Author: Amanda Ahne
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – A Regime Change in Bonds? (October 23, 2023)
by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF
Jim Bullard, former president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, based his policy votes and economic analysis, in part, on a concept known as regimes. Our take on his concept is that an edifice of factors underly clearly observable correlations in markets, and when this edifice changes, the former rules of thumb no longer hold. Regime changes are jarring for investors as previous relationships no longer hold, and there is a sense that the world no longer makes sense. However, over time, new rules of the road emerge, and markets tend to become understandable again.
We think that something similar is occurring in long-duration fixed income. Since the early 1980s, low inflation volatility (supported by globalization and deregulation) and strong confidence in the Federal Reserve’s ability to give value to the dollar and suppress inflation, led to steadily falling long-term bond yields. Consequently, this allowed investors to use bonds as a buffer in portfolios, fostering solid performance of the 60/40 portfolio. However, as we have been detailing for some time, the steady erosion of U.S. hegemony is undermining globalization and as the world factures, national security concerns are overriding efficiency. This set of circumstances are expected to lead to higher and more volatile inflation.
In an attempt to quantify what this means for investors going forward, we use a reduced form of our 10-year T-note model. First, let’s look at the model from 1960 through the present:

The model includes the fed funds rate, oil prices (WTI), the 15-year average of yearly CPI (which is our inflation expectations proxy), the five-year standard deviation of yearly CPI, the deficit to GDP ratio, and a binary variable for periods when Congress and the White House are controlled by the same political party. There are a few unexpected outcomes. First, oil prices carry a negative coefficient, meaning that higher oil prices lead to lower yields. Second, the coefficient on the deficit is also positive, meaning that larger deficits bring lower yields. Both are contrary to common expectations.
Now, let’s look at the model from 1960 through 1982. This was the pre-Volcker era, where it was generally held that monetary and fiscal policies should work in concert, and after the gold standard was ended in 1971, there was uncertainty surrounding what would give value to fiat currency.

Note the differences from the overall model. First, the oil price and deficit coefficients are positive, which means that rising oil prices and deficits led to higher interest rates. Also, a unified government led to lower yields. We suspect the government variable reflects a period when there was greater confidence in government, and thus, a clear mandate (expressed by single party dominance) led to lower yields.
Now for the 1983 through the current period model:

Some major changes have emerged. First, the oil coefficient sign flipped, meaning higher oil prices have led to lower yields. The best explanation of this circumstance is that investors had faith that the Fed would see high oil prices as an inflation threat and would move to tighten policy to ensure oil price increases didn’t lead to persistent inflation. Second, the trend in inflation has had a much greater impact on yields when compared to the earlier period. This change likely reflects the “scars” of the high inflation period of the 1970s. At the same time, the deficit variable’s sign also flipped as higher deficits led to lower yields. This change likely reflects faith that the Fed will lean against deficit spending. In other words, Volcker was seen to have implemented Fed independence, which, along with a clear inflation target, replaced gold as the factor that gave credibility to the dollar. Finally, the lack of faith in government is reflected in the sign flip of that variable. Since 1983, a unified government has led to higher yields on the expectations that an administration with such a mandate would use it to spend money and potentially bring inflation. Or, put another way, a divided government was considered a positive.
Recent market behavior has raised concerns that the regime that began in 1983 could be ending. Large fiscal deficits have led to fears of rising debt service costs. There is increasing worry that we could be approaching fiscal dominance, where the Fed is no longer independent because it must partially monetize Treasury spending to maintain order in the Treasury bond market. This outcome may not materialize since it’s possible that policymakers would implement austerity measures to reduce deficits, although there is some evidence to suggest that investors doubt the resolve of policymakers. If the Fed’s independence is compromised, we would likely see oil prices become positively related to yields again.
What will be important going forward is that the truism of the past forty years may not hold to the same degree. That doesn’t mean we will completely revert to relationships last seen in the 1960-82 period, but it probably means that a breakdown in variable relationships from the most recent period is likely. Investors should be prepared for new relationships to emerge over time.
Weekly Energy Update (October 19, 2023)
by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF
Continued tensions in the Middle East are supporting crude oil prices.
(Source: Barchart.com)
Commercial crude oil inventories fell 4.5 mb compared to forecasts of a 0.6 mb draw. The SPR was unchanged, which puts the net draw at 4.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 13.2 mbpd. Exports rose 2.3 mbpd, while imports fell 0.4 mbpd. Refining activity rose 0.4% to 86.1% of capacity. The rise likely signals that we are coming to the end of the autumn refinery maintenance period, which should lift oil demand.
