Weekly Energy Update (February 23, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil remains in a trading range between $72-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 7.6 mb compared to a 2.0 mb build forecast.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.3 mbpd.  Exports rose 1.5 mbpd, while imports rose 0.1 mbpd.  Refining activity fell 0.6% to 85.9% of capacity.

 (Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  We are accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace, even without SPR sales.  The primary culprit is low refining activity, which should pick up later this year.  The rapid rise in stockpiles, though, is a bearish factor for oil, and current stockpiles have already exceeded the five-year average peak normally seen in early summer.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales set to happen, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $94.35.

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:


[1] Most natural gas storage is housed in depleted wells.  To maintain well integrity, gas must be injected and withdrawn at a steady pace.  During mild winters, current production and required storage withdrawals tend to cause significant price weakness.

  View PDF

Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Chip War: Book Review (February 21, 2023)

Thomas Wash | PDF

It was simple in the beginning. American firms developed all the designs for semiconductor chips, and Asian manufacturers turned them into reality. It was a match made in capitalist heaven. This all changed after the pandemic exposed supply chain vulnerabilities in the business model, and the situation only worsened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has led to a rethink regarding the U.S.’s reliance on Taiwan-produced semiconductors. Thus, an industry model which previously had been based solely on working with the lowest-cost producer must now consider supply-chain security.

In his book Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, Chris Miller discusses how semiconductors have become essential for economic and military ambitions. The author not only details how semiconductors originated but also how they became a linchpin in the global economy. In this report, we summarize the findings in Miller’s book, including how chip manufacturers paved the way for globalization and a subsequent clash between global powers. Additionally, we provide our thoughts on the book and conclude with potential market ramifications.

Read the full report

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Weekly Energy Update (February 16, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to have based but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose a whopping 16.3 mb compared to a 2.0 mb build forecast.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.3 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.2 mbpd, while imports declined 0.8 mbpd.  Refining activity fell 1.4% to 86.5% of capacity.

 (Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  We are accumulating oil inventory at a rapid pace, even without SPR sales (see below).  The primary culprit is low refining activity, which should pick up later this year.  The rapid rise in stockpiles, though, is a bearish factor for oil.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  With another round of SPR sales, the combined storage data will again be important.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $95.37.

The Nord Stream Issue:  Seymour Hersh, a long-time investigative reporter, released a blockbuster allegation a few days ago, suggesting that the U.S., along with Norway, attacked the Nord Stream pipelines.  According to his report, U.S. Navy divers from the Diving and Salvage Center based in Panama placed explosives on the pipeline and were responsible for the damage.  If these allegations are true, it would create a crisis.  Arguably, this action is a casus belli and could put the U.S. and NATO into a direct conflict with Russia.  Although, before we take the report at face value, caution should be exercised.

Hersh is an 85-year-old investigative reporter who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1970 for uncovering the Mỹ Lai massacre.  However, over the years, a good bit of his reporting has been increasingly discredited.  He wrote a large piece for the London Review of Books that suggested the Obama administration’s account of the assassination of Osama bin Laden was essentially a lie.  He faced strong criticism for that report, which relied heavily on unnamed sources.  Later, he seemed to side with the Assad regime over chemical weapons, but the allegations he made were not entirely refuted either.  Our take is that Hersh, at least at one time, was an important journalist.  Over the years, though, his reporting seems to have become increasingly erratic.

As we noted, Hersh isn’t a crackpot, but likely due to his experiences in dealing with the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, he seems to have taken a position more recently that the benefit of the doubt should go to foreign interests.  Thus, there is a potential bias to his reporting.  At the same time, even though there is a notable lack of sourcing in the report, there are solid geopolitical reasons for the U.S. to want to end Nord Stream.

