Weekly Energy Update (April 20, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

After gapping last week, prices are consolidating.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories fell 4.6 mb compared to the forecast draw of 0.9 mb.  The SPR fell 1.6 mb, putting the total draw at 6.2 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.3 mbpd.  Exports rose 1.8 mbpd, while imports rose 0.1 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.7% to 91.0% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  After accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace into mid-February, injections first slowed and have since declined, putting storage levels in line with seasonal norms.

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $56.81.  The recent actions of OPEC+ are clearly designed to prevent this sort of price from emerging.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales set to happen, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $94.11.

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

  • Saudi Crown Prince Salman announced that 4% of Saudi Aramco (2222, SAR, 34.65), worth about $80 billion, will be moved to the nation’s sovereign wealth fund. The reason is to support the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification.  Although the amount doesn’t necessarily suggest a rapid move away from fossil fuels, the “direction of travel” suggests less investment in oil and gas, and more in other parts of the economy.
  • The IEA admits that the price cap on Russian oil has been violated. Russian oil exports are now exceeding prewar levels with nearly all of the oil flows going to China and India.  Russia is also apparently selling oil in the Far East that is being exported by tanker, but this voyage is short enough to avoid insurance, which means that buyers can violate the price cap.  The U.S. is warning that it will begin cracking down on this practice.
  • Russia has surprisingly little domestic oil storage. Because of this lack of storage capacity, it must sell most of what it produces.  The country has announced that it will build new storage facilities which will give it more flexibility for timing sales.
  • China is proposing new natural gas pipelines from Kazakhstan to diversify its sources of the product.
  • Given China’s dominance in renewable energy and EV components, Chinese companies are often participants in foreign investment projects. However, due to deteriorating relations between China and the West, political resistance to these projects is growing.

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – U.S. Intelligence Sharing as a Tool of International Relations (April 17, 2023)

Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Why should investors care about international relations?  Why should they pay attention as great powers jostle for influence and dominance across the globe?  One simple answer is that the global economy tends to grow better when there is one dominant country or “hegemon” that provides security, order, effective instruments for trade and investment, and perhaps even a common culture or set of values.  Since World War II, investors have benefited from relatively fast and stable economic growth as the United States provided those public goods in its role as the world’s “Benevolent Hegemon.”  Investors in the U.S. have enjoyed especially strong, risk-adjusted returns.

But as we’ve written before, the military, economic, and social costs of hegemony have now given the U.S. pause.  Whether the U.S. ultimately abandons its role as hegemon, and how fast it might do so, will have major implications for investors.  In this report, we look at one way U.S. officials today are trying to maintain their influence on other countries without the big economic costs they’ve accepted in the past.  As always, we will also examine the investment ramifications of that strategy.

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Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Weekly Energy Update (April 13, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil gapped higher in early April on reports that OPEC+ was cutting production targets.  It has held those gains and is now moving above chart resistance at $82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories rose 0.6 mb compared to the forecast draw of 1.7 mb.  The SPR fell 1.6 mb, putting the total draw at 1.0 mb

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 12.3 mbpd.  Exports plunged 2.5 mbpd, while imports dropped 0.9 mbpd.  Refining activity declined 0.3% to 89.3% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  After accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace into mid-February, injections first slowed and then declined for two weeks.  The mostly steady report for last week puts stockpiles near seasonal norms.  Past history would suggest there will be mostly steady inventory levels into early June.

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $55.36.  The actions of OPEC+ this week are clearly designed to prevent this sort of price from emerging.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales set to happen, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $93.33.