(Sources: DOE, CIM)
The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories. Last week’s is contrary to seasonal patterns, but we do note that refinery operations rose this week.
(Sources: DOE, CIM)

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $74.38. However, given the level of geopolitical risk in the market, we are not surprised that oil prices are well above this model’s fair value.
Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in late 1984. Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $94.45.
Market News:
- Rising prices for diesel fuel are creating an opportunity for China to expand product exports. Although China is dependent on foreign oil supplies, it has expanded its refining capacity, giving it the ability to export product. It is worth noting that China has been buying sanctioned oil from Iran and Russia at discounts and in its own currency, likely creating attractive refining margins. Russia has been curtailing diesel exports to secure domestic supplies which is giving China an export opportunity.
- For the first time in history, crude oil is poised to become America’s largest export. The combination of rising production and higher prices, along with demand from Europe, have led to this development.
- At the same time, environmental activists are working to create impediments to U.S. LNG exports.
- Canada is nearing the completion of its Trans-Mountain Pipeline, which will allow it to send oil from central Canada to the Pacific coast. This development will likely raise prices on Canadian oil exported to the U.S. At the same time, it should also reduce prices to Asia.
Geopolitical News:
- As Israel begins its ground offensive in Gaza, we continue to watch for signs of escalation. Iran is warning Israel not to expand its offensive into Gaza, while the U.S. is warning Iran not to escalate the current conflict into a regional war. In the wake of the missile strike on a Gaza hospital, Iran has called for an oil embargo on Israel and is warning of pre-emptive strikes. There is a dispute over who is responsible for the attack on the hospital: Israel claims it was a misguided missile launched by either Hamas or Islamic Jihad, while Hamas accuses Israel.
- The U.S. has issued new sanctions on Iran, mostly targeting Iranian firms tied to supporting Iran’s missile and drone programs. The firms are based in Iran, Hong Kong, China, and Venezuela.
- The U.S. has sent a second carrier strike force into the region, suggesting rising concern about a widening conflict.
- Last week, we speculated that the Hamas invasion and Israeli response would likely lead to at least a suspension of Israel/KSA talks. The Saudis have confirmed that the talks are on hold for now.
- China and Russia are decidedly siding with Hamas, likely to undermine U.S. influence in the Middle East.
- At the onset of the war in Ukraine, there were widespread concerns that the global fertilizer market would be disrupted. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were all significant producers of fertilizer. In addition, one of the key feedstocks of fertilizer is natural gas, which has seen a jump in prices. We are now seeing reports of fertilizer shortages, which will reduce crop yields, especially in the emerging economies.
- As the U.S. moves to tighten sanctions on Russia, Washington is also moving to ease them on Venezuela, likely to restrain oil prices. The Maduro government is agreeing to hold elections under international observation.
- The House of Representatives is planning to issue a subpoena to Robert Malley, the former Biden administration official who is under scrutiny on concerns he may be acting in the interests of Iran.
Alternative Energy/Policy News:
- For EVs to be a viable replacement for ICE (internal combustion engine) cars, the issue of range anxiety will need to be addressed. Currently, the range is about 350 miles, which is serviceable, but recharging can take a long time and finding places to recharge can be a challenge. However, Toyota (TM, $177.68) may have the ultimate solution: a solid state battery that has a range in excess of 900 miles with a 10 minute recharge. Such a combination would be an improvement over ICE vehicles and would likely resolve much of the range concern. Toyota is working to mass produce these batteries, which are expected to be in its cars by the end of the decade.
- Meanwhile, EV sales have started to fade in the U.S. due to rising costs coupled with range anxiety.
- Although there is general agreement among environmentalists that fossil fuel use needs to be curtailed, there is persistent opposition to the mining of the metals needed to make the transition. Often, these resources reside in environmentally sensitive areas. Although we understand the concern, if areas where the metals can be found continue to be excluded, it may become difficult to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels.
- As Britain contemplates achieving net zero by 2050, it is starting to count the costs of decommissioning its natural gas distribution network. These costs will be formidable.
- A recent study by the Dallas Federal Reserve is a “good news, bad news” story for wind and solar. There is clear evidence that these alternative power sources helped Texas avoid brownouts this summer. The bad news is that the intermittency of these two sources have made managing the grid difficult as solar and wind power tend to increase in the daytime and taper off in the evening. This pattern requires grid operators to adjust other power sources to accommodate this pattern. Ramping up other sources, primarily natural gas fired turbines, tends to increase maintenance costs. Battery storage may help grid operators deal with the intermittency issue.