The age of oil has been difficult for Europe, mainly because the continent doesn’t have much oil of its own.  Although Europe is blessed with ample coal resources, the superiority of oil as an energy source meant that without secure sources of oil, European dominance of the world was in trouble.  There is a bit of production available in Romania, and of course, after oil prices spiked in the 1970s, oil was extracted from the North Sea, but Europe was never going to achieve oil and gas independence.  The European powers attempted to expand their colonial reach into the Middle East and Asia to acquire oil, but those areas proved difficult to secure.  The Dutch lost the oil in Southeast Asia to Japan during WWII.  After WWII, when the U.S. fostered independence for European colonies, Europe lost controlled access to oil in North Africa and the Middle East.  Until the early 1970s, Europe was mostly dependent on the U.S. for oil.  Not wanting to be fully dependent on Washington for energy, Europe, and especially Germany, turned to Russia.  Naturally, this reliance on Russia wasn’t popular with the U.S.  Consistently, American administrations criticized Europe for its increasing reliance on Russia oil and gas.  The Nord Stream projects were especially galling because they directly linked Russia to Germany.

Thus, the destruction of the pipelines is arguably in American interests.  That’s why this narrative will likely be hard to quash, even if the Hersh reporting is false.  It is natural to assume that if a party benefits from an event it might have had a role in causing it.  However, that is about as far as this goes.  It is quite possible that Hersh received this information from someone that would also benefit from increased tensions between the U.S. and Russia.  And since no sources are named, it may be impossible to really prove anything.

We will continue to monitor developments and reporting around this issue.  We doubt that we will see anything definitive on this in the near term, so the most likely outcome is that it won’t cause an escalation directly involving the U.S. and NATO against Russia.  But we could see “tit-for-tat” actions, such as sabotage of LNG facilities, cutting of fiber optic cables, etc.

Market News:

  • The big news this week, although maybe it shouldn’t be, is that the U.S. will sell an additional 26 mb out of the SPR. This sale was previously mandated by Congress.  Over the past couple of decades, Congress has, on occasion, used the SPR as sort of a “slush fund” to address budget issues that couldn’t be met with taxes or by borrowing.  This is a rather small sale given the scale of recent withdrawals, but the market didn’t take the news well by selling on fears of further sales from the reserve.  In fact, the administration considered canceling the sale, but doing so would have required an act of Congress, probably difficult to do in the current environment.  We don’t think this sale matters all that much, but our Twitter feed lit up with all sorts of commentary about how irresponsible the SPR sales were, and “look, they are at it again.”   We don’t disagree about the risks from earlier sales, but this one isn’t all that big of a deal.
  • The IEA is forecasting oil demand will reach a new high this year due to China’s reopening.
  • In response to the G-7 price cap, Russia announced a 0.5 mbpd oil production cut. There are two concerns beyond the obvious one that this action will lift prices. The first is that Russia may not be making this cut voluntarily but is finding that demand for its oil is falling.  Announcing a cut may be a measure to save face.  Second, cutting production is always a risky idea because once a well is shut in, in a short amount of time that production is lost without having to redrill.  Complicating matters further is that Russia was dependent on Western expertise to drill and maintain technically difficult oil fields.  Sanctions and disinvestment may lead to further output losses.  Oil prices initially rose on the report but failed to hold gains.  Oil markets are most likely worried about global recession weakening demand rather than the loss of supply.
  • China is working on an LNG deal with Qatar. As Qatar develops its North Field, it is apparently looking for long-term contracts to finance the development.
  • Although Freeport began exporting LNG this week, regulators report that the plant has systemic safety concerns.
  • The U.S. natural gas market is dealing with increased demand, especially from LNG, and rising production. However, inventory capacity is mostly fixed, meaning that price volatility is rising.  Complicating matters is that most U.S. inventory facilities are depleted gas wells where, to maintain integrity, gas is injected and withdrawn at a mostly steady pace.  This factor leads to a seasonal pattern of storage where gas is injected from April to October and withdrawn from November to March.  Storage seasonality is why price lows usually occur in January; however, if temperatures are moderate, stored gas must still come to market.  Exports come with their own set of difficulties.  Although European gas prices have declined due to mild temperatures, once the European refill season begins, export demand will likely increase.  Volatile natural gas prices will make planning difficult and could increase volatility for fertilizer and chemical prices as well.
  • We are hearing of increasing concern over the future production from the Permian Basin. In some respects, this is nothing new.  A few years ago, some analysts were sounding the alarm that drilling practices were damaging reservoirs.  Now, firms operating in the region are considering consolidation which is rational if production has peaked.
  • A growing number of long-term forecasts suggest that U.S. oil demand may be close to peaking. If true, the case for investing in future production would be hard to make. At the same time, the lack of refining investment could lead to strong margins for the foreseeable future.
  • A warming trend over the Arctic may bring much colder temperatures to Europe and North America. If it persists, it could lead to a cold spring which could delay crop planting.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  View PDF

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Reflections on Inflation (February 13, 2023)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: There will be no accompanying podcast with this report.]