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

  • The U.S. has sent the USS Florida, a guided missile submarine, to the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. often has a naval presence in this region, but this sub could be viewed as a show of force against Iran.
  • The U.S has been restricting China’s ability to import semiconductor chips and the equipment for fabricating them. China is considering retaliation in the form of restricting rare earth exports.  Rare earths are critical in technology and alternative energy.
  • Last week, we noted that China hosted a meeting between diplomats from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran. Both sides agreed to resume flights between the two Middle Eastern nations.
  • Officials from the KSA are meeting in Yemen for talks with rebel groups. One potential outcome from the recent détente between Iran and the KSA could be a ceasefire in the long-running civil war in Yemen.
    • Graham (R-SC) had a “productive meeting” with Crown Prince Salman this week. Graham has been critical of the crown prince in the past, so the meeting might signal something of a thaw in U.S./KSA relations.
  • Although the U.S. political class is moving decidedly against China, the business class is clearly loath to break ties. We think that eventually businesses will be forced to choose.
  • Recently, we reported that schoolgirls in Iran were being poisoned in their schools. Apparently, the poisonings have continued.  It isn’t clear if Iran is facing a dissident movement within Shia Islam, or if the acts are being perpetrated by radical Sunni groups.  We note that the Islamic State and Taliban groups oppose education for women and so these acts may be being perpetrated by groups outside of Iran.
  • Iran is apparently in talks with China and Russia to provide components for missile fuel. Russia is attempting to acquire ammonium perchlorate which is used in solid fuel propellants in missiles.  If Iran supplies the component, it will surely face additional sanctions, but at the same time, Tehran may be reluctant to sell the fuel to Russia because it has its own needs for missile fuel.
  • Recent leaks of classified materials indicate that Russian hackers were targeting Canadian pipelines. Although the hackers claimed success in penetrating the networks, there were no reports of disruptions from cyberattacks.

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Increasing Concerns About Commercial Real Estate (April 10, 2023)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Last month’s failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SIVB, $106.04) showed that the institution had vulnerabilities in both its assets and its liabilities.  On the asset side of its balance sheet, the bank had too much exposure to longer-maturity government bonds, which depreciated sharply as the Federal Reserve aggressively hiked interest rates over the last year.  On the liability side, the bank had many huge deposits from small, start-up technology firms that were burning through cash rapidly.  A number of those deposits far outstripped the FDIC insurance cap of $250,000.  As its deposits fell, Silicon Valley had to sell many of its bond holdings at a loss, undermining faith in the bank and spurring further withdrawals.  Investors worried that other small and mid-sized banks could have similar vulnerabilities, especially if they had excessive exposure to a particular industry or type of customer.

The moves by bank regulators to insure all of Silicon Valley’s deposits and set up a special lending facility for banks facing a potential run on deposits helped calm depositors and ease investor apprehensions about the banking system.  Still, the crisis has sparked concerns about what the next source of problems will be in the financial system.  The focus has fallen hard on the commercial real estate (CRE) industry.  A key concern is whether the crisis-driven flight of deposits from small and mid-sized banks to bigger banks and mutual funds will crimp CRE lending in the coming months.  Since small and mid-sized banks provide the majority of CRE loans in the U.S., such a drop in lending could make it harder for building owners to roll over their maturing loans, which could spark defaults, push down property prices, and slow new investment.

Our analysis indicates a drop in CRE lending is indeed likely.  For example, the chart below shows that the volume of bank CRE loans closely tracks the Fed’s Commercial Real Estate Price Index with a lag of about five quarters, or 14 months.  Since the price index hit a plateau at the end of 2021, the relationship suggests lending volumes should now be flattening out as well.

Similarly, the chart below shows that CRE lending is highly correlated with the price of real estate investment trusts (REITs), with a lag of about 20 months.  Since the Wilshire U.S. REIT Price Index peaked in December 2021 and then fell precipitously, this relationship suggests CRE lending should start to fall quickly by late summer 2023.

Finally, the following chart indicates that CRE lending is also highly correlated with the volume of bank deposits, with virtually no lag at all.  Even when deposit growth merely slows, as it did from 2009 to 2011, CRE loans have historically fallen.  The worrisome factor is that deposits have recently been in outright decline, even though many of the deposits pulled from small and mid-sized banks ended up in large banks.  Since bank deposits have already been falling for some time now, it would suggest a drop in CRE lending is now actually overdue.