- Within the EU, France and Germany are at loggerheads over the nuclear power issue. The former wants nuclear power to be included as a green alternative. Germany, which has decided to close its reactors, opposes this characterization.
Note: The next edition of this report will be published on November 2.
Keller Quarterly (October 2023)
Letter to Investors | PDF
One quarter ago I discussed the inadvisability of living in the future (or the past), at least as far as investing goes. Much better, we said, to stay in the present, investing in what is, not what if. Today we deal with the difficulty of investing in the present. The recent past has delivered a decade’s worth of crises: a global pandemic, war in Ukraine, a resurgence of inflation, rising interest rates, a U.S. banking crisis, political polarization and paralysis, possible government shutdown, an auto industry strike, increasing “great power” tensions, and now…a war in the Middle East.
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind
Cannot bear very much reality.
(Burnt Norton, I, 44-45. I promise to quote a poet other than T.S. Eliot in future letters.)
Investors, like most people, prefer to have reality approach little by little, rather than all at once. But, as my colleagues are probably tired of hearing, “We don’t get to invest in the world that we wish we had, only in the world we have.”
So, how is an investor to deal with such an onslaught of reality? Today, we sing an ode to Asset Allocation. By asset allocation, we mean the practice of diversifying one’s entire portfolio of investments by asset type. The reason to do this is that different classes of assets not only perform differently over time, but also respond differently to events. This is essential because no one can predict the future. While the recent run of extraordinary events appears unusual to many, our experience is that, in the world of investing, the extraordinary is ordinary. One must be prepared for anything.
We believe the best way for an investor to be prepared for anything is to have one’s assets diversified by type. And we’re not just speaking of stocks and bonds (or even different types of stocks and bonds), but all assets, including commodities, currencies (most easily accessed via assets denominated in foreign currencies), gold (more of a currency than a commodity), real estate, and even “good old-fashioned” cash.
As noted above, not all assets respond to reality in the same way. In almost any of the myriad of possible economic, geopolitical, and market environments, some assets will do meaningfully better than others. For example, when war breaks out in the Middle East, the prices of oil, gold, defense stocks, Treasury bonds, and the dollar usually rise, even while the prices of many other assets decline. Sensible diversification by asset class can bring a measure of stability to a portfolio even on days of crisis.
If we knew that today’s winning stocks would continue to work forever, we would not need asset allocation; there would be no need to own multiple asset classes if we knew precisely what was going to happen a year from now. But since we don’t know the future, we diversify by asset class. This is the same reason that we buy insurance on our cars. If we knew for a fact that we would never have an accident, such insurance would be a waste of money. But we don’t know that, so keeping the car insured is prudent.
Asset allocation is for every investor. And you do have an asset allocation, even if you’ve never thought about it. But thinking about it is the first step toward modifying it to best fit your needs. Regardless of which Confluence strategies (Value Equity, International Equity, Alternative Investment, or Asset Allocation) you might be invested in or what other investments you may have, it is important that you thoughtfully evaluate your asset allocation. We encourage you to sit down with your financial advisor to plan an asset allocation strategy that is right for your risk tolerance and long-term objectives. At Confluence, we believe asset allocation is the most prudent way to maintain investment stability when reality seems too much to bear.
We appreciate your confidence in us.
Gratefully,
Mark A. Keller, CFA
CEO and Chief Investment Officer
Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – What Shall We Call the New Era? (October 16, 2023)
Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF
Whether you’re a policymaker, an investor, a small business owner, or simply a student of world history and international affairs, it’s useful to have meaningful labels for various epochs. Ideally, such a label is widely accepted and captures some essential aspect of the era you’re thinking about, making it easier to talk about that era with others. The Elizabethan Age, The Progressive Era, World War I, World War II, and The Cold War are all terms that suit that purpose quite well. Each immediately conveys not only the period you’re talking about, but it also conjures up something of the political, economic, and military landscape of the period.
The world has just concluded a great epoch that ran for nearly three decades from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet Communism to Donald Trump’s term as U.S. president. During that epoch and in the years since it has ended, the labels used to describe it have been unsatisfying, probably because we were still unsure about which of its aspects were defining and which were not. Now that that world has ebbed, there seems to be a growing consensus toward calling it the post-Cold War period or the period of Globalization. Both terms capture the sense that it was a time of relative peace, which encouraged global trade and investment.
