assert themselves. “The Jungle Grows Back” is the term we use to describe the situation. This report examines how, in this newly chaotic world with weakened hegemonic order, nations may increasingly rely on “deterrence” to protect themselves, with potentially big implications for investors.

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Don’t miss our accompanying podcasts, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google