Several advisors and their clients have been asking questions about inflation, which suggests there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the issue.  This uncertainty is understandable as inflation is a very complicated subject and, unfortunately, economic theory has oversimplified inflation to the point where it can seem mechanical.  For example, an increase in the money supply and/or strong economic growth doesn’t always lead to inflation, but theory would suggest it should.  On the other hand, sometimes these factors do lead to inflation.  In the absence of a definitive working theory of inflation, confusion shouldn’t be a surprise.

We won’t offer a definitive theory of inflation in this short report, but we will make some observations that will hopefully shed some light on the situation.  First, it’s important to have working definitions of topics.  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the cost of living, while inflation measures the rate of change in the cost of living.

The chart on the left shows the CPI beginning in 1871, and the chart on the right depicts the yearly rate of change (inflation).  On both charts, we have labeled four different monetary regimes.  On the far left is the Gold Standard.  It yielded cost of living stability, and over time, the level of the index barely budged.  However, the chart on the right shows the rate of change in the index (inflation or deflation), indicating that price volatility was the main feature of the Gold Standard years.  Because the money supply was mostly fixed, industrial expansion often led to deflation.  During wars, or when new gold mines were discovered, the influx of new money or the increase in velocity (wars boost spending) led to spikes in inflation.  Note the standard deviation in this period was a whopping 7.3%.

The second regime was Bretton Woods, which was a quasi-gold standard.  The dollar was convertible to gold, and other currencies were fixed against the dollar.  In theory, this system created an anchor, with the idea that the U.S. couldn’t abuse its reserve currency position because foreigners could demand gold for their dollars.  In practice, the U.S. was only partially constrained by the restriction of gold convertibility.  Capital controls were a key feature of this era.[1]  But the advent of the Eurodollar market created a way to circumvent capital controls and accelerated the end of Bretton Woods.  Still, in terms of price and inflation control, the system led to higher, but much less volatile, inflation.

The third regime, known as the Lost Years, emerged when President Nixon ended gold convertibility.  Although the Eurodollar market was undermining the system, Nixon didn’t want to curtail fiscal spending or the Fed to trigger a recession going into the 1972 election.  The decision unmoored the dollar and convinced foreigners that the U.S. would not inflict austerity in order to protect the value of the dollar.  In other words, American policymakers would protect the domestic economy to the detriment of foreigners.[2]  The greenback entered a deep bear market, and inflation roared.  Interestingly enough, the standard deviation actually fell, suggesting that prices were rising at a steady clip.

The fourth era, which we call Fiat Credibility, is the current regime.  Paul Volcker was a key figure in this regime.  Although he is credited with bringing down inflation by forcing two recessions on the economy, perhaps his greatest contribution was that his policies signaled that the U.S. would implement austerity (at least monetary austerity) and would be willing to put the country into a deep downturn to curtail inflation.  In other words, Volcker signaled that, to bring inflation under control, the U.S. would offer some degree of protection to foreign investors.  The dollar soared, and combined with deregulation and globalization, inflation remained at bay.[3]  Monetary policy had two pillars: a defined inflation target (usually 2%) and central bank independence, both seen as necessary to implement austerity.

This history shows that low inflation isn’t the same as cost-of-living stability.  During the Gold Standard, the broad index of prices didn’t change much over time, although year-to-year the swings could be large.  The Fiat Credibility era showed that steady price increases can be tolerated.  But make no mistake about it—prices generally rise.  When Chair Greenspan was asked to define price stability, he stated that it is an inflation level low enough to where the general price level isn’t taken into consideration when making investment or purchasing decisions.  However, this isn’t cost-of-living stability; instead, it’s a pace of price increases deemed to be tolerable.