But what about the new era that is now taking hold as China and its evolving geopolitical and economic bloc increasingly assert themselves against the global hegemony of the United States? In this report, we explore some ways to describe this new world epoch in hopes that it will help sharpen investors’ understanding of what really differentiates it from the post-Cold War globalization period that has now come to an end.
Don’t miss our other accompanying podcasts, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google
Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Podcast – #36 “What Shall We Call the New Era?” (Posted 10/16/23)
Weekly Energy Update (October 13, 2023)
by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF
The Hamas attack on Israel did lift oil prices earlier this week, but markets are mainly taking a “wait and see” approach to prices so far.
(Source: Barchart.com)
Commercial crude oil inventories jumped 10.2 mb compared to forecasts of a 0.4 mb draw. The SPR was unchanged, which puts the net draw at 10.2 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production has jumped 0.3 mbpd to 13.2 mbpd; we have suspected for some time that the DOE was undercounting production, which has led to large “adjustment” plug numbers. Exports fell 1.9 mbpd, while imports rose 0.1 mbpd. Refining activity fell 1.6% to 85.7% of capacity. We are clearly heading into the autumn refinery maintenance period which should reduce oil demand.
(Sources: DOE, CIM)
The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories. Last week’s jump in inventories is consistent with seasonal patterns and represents some “catch up” to the recent stockpile declines. With refinery operations slowing, further increases in inventories would be expected. At the same time, as the chart below shows, we should be near the trough of the seasonal maintenance period and demand should start rising soon.
(Sources: DOE, CIM)

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $72.52. However, given the level of geopolitical risk in the market, we are not surprised that oil prices are well above this model’s fair value.
Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in late 1984. Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $93.83.
What’s Happening to Gasoline Demand?
As summer came to a close, gasoline demand turned down sharply.
It isn’t unusual for gasoline consumption to decline when summer ends. Vacation season ends as school starts and, often, a seasonal decline in homebuilding activity can also hurt demand.

However, as the chart above suggests, the recent decline is rather sharp, and, more importantly, actually began during the summer.
We have noted that driving activity hasn’t been the same since the Great Financial Crisis.

From the early 1980s into the crisis, gasoline demand steadily rose. Recessions didn’t generally cause significant declines, but driving activity flattened following the crisis. We did see some improvement from 2015 until the pandemic, but since the pandemic, miles driven have been under pressure. There are likely a myriad of reasons for this change. We were approaching the point where suburban sprawl had reached a limit; commutes were so long that households could no longer live further from work. The pandemic introduced more widespread work-from-home employment, which played a role. Also, social media now allows friends to “meet” without physically going anywhere. So, it makes sense that gasoline demand would be affected.

This model looks at gasoline consumption from 1973 to the present. We seasonally adjust the data and run a Hodrick-Prescott trend variable through the data. Note the plunge in the divergence[1] in the most recent data. The decline in gasoline demand suggests that something is affecting consumption. Given that gasoline consumption is usually price insensitive, this may be a warning that the economy is under pressure. Usually, when gasoline demand is this weak, a recession is underway.
Market News:
- Despite a hot summer, EU natural gas inventories are ample. Some of this is because last winter was mild, which meant the spring and summer refill seasons began with a surplus. Now that inventories are mostly full, natural gas prices have been soft, and volatility has been low. In the past week, however, this calm has been disrupted. The Hamas incursion led to a production halt in the Eastern Mediterranean which triggered a jump in prices. In addition, it’s worth noting that there is never enough storage if the winter is cold, and so, prices could move rapidly higher if the weather dictates. Also, we note that Australian LNG workers are going on strike.
- The IEA is projecting slower global natural gas demand in the coming years.
- Germany is (wisely) considering increasing its natural gas inventory capacity.
- Drought is reducing water levels in the Panama Canal; the restrictions could reduce flows of petroleum, LNG, and related products.
- Although company information is not the primary focus of this report, the recent announcement of a merger between Pioneer (PXD, $239.71) and Exxon (XOM, $105.69) will give the latter a dominant position in the U.S. shale patch. Exxon usually engages in large projects that take years to develop. By adding shale assets, it will be able to ramp up production quickly. There are two takeaways: first, Exxon must feel comfortable that the U.S. policy environment will continue to support fossil fuel production; and second, the company may have been worried about the long-term prospects for oil and therefore wanted to increase its portfolio of rapid production assets.
- In addition, Exxon’s expansion could bring more reliable oil flows from the shale patch. In recent years, smaller firms have heeded the call from shareholders to increase dividends and restrict investment. Exxon will be less susceptible to such pressures.