In sum, these and other indicators point to an imminent fall in CRE lending.  Since banks have some flexibility in how they recognize their balance sheet position, the drop in lending will probably be drawn out rather than sudden.  The key question is how sharp the lending pullback will be, and an important consideration for that is what small and mid-sized bank depositors do with any funds they withdraw.  If those depositors believe that regulators’ actions have stabilized the banking system and they merely shift their funds to larger banks, then overall CRE lending may not fall too much.  However, if they think the banking system is still risky and therefore shift their funds into money market funds, short-term bonds, and the like, then the chance of a more painful CRE pullback would increase.  Any such drop in lending could make it harder for building owners to roll over their maturing loans and could spark widespread defaults, push down property prices, and deter new investment.  That would likely exacerbate any recession in the short term.  In any case, the implication for investors is that it is probably still too early to begin buying REITs again.

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Weekly Energy Update (April 6, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil jumped on the unexpected decision by OPEC+ to cut production targets.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.7 mb compared to the forecast of a 1.8 mb build.  The SPR fell 0.4 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.7 mbpd, while imports increased 1.8 mbpd.  Refining activity declined 0.7% to 89.6% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  After accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace into mid-February, injections first slowed and then declined for the past two weeks, putting levels near seasonal norms.

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $55.48.  The actions of OPEC+ this week are clearly designed to prevent this sort of price from emerging.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales set to happen, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $94.11.

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 

Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Windsor Framework (April 3, 2023)

Thomas Wash | PDF

On February 27, the United Kingdom and the European Union announced an important agreement to resolve disputes over the Irish border. The arrangement, referred to as the Windsor Framework, has been hailed by British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak as a step toward restoring trust between the EU and U.K. However, despite assurances from Sunak, the agreement fails to address the key concerns of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which wants border checks and other trade hurdles between mainland U.K. and Northern Ireland completely removed from the Brexit agreement.

This report explores how the Windsor Framework changes the U.K.- EU relationship. We begin with a brief summary of the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. We then focus on the details in the framework and why they fall short of the DUP demands. We conclude with a summary of the possible financial and political ramifications of the agreement.

Read the full report

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Business Cycle Report (March 30, 2023)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in February. The latest report showed that eight out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from -0.21 to -0.39, well below the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Deterioration has eased in financial indicators
  • Manufacturing showed slight improvement but remains weak
  • Labor market data continues to show signs of tightness

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (March 30, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil decisively broke its recent $72-$82 per barrel trading range.  Recent weakness was exacerbated by funds that sold out of long crude oil positions.  Prices have recovered to the lower end of the previous trading range.  We will see if this acts as resistance.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories plunged 7.5 mb compared to the forecast of a 1.5 mb build.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.1 mbpd to 12.2 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.3 mbpd, while imports dropped 0.8 mbpd.  Refining activity jumped 1.7% to 90.3% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  After accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace into mid-February, injections first slowed and then declined this week due to the rise in refinery activity.  Levels are nearing seasonal norms, which should relieve the bearish pressure on the market.

Fair value, using commercial inventories and the EUR for independent variables, yields a price of $54.26.  Although we think there is enough geopolitical risk in the world to prevent a decline to this level, it does suggest that the oil market is dealing with rather weak fundamentals.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales set to happen, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $93.58.

Market News:

 

Geopolitical News:

 

Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Have Policymakers Solved the Tinbergen Problem? (March 27, 2023)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Central banking was initially created to address commercial bank runs.  Commercial banks engage in a liquidity transformation, where they accept deposits, which are mostly available on demand, and turn that liquidity into less-liquid assets, usually loans or securities.  Bank revenue comes from capturing this liquidity premium as less-liquid assets tend to pay a higher return than liquid ones—the advantage for giving up immediate access to the funds.  A bank run occurs when depositors demand their cash back en masse but the bank cannot liquidate its loan and security assets quickly enough or at a high enough price to meet the demands of depositors.  Central banks were created to accept the loans and securities from the banks in return for cash, which would allow them to address the liquidity demands of depositors.

Over time, central banks have been given additional roles.  For example, during WWII, the Federal Reserve facilitated Treasury borrowing for the war effort by fixing interest rates along the entire yield curve.  In the U.S., the Fed has been given the additional mandate of conducting monetary policy to achieve full employment and stable prices.  As part of its financial stability mandate (described above), the Fed is also a bank regulator.  At the present time, the Federal Reserve has three main mandates: financial stability, stable prices, and full employment.