Ultimately, inflation becomes a problem when businesses and households think it’s a problem.  When inflation begins to affect purchasing and investment decisions, the very act of protecting oneself from higher future inflation creates an adverse feedback loop of ever-increasing inflation.  For example, a business estimating a project will build in an inflation estimate for materials, thereby increasing the cost to the buyer.  Consumers, seeing higher prices, begin to protect themselves by hoarding goods. Accordingly, businesses may react similarly, causing rising inventories.  Consumers will also tend to buy sooner rather than later, which can feed into demand and exacerbate inflationary pressures.

Central bankers believe that 2% inflation is tolerable, and thus, have established public targets for that rate.  However, there isn’t anything to prove that 2% inflation has this unique characteristic.  It’s just as possible that 3% might lead to the same outcome, or it’s also possible that any target rate might lead to the perception of price stability.

This chart shows the rolling five-year standard deviation of the yearly change in CPI.  We have numbered business cycles by their length in rank order.  In general, there is a tendency to see long expansions when price volatility is below 2%.  This chart suggests that the pace of price increases may matter less than the dispersion.  Note that in the Gold Standard years, recessions were common, but ultimately, what households and businesses want is the absence of recessions.  It is quite possible that the 2% target isn’t “magic”; instead, inflation stability may be the more important goal.

Sadly, in a world that is resetting supply chains, inflation volatility is much more likely.  This is because the end of the 1990-2020 period of hyper-globalization will likely lead to a steeper aggregate supply curve which means greater inflation volatility.  If so, maintaining the 2% target may be excessively costly to the economy and, in fact, may lead to more frequent recessions and higher inflation variation.


[1] This feature also allowed governments to implement high marginal tax rates on high earning households.  It was difficult to avoid taxes by shifting money abroad.

[2] Hence the famous quote, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”

[3] That is, until recently.

 

View PDF

Weekly Energy Update (February 9, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to have based but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 2.4 mb compared to a 2.0 mb build forecast.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 12.3 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.6 mbpd, while imports declined 0.2 mbpd.  Refining activity increased 2.2% to 87.9% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Last week’s increase was contra-seasonal.  So far, crude oil inventories have been rising this year, mostly because refinery operations have been weaker than normal.  As refining activity accelerates, we would look for commercial inventory accumulation to slow.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.07.

Summer:

We don’t usually start thinking about summer until pitchers and catchers report to spring training.  By then, the Super Bowl has been played and we are only a couple of weeks away from the kick-off of the NCAA’s “March Madness” tournament.  However, we have been watching the gasoline markets and there are some concerns lurking around the bend.

Gasoline inventories are running about 14 mb below their five-year average.  Scaled to consumption, inventories are in line with normal, but that’s only because consumption has been weak.  We are approaching the usual peak in gasoline stockpiles, since inventories usually decline as refiners clear their winter grade gasoline from surplus to prepare for summer.  If we experience the usual drop in the coming weeks, stockpiles could be lower than normal and may trigger higher prices.  High gasoline prices are politically sensitive and may trigger another round of SPR releases.

At the same time, we are in the midst of a secular drop in gasoline consumption.  The following chart shows annual miles driven by passenger cars and light trucks.  In general, the trend in miles driven rose steadily from the early 1970s until the Great Financial Crisis in 2007.  We use gray bars to highlight periods when we did not hit a new high in the number of miles driven and note the number of months until a new peak occurred.  There was a small dip from 1973 to 1975, which was a product of the Arab Oil Embargo (which pushed up gasoline prices), and a more notable dip in the uptrend from 1979 to 1982, triggered by two U.S. recessions and a spike in prices caused by the disruptions from the Iran/Iraq War.  From 1983 until 2007, the rise in driving was relentlessly higher, with only short interruptions typically due to recessions or periods of high prices.  After 2007, though, we had a long gap before a new high was reached and the underlying trend clearly declined.

There are likely multiple reasons for the overall change in trend.  First, social media has led to friends being able to interact online, rather than needing to drive to meet in person.  Working from home and increased urbanization have also likely played a role.  Driving less, coupled with steady efficiency improvements, is leading to lower demand for gasoline.

The underlying factors reduce the chances of a gasoline crisis this summer, although the lack of inventory bears watching.  Probably the biggest factor that could push gasoline prices higher is crude oil pricing.