- U.S. oil exports reached a new record in the first half of the year.
- Artificial intelligence energy demands are enormous and will likely drive the need for more generating capacity.
Geopolitical News:
- The major geopolitical news of the week was the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel. On Sunday, Hamas, operating in the Gaza strip, launched a widescale attack on southern Israel, assaulting several towns, killing several hundred Israelis, and taking over 100 hostages. In our Daily Comment, we have covered this event. For energy markets, there are four key factors:
- The Saudi/Israeli normalization talks are likely dead for now. Although there was progress being made before the invasion, it would be difficult for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) not to show solidarity with Hamas. At the same time, the degree of restraint Israel would have to exercise to keep negotiations alive would be near impossible for the Netanyahu government. A deal that might encourage the Saudis to utilize the 2.0 mbpd of excess capacity to bring down oil prices is unlikely at this point.
- Broader normalization among the Arab states is also uncertain at this time. Generally speaking, these states are issuing “both sides” types of statements and calling for a curtailment of violence.
- If Iran is held culpable for supporting Hamas’s attack, some level of Israeli (and perhaps U.S.) retaliation is probably unavoidable. Although the retaliation could be covert by focusing on cyber-attacks and special operations, such low-key strikes might not be politically sufficient for Israel. After all, this event is being described as Israel’s “9/11.” A direct attack on Iran would almost certainly roil the oil market and send prices higher. If Iranian crude shipments were forcibly curtailed, it would not be a surprise if Iran closed off the Strait of Hormuz. We expect the U.S. to tread carefully in blaming Iran, but the evidence thus far seems to support its involvement. We do expect the U.S. and Europe to try to prevent a widening of the conflict as a broader war would bring the risk of higher oil prices. So far, Iran is claiming no role in the attack, which contradicts accounts recently detailed by the WSJ. Our expected playbook on Iran is for increased sanctions, which will likely include freezing the recently unfrozen $6.0 billion of Iranian assets. At the same time, expect to see reports that confirm Iran was not directly involved in the actual attack.
- To a great extent, the White House will have to choose between sanctioning Iran or having higher oil prices. We note that Iranian production has been rising this year.

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- There will be pressure to reduce Iran’s exports in response to this event. Of course, if it so chose, Saudi Arabia could plug this gap as it currently has 2.0 mbpd of excess capacity that it could tap. Iran and Saudi Arabia have held talks recently, but we doubt that Riyadh would come to Tehran’s aid on this issue.
- Potentially the biggest loser to renewed sanctions on Iran would be China. China has benefited by purchasing sanctioned oil at a discount. At the same time, it has become dangerously dependent on oil flows from the Middle East that could possibly be interdicted by the U.S. Navy.
- A potential beneficiary could be Venezuela. The White House may ease sanctions on the Maduro regime to contain oil prices.
- We are also watching for other groups in the region to join the conflict. The most likely one would be Hezbollah. Other armed insurrectionist groups in the Middle East have warned they may create a multifront war for the West.
- There are also concerns that Russia may have aided Hamas.
- The backlash against Israeli retaliation has begun.
- This attack may stunt natural gas development in the eastern Mediterranean. The projects could be vulnerable to attack, and even if the current facilities can be secured, geopolitical risks could affect future investment.
- As we have noted in recent reports, there is some evidence that Iran may have penetrated upper levels of the Biden administration. The Hamas attack could raise concerns about the administration’s recent actions to improve relations with Iran.
- China also issued statements, which can be characterized by “both sides, curtail violence, the U.S. caused these problems.” Israeli diplomats were unimpressed.
- A gas pipeline reaching from Finland to Estonia began leaking, raising fears of sabotage. NATO has warned it will respond if it turns out the pipeline was attacked.
- Russia, in a bid to keep domestic fuel prices low, has implemented an export ban. More importantly, Putin has also ordered price regulations and capital controls. When the U.S. used such regulations in the 1970s, it led to widespread shortages. The Kremlin may be banking on its power to force oil companies to lose money to prevent a similar experience.
- Scalise (R-LA) has been nominated by the Republicans to be speaker of the House but still needs to secure the position from the full House. He is a major supporter of the fossil fuel industry and would likely push back against the energy transition.
- The G-7 has relaxed its enforcement of the Russian oil price cap. Treasury Secretary Yellen announced the U.S. is preparing to crack down on sanction evasion. We doubt the G-7 will have much success. Russia has a fleet of tankers that allow it to evade sanctions and the buyers are getting by without Western insurance.