Jan Tinbergen was a Dutch economist who was awarded the first Nobel Prize in economics.  He formulated a rule stating that policymakers need an equal number of policy tools for an equal number of problems.  If the Fed has three mandates, the Tinbergen Rule would suggest that it needs at least three policy tools.  If it has less than three tools, then it may be forced to choose which mandate is the most important.

The Fed’s most important policy instrument is the fed funds rate, which (directly or indirectly) sets short-term borrowing costs for the economy.  Although it has regulatory tools as well, for most of its history the interest rate tool has been its primary method for meeting its mandates.  Clearly, this situation violates the Tinbergen Rule, and as such, this means the FOMC will occasionally find itself facing the Tinbergen Problem, which requires that it must choose one mandate over the others.

The key question we will try to address is, what does the FOMC do when faced with the Tinbergen Problem?  More specifically, what does the Fed do if it faces a conflict between its financial stability mandate and its inflation mandate? To measure the financial stability mandate, we use the Chicago FRB’s National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI).  This index of 105 financial market variables is the longest-running index of its type.

The chart on the left shows the fed funds rate along with the aforementioned NFCI.  From the index’s inception in 1973 until July 1987 (when Paul Volcker’s term as Fed Chair ended), the correlation between the two series was 72%.  After August 1987, it fell to 9.8%.  When the FOMC changed rates during the earlier period, there was a nearly immediate response seen in financial conditions.  In the later period, the correlation declined.  What changed?  In the earlier period, the FOMC was dealing with a persistent inflation problem.  The chart on the right shows our Fed indicator, which is the yearly change in the CPI less the U-3 unemployment rate.  After Volcker, monetary policy appeared to have been aimed at keeping the Fed indicator below zero.  The Fed would raise the policy rate when the indicator approached zero, essentially treating a negative Fed indicator as having met the inflation/full employment mandates.  Note that when the NFCI rose during this period, the policy rate was usually reduced.  This is how the Fed resolved the Tinbergen Problem.  By preemptively keeping prices stable (and arguing that price stability led to full employment in the long run), the Fed could directly address threats to financial stability.

Financial markets began to expect that when financial stress rose, monetary policy would be eased.  Investors would suffer through the declines in risk assets during stress events but would also assume that easier policy was on the way, which would support an eventual price recovery.  In other words, when faced with the Tinbergen Problem, policymakers would opt to reduce financial stress.  Since this policy has been in place for over 35 years, it makes sense that investors would expect easier policy when “something breaks” in the financial markets.

The recent bout of financial system problems has raised expectations that the FOMC will stop raising rates.  Financial markets have been signaling for some time that the Fed should end this tightening cycle.

This chart above shows the fed funds target rate compared to the implied three-month LIBOR rate from the two-year deferred Eurodollar futures market.  Because LIBOR lending isn’t government guaranteed, the rate usually exceeds the fed funds rate.  However, there are occasions when the spread inverts; we show this on the chart with vertical lines.  Usually, the inversion leads to at least an end in the tightening cycle.  That hasn’t been the case thus far, and we suspect the Fed has continued tightening due to elevated inflation.

The key question is, now that we have seen a financial stress event, will the FOMC follow the pattern of the past 3.5 decades and end its tightening cycle?  We suspect the Fed is close to the end, but, as the chart below shows, cycles don’t usually end until the policy rate is at least within the model’s lower standard error band.

This model projects the fed funds rate using the Fed indicator as the independent variable.  Since 2000, the FOMC has tended to hold the policy rate around the lower deviation line.  The current deviation is about 40 bps below the lower standard deviation line, suggesting that the Fed is 15 bps short of “neutral.”  We note that the rate was raised to fair value during the tightening cycle in 2004-2006, but we would not expect that to occur in this cycle.

Since the Fed has created a backstop for bank deposits called the Bank Term Funding Program, policymakers may be less inclined to lower rates due to the recent financial concerns.  If so, the Fed may keep raising rates until inflation falls to an acceptable level.  Given that market participants mostly expect tightening to end when the financial system comes under stress, further rate increases may be an unwelcome surprise.  But, in any case, we suspect we are near the end of this tightening cycle.

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