Market News:

  • The tragic earthquake in Turkey has closed the Ceyhan oil export terminal in southern Turkey. The terminal moves about 1.0 mbpd, with two-thirds coming from Azerbaijan and one-third from Iraqi Kurdistan.  Coupled with news that the KSA increased prices to Asia, oil markets were supported this week.  We do note that the port of Ceyhan has reopened, but it’s unclear just how long it will take for oil flows to resume.
  • The IEA has released its annual report on electricity. The report suggests that carbon emissions from electricity are trending lower as wind, solar, and nuclear power expand.
  • As we have noted in earlier reports, the Biden administration has approved a drilling project in Alaska over the objections of environmentalists. Although the president campaigned on restricting drilling activity on federal lands, he has found that the courts have not sided with this goal.  At the same time, high oil prices tend to soften opposition, so we do expect this project to go forward.
    • The administration has been struggling with dissonant objectives on crude oil production. On the one hand, the White House tends to criticize oil companies for not increasing output to quell oil prices, but then on the other it talks about a possible windfall profits tax, which would tend to reduce the incentive for investment.
    • This is not just a U.S. issue. EU climate goals, which hope to reduce natural gas imports, are stifling investment in U.S. production and LNG capacity.  It may be adversely affecting investment in the Middle East as well.  The Qatari energy minister mused recently that the EU will eventually return to buying Russian gas.  If that is the expectation, it is foolhardy to expand capacity.
  • The EIA is projecting record U.S. crude oil production (on an annual average basis) this year and next, although the growth rate is rather modest (0.1 mbpd this year and 0.4 mbpd in 2024). Much of that production is coming from the Permian Basin.
  • Japan is trying to cut coal import costs by burning lower grade coal (which is almost certainly dirtier).
  • Colombia’s President Petro made it clear during his campaign that he wanted to curtail the country’s oil and gas industry for climate change reasons. He has moved to ban oil exploration, a risky decision given that crude oil exports accounted for 34% of Colombia’s exports (excluding illegal substances).  Because oil is a depleting asset, cutting exploration will lead to falling output in the coming months.  Not only will this move hurt Colombia’s economy, it could also reduce global oil supplies.
  • Asian oil imports hit a new record in January, and that has occurred before the full effects of China’s reopening have been felt.
  • Oil and product prices have been stable recently, but much of that improvement is tied to a mild winter, which has reduced demand. Europe remains short of diesel, so prices could rise in the spring.
  • Despite the recent drop in natural gas prices, fertilizer supplies remain tight and could lead to widespread grain shortages.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  View PDF

Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Is Japan’s Sun Rising Again? (February 6, 2023)

Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Ever since Japan’s “bubble economy” imploded at the end of the 1980s and its population began to fall in the 2000s, investors have tended to dismiss the country’s financial markets as well as its geopolitical and economic standing.  Japan’s pacifist constitution and its diplomatic deference to the United States constrained its international influence, while its slow economic growth, rising debt, and ultra-low inflation made its business environment seem sclerotic and stagnant.  Likewise, through much of the past few decades, Japanese stocks and bonds have not offered investors much to get excited about.  In U.S. dollar terms, the MSCI Japan stock index including gross dividends only returned 5.5% per year in the two decades prior to 2022, versus an average total return of 9.8% for U.S. stocks.

Japan had plenty of false dawns in recent decades, which raised hopes for a rejuvenated society and economy.  In this report, we explore whether the country could finally see reinvigorated economic growth and investment returns, not so much because of economic reforms like it has tried so often in recent years, but because of its unique role in the evolving geopolitical environment.  Diving deeply into Japan’s geopolitical position, economic situation, and financial market valuations, we will explore whether the country might find the catalyst needed to boost its power and growth again.  We also lay out the specific investment implications for a range of asset classes.

Read the full report

There will be no accompanying podcast with this report.

Weekly Energy Update (February 2, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to have based but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 4.1 mb compared to a 1.0 mb draw forecast.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports fell 1.2 mbpd, while imports rose 1.4 mbpd.  Refining activity declined 0.4% to 85.7% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Last week’s increase was contra-seasonal.  Generally, we expect this year to follow last year, meaning that the usual rise in inventories isn’t likely.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.01.