- India recently paid Russia well in excess of the price cap.
Alternative Energy/Policy News:
- Nio (NIO, $8.53), a Chinese car company, is losing $35k per car. China’s ability to subsidize these losses makes the country a formidable competitor in this area. As we have noted in recent reports, China appears to be targeting the EU for its EVs, and Brussels is increasingly concerned about Chinese dumping and the potential damage to Europe’s auto industry.
- Overcapacity in the Chinese EV industry is likely to bring a shakeout in the coming months.
- Chinese battery firms are creating trade paths to evade U.S. trade restrictions.
- The stigma against nuclear energy is slowly weakening in Europe as the need for electricity and the appeal of no carbon emissions make the source increasingly attractive.
- Kenya is emerging as a major leader in geothermal power. It plans on generating half of its electricity from this clean source.
- Perhaps the most important metal in the energy transition is copper. Battery metals will change as technology changes, but, to date, no one has developed an electrical conductor as price efficient as copper. Unfortunately, existing mines are faced with a reduction in productivity as ore concentration declines. Thus, new mines will be necessary in order to boost output; however, it has been difficult to fund and approve new projects.
- Heat pumps are an efficient, yet controversial, method for heating and cooling. The problem is that they don’t work well in extreme temperatures. In the case of Germany, the government has been forcing homeowners to use heat pumps when they would prefer not to. As the IEA points out, though, improving efficiency is an important part of reducing energy consumption.
- Technology has become an issue in recent union contract negotiations. For example, part of the demands of the Hollywood writers included protection against AI-derived scripts. The UAW is worried that EVs will reduce the number of autoworkers required to build cars and, at the same time, the union fears battery factories are increasingly being sited in right-to-work states. The new technology is a threat to UAW jobs and the current strike is trying to address these issues.
[1] We have truncated the residual data to reduce the chart distortions from the pandemic.
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – #107 “The FOMC in 2024” (Posted 10/9/23)
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The FOMC in 2024 (October 9, 2023)
by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF
The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) votes on monetary policy. The FOMC consists of seven governors, the New York FRB president, and a rotating roster of four regional presidents who serve a one-year term on the committee. This rotation feature means that the policy leanings of the FOMC could change each year. In our observations, though, the changes from year to year are not typically monumental, but at the margin, the composition of the committee might trigger more rapid policy shifts or changes in the number of dissents to policy decisions.
This table shows the breakdown of the FOMC:


(Sources: Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, Confluence)
Using Bloomberg’s assessment of policy leanings,[1] there are five categories of voters, ranging from Uber Hawk to Uber Dove. We then assign numbers, ranging from one to five, with higher numbers signaling hawkishness. Overall, the average is moderate, with presidents being slightly more hawkish than governors . This year, the FOMC was a bit more dovish than the average of all potential voters. However, note that in 2023, hawks outnumbered doves five to four. Next year, the serving presidents are much more dovish. The average falls from 3.2 to 2.8, with doves outnumbering hawks five to four. The higher number of doves may make the “higher for longer” story harder to maintain.
One of the unusual characteristics of the Powell Fed has been the low number of dissents.
(Sources: Federal Reserve, Confluence)
This table measures the number of dissents relative to the number of meetings that a Fed chair has presided over. Clearly, Chair Powell has had the most unified FOMC in history. However, this upcoming year might be a challenge for Powell as his stated goal of keeping policy tight will be coming up against an FOMC that is more dovish than usual. If he maintains his dissent record, it will suggest his powers of persuasion are strong. It’s important to note that there is an unofficial rule that four governors dissenting at a meeting should trigger the resignation of the chair.[2] There are three dovish governors, so a moderate would have to vote against the chair in order to hit the critical fourth vote. We note that the last governor dissent was in 2005, so they have become rare. Thus, even one dissent would likely be newsworthy.
Overall, the composition of the FOMC in 2024 will lean dovish, while Chair Powell appears to be holding a hawkish line. At the last meeting, the FOMC dots plot took away two rate cuts from the 2024 projection. It remains to be seen whether those dots signaling a retreat from rate cuts are going to be voters next year. We may have a Fed that turns out to be more dovish than currently expected.
[1] Note that Governor Cook, who has recently been appointed, is colored in blue. This is because Bloomberg hasn’t given her an assessment yet.
[2] This is not a hard and fast rule, but a chair that is in the minority of the governors has probably lost the mandate to govern. For background, see Mallaby, Sebastian. (2016). The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan. New York, NY: Penguin Books, pp. 311-315.