Market News:

  • BP (BP, $36.31), has released its annual energy outlook. The research indicates that peak demand for fossil fuels will occur by 2035 at the latest but could occur by 2030 if policy leans against carbon emissions.  There are a number of factors behind the expected peak, but one of the most overlooked areas is improved consumption efficiency.  Research such as this makes it more difficult to argue for aggressive investment into future production.
  • A normal response to supply shortages is hoarding since insecurity over supply leads consumers to build stockpiles to protect against future outages. Paradoxically, this activity can cause its own supply problems as this stockpiling becomes a source of additional demand.  We note that there are periods when U.S. commercial crude oil inventories are positively correlated to price.  If inventory is simply a residual of supply and demand, then a positive correlation would not be expected.  On this note, the German natural gas inventory manager says it intends to maintain a “buffer,” which we suspect means keeping a higher level of inventory than it would otherwise maintain.  Also, the German government is considering a “strategic” natural gas reserve, which would be another source of demand.  We have postulated, for some time, that as American hegemony wanes, one of the consequences would be insecurity of commodity supply, which would boost prices.  These reports from Germany provide evidence of such activity.
  • The White House criticized Chevron (CVX, $187.30) for its decision to repurchase shares. The administration would prefer the company expand production, but once an environment is created that calls for the replacement of fossil fuels, rewarding shareholders rather than boosting output is a rational outcome.
  • Whenever the price of an important commodity rises, politicians usually charge firms in those industries with “price gouging.” Although further investigation rarely confirms that suspicion, it persists.  Recently, Italian PM Meloni criticized gas station owners by accusing them of price gouging.  In response, they held a one-day strike.  Although closures of stations are rare, this event does highlight the potential for unrest due to high oil prices.
  • One of the consequences of the war in Ukraine has been a restructuring of global oil flows. We also note that the EU is placing a ban on Russian product imports on February 5.  It is not obvious if the markets are ready for this action.
  • Local governments in China have exhausted their funds in the battle against COVID and now find they lack the resources to buy natural gas.
  • One of the side effects of fracking is earthquakes. Although none of these earthquakes are of a high magnitude,[1] they are enough to be felt and raise fears among homeowners that the quakes will trigger structural damage.  Tremors have been reported in Oklahoma and also now in Texas.  It is thought that the primary culprit is fracking wastewater.  Sand, water, and other chemicals are injected into the ground when a well is fracked.  The water usually surfaces and needs to be disposed of, and a cheap solution is to reinject it into the depleted well.  The water is thought to act as a catalyst for these earthquakes.  The solution is to force energy companies to dispose of the wastewater in another fashion, and although possible, changing the regulations would lift costs and eventually raise energy prices.
    • It should be noted that oil activity is said to be in a “boom” in Texas and New Mexico. It is having ripple effects outside of the oil and gas industry by lifting salaries and employment in other sectors of the economy.
  • One of the bright spots for oil production is Guyana, which is expected to steadily boost production.
  • The Biden administration’s decision to aggressively sell oil out of the SPR has been controversial. Although it is arguable that there are still ample supplies, as the previous chart showed, combining both the SPR and commercial stockpiles indicates that inventory levels have notably declined.  The House of Representatives has passed a bill that would limit the Department of Energy’s ability to tap the SPR. While it has no chance of passage, it does reflect the current level of concern.
  • Warm weather has not just lowered natural gas prices in Europe, but it has also taken U.S. prices below $3.00 per MMBTU. Although inventory levels are rather close to their five-year average, we are in the period of the year with the strongest drawdowns, but because of mild temperatures, we actually saw a build in U.S. stocks.  Even if temperatures turn cold, it is likely we will begin the refill season in April with adequate stocks.  We do look for prices to recover in the spring and summer as LNG exports increase to ensure Europe has adequate supplies.

 Geopolitical News:

  • Over the weekend, Iran was hit with a series of aerial attacks. Oil refineries and defense infrastructure were reportedly hit by drones.  The U.S. is suggesting that Israel was behind the widespread attacks, and apparently the U.S. was apprised of the operation.  Iranian media reported that the damage was light, but the fact that the attacks occurred is notable for a few reasons.  First, Israel has been reluctant to support Ukraine due to relations with Moscow (Russia and Israel cooperate in Syria); however, Iran is supplying arms to Russia so by attacking its defense infrastructure Israel could both help Ukraine and attack an avowed enemy.  Second, Israel must believe that Iran has limited scope to retaliate, likely assuming that it probably can’t do much in response between the protests and a weak economy.  Third, although there isn’t evidence that the U.S. directly participated, Washington appears to have abandoned a return to the JCPOA and thus is working on other ways to contain Iran.  This cooperation may include the actions Israel took over the weekend.  Still, the attacks on Iran create conditions where the war in Ukraine could expand.
  • Even with the lack of progress in Iran and the U.S.’s return to the JCPOA, diplomats haven’t completely cut off contact, mostly because they don’t perceive any other available options to restrain Iran’s nuclear program.
  • The U.S. has accused Iran of a “murder for hire” plot to assassinate an Iranian-American writer living in New York.
  • Iraq is dealing with increased currency smuggling, which has led to the Iraqi dinar’s depreciation. It is suspected that Iran is using its allies in Iraq to acquire dollars and the drain is weakening the Iraqi currency.
  • Although Russia and China have publicly declared their strong alliance, in reality, the two nations don’t necessarily align in certain areas. One of the more contentious areas is in central Asia.  Since these regions were formerly part of the Soviet Union, Russia tends to think of the “stans” as part of its sphere of influence.  However, China’s goal of building a Eurasian bloc, expressed by its “belt and road” project, means that China would like these nations to align with Beijing.  China has been using its economic heft to build relations, and we note that Russia is also making overtures to the stans by offering to sell natural gas in return for influence.  So far, the stans have been reluctant to fully sign on.  The central Asian nations are open to joint ventures but are reluctant to give Russia control of infrastructure.
  • The EU has agreed on a price cap for natural gas, while the Intercontinental Exchange is creating a parallel contract in London to match the TTF price in Amsterdam ostensibly to skirt the cap.
  • As Venezuela begins to emerge from sanctions, it is attempting to normalize its trading relationships. While under sanctions, it had used middlemen trading firms, likely for selling oil and to evade U.S. sanctions.  As conditions normalize, it is now demanding cash up front for exports in a sign that it is moving on from sanctions trading.

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • Polls show that the German public now supports nuclear power. Former Chancellor Merkel tried to phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, but high natural gas prices have changed public sentiment.
  • We are beginning to see price discounting of EVs. Tesla (TSLA, $169.34) started the process, and now Ford (F, $12.94) is following suit.  Some of this action is due to rising inventories, especially at Tesla, but another factor is that the cars may simply be too expensive to compete against gasoline-fired vehicles.
  • China is considering banning the exports of its solar technology. Since it dominates this industry, such an action would send up the cost of solar energy outside of China.
  • Researchers at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign have taken an abandoned oil well and turned it into a geothermal energy storage system. The researchers injected 120oF water into the well, and it maintained the temperature, suggesting that other abandoned wells could be repurposed for similar uses.
  • In response to U.S. subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act, the EU is planning to use tax credits to offer European businesses support for green energy.

[1] Californians would not be impressed.

  View PDF

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Secular Trends In Bond Yields (January 30, 2023)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be posted later this week.]

Secular trends in markets are trends that have an extended life.  Their length can be different across various markets, but they are usually measured in years and sometimes decades.  It is not uncommon for shorter-term trends to occur within the secular trend.  But, in a secular bull market, the cyclical trends usually result in “higher highs and higher lows.”  From an investing perspective, knowing what kind of secular trend is in place in a market can be quite helpful.  The idea of “buying the dip” is rewarded in secular bull markets as downcycles offer buying opportunities.  The opposite notion, “selling the rallies,” makes sense in secular downtrends.

What causes secular trends?  Usually, it is a set of macroeconomic conditions that foster the trend.  These macroeconomic conditions can include growth and inflation trends and are often bolstered by policy.  Detecting reversals in secular trends is difficult[1] as history shows that often the underlying factors that supported a secular trend begin to deteriorate well before the market trend changes.  Some of this extension of the trend is simple inertia, while other times, even though the underlying factors are weakening, the factors that support a new and different trend are not yet in place.  Markets are often driven by narratives,[2] which can then become articles of faith to investors.  If these narratives become imbedded, they can make it hard to see when conditions change.  Complicating matters is that if a secular trend lasts long enough, a large number of investors may have no experience with any other type of trend.  If investors lack personal experience or a foundation in history, the change in trend can be difficult to manage.

There is increasing evidence, in our opinion, that the secular downtrend in long-duration Treasury yields has ended.  The chart provided shows the 10-year T-note yield since 1921.  We have regressed time trends through periods when we estimate that a secular trend was in place.  The bands around the trend reflect a standard error above and below the estimated trend.  Over the past 102 years, we have identified three secular trends.  Clearly, these trends are persistent, and when changes do occur, they definitely matter.

Clearly, it is difficult to know in real time when a secular trend has changed.  Note that in 1931, there was a pop in yields that would have looked big enough to raise concerns that a secular reversal was underway.  However, yields subsequently declined and the downtrend remained in place.  Also, when the uptrend developed in the late 1940s, it probably wasn’t obvious that a trend change was in place for at least five years after the low in the former downtrend had occurred.  The difficulty that dealers had in selling those T-notes yielding more than 15% in 1981 is legendary.  Given the outsized move in yields from 1980-85, we didn’t attempt to calculate a trendline.  However, after a spectacular decline in yields from the peak in the autumn of 1981 to the bottom in July 2020, it appears to us that the secular downtrend is probably over.

What changed?  In our opinion, the U.S.-led hegemonic system, which began in the early 1980s but was bolstered by the end of the Cold War, has ended.  There are multiple causes for the end of this system.  Politically, the U.S. voting public has concluded that providing the reserve currency, which requires running persistent current account deficits, is too much of a burden.  When President Obama couldn’t pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it was clear that free trade and open investment, which were critical to keeping inflation under control, were in trouble.  These two free trade agreements would have put the U.S. in a dominant position to control global trade.  Another factor was growing political instability in the U.S., and although there are multiple facets to that instability, much of it is driven by inequality.  Ending globalization and addressing inequality will almost certainly bring with it higher inflation, which will then likely lead to a rise in interest rates.

The great unknown is the pace of that expected rise.  Given the long-term nature of secular cycles, there isn’t a large number of “turns” to observe.  Even looking at U.K. Consol yields doesn’t offer much insight because interest rate changes were abrupt until 1825 but have tended to be much more gradual since then.  We have been expecting the secular downtrend in yields to gradually shift to a steady uptrend, similar to what we saw from the late 1940s into the early 1970s.  However, that assumption doesn’t have a strong theoretical underpinning.  The notion of gradual shifts in trend is mostly based on Milton Friedman’s theory that investor inflation expectations are built over a lifetime, and thus, when inflation changes accelerate, investor response tends to be slow.  In other words, it takes a rather long time for investors to adjust to the new inflation regime.

What worries us about the current environment for long-duration yields is that there is still a rather large cohort of baby boomers who have memories of the 1970s inflation crisis and the consequent bond bear market.  It is possible that instead of a slow, steady rise in long-duration interest rates over the next decade or two, we could see a sharp increase.  So far, market action seems to favor that outcome.  If that is the case, the FOMC and Treasury could come into conflict.  A rapid rise in long-duration yields may lead to excessive interest expenses.  Although the Treasury could offset that by shortening their borrowing profile, another response could be to force the Federal Reserve to fix interest rates along the Treasury yield curve.  This policy was executed during WWII and continued into the early 1950s before the Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord was established in 1951.  This accord gave the Fed its independence.  This process, called “yield curve control,” would prevent the secular rise in long-duration yields in Treasuries (but not necessarily in other investment-grade products) but could be catastrophic for the dollar.

Due to these risks, we have shortened duration in our fixed income allocations.  So far, the long end has behaved rather well, but we think there is an elevated risk of an unexpected outcome.  Usually, long-duration fixed income is a good place to be in a recession.  That may be the case this time as well, but if we are in the midst of a secular change in yields, the usual rally in long duration may not occur.


[1] For our reflections on inflection points, see Reflections on Inflections, part 1 and part 2.

[2] For a good discussion on narratives and economics, see: Shiller, Robert. (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories go Viral and Drive Economic Events. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

 

View PDF