Author: Amanda Ahne
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Secular Trends In Bond Yields (January 30, 2023)
by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF
[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be posted later this week.]
Secular trends in markets are trends that have an extended life. Their length can be different across various markets, but they are usually measured in years and sometimes decades. It is not uncommon for shorter-term trends to occur within the secular trend. But, in a secular bull market, the cyclical trends usually result in “higher highs and higher lows.” From an investing perspective, knowing what kind of secular trend is in place in a market can be quite helpful. The idea of “buying the dip” is rewarded in secular bull markets as downcycles offer buying opportunities. The opposite notion, “selling the rallies,” makes sense in secular downtrends.
What causes secular trends? Usually, it is a set of macroeconomic conditions that foster the trend. These macroeconomic conditions can include growth and inflation trends and are often bolstered by policy. Detecting reversals in secular trends is difficult[1] as history shows that often the underlying factors that supported a secular trend begin to deteriorate well before the market trend changes. Some of this extension of the trend is simple inertia, while other times, even though the underlying factors are weakening, the factors that support a new and different trend are not yet in place. Markets are often driven by narratives,[2] which can then become articles of faith to investors. If these narratives become imbedded, they can make it hard to see when conditions change. Complicating matters is that if a secular trend lasts long enough, a large number of investors may have no experience with any other type of trend. If investors lack personal experience or a foundation in history, the change in trend can be difficult to manage.
There is increasing evidence, in our opinion, that the secular downtrend in long-duration Treasury yields has ended. The chart provided shows the 10-year T-note yield since 1921. We have regressed time trends through periods when we estimate that a secular trend was in place. The bands around the trend reflect a standard error above and below the estimated trend. Over the past 102 years, we have identified three secular trends. Clearly, these trends are persistent, and when changes do occur, they definitely matter.

Clearly, it is difficult to know in real time when a secular trend has changed. Note that in 1931, there was a pop in yields that would have looked big enough to raise concerns that a secular reversal was underway. However, yields subsequently declined and the downtrend remained in place. Also, when the uptrend developed in the late 1940s, it probably wasn’t obvious that a trend change was in place for at least five years after the low in the former downtrend had occurred. The difficulty that dealers had in selling those T-notes yielding more than 15% in 1981 is legendary. Given the outsized move in yields from 1980-85, we didn’t attempt to calculate a trendline. However, after a spectacular decline in yields from the peak in the autumn of 1981 to the bottom in July 2020, it appears to us that the secular downtrend is probably over.
What changed? In our opinion, the U.S.-led hegemonic system, which began in the early 1980s but was bolstered by the end of the Cold War, has ended. There are multiple causes for the end of this system. Politically, the U.S. voting public has concluded that providing the reserve currency, which requires running persistent current account deficits, is too much of a burden. When President Obama couldn’t pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it was clear that free trade and open investment, which were critical to keeping inflation under control, were in trouble. These two free trade agreements would have put the U.S. in a dominant position to control global trade. Another factor was growing political instability in the U.S., and although there are multiple facets to that instability, much of it is driven by inequality. Ending globalization and addressing inequality will almost certainly bring with it higher inflation, which will then likely lead to a rise in interest rates.
The great unknown is the pace of that expected rise. Given the long-term nature of secular cycles, there isn’t a large number of “turns” to observe. Even looking at U.K. Consol yields doesn’t offer much insight because interest rate changes were abrupt until 1825 but have tended to be much more gradual since then. We have been expecting the secular downtrend in yields to gradually shift to a steady uptrend, similar to what we saw from the late 1940s into the early 1970s. However, that assumption doesn’t have a strong theoretical underpinning. The notion of gradual shifts in trend is mostly based on Milton Friedman’s theory that investor inflation expectations are built over a lifetime, and thus, when inflation changes accelerate, investor response tends to be slow. In other words, it takes a rather long time for investors to adjust to the new inflation regime.
What worries us about the current environment for long-duration yields is that there is still a rather large cohort of baby boomers who have memories of the 1970s inflation crisis and the consequent bond bear market. It is possible that instead of a slow, steady rise in long-duration interest rates over the next decade or two, we could see a sharp increase. So far, market action seems to favor that outcome. If that is the case, the FOMC and Treasury could come into conflict. A rapid rise in long-duration yields may lead to excessive interest expenses. Although the Treasury could offset that by shortening their borrowing profile, another response could be to force the Federal Reserve to fix interest rates along the Treasury yield curve. This policy was executed during WWII and continued into the early 1950s before the Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord was established in 1951. This accord gave the Fed its independence. This process, called “yield curve control,” would prevent the secular rise in long-duration yields in Treasuries (but not necessarily in other investment-grade products) but could be catastrophic for the dollar.
Due to these risks, we have shortened duration in our fixed income allocations. So far, the long end has behaved rather well, but we think there is an elevated risk of an unexpected outcome. Usually, long-duration fixed income is a good place to be in a recession. That may be the case this time as well, but if we are in the midst of a secular change in yields, the usual rally in long duration may not occur.
[1] For our reflections on inflection points, see Reflections on Inflections, part 1 and part 2.
[2] For a good discussion on narratives and economics, see: Shiller, Robert. (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories go Viral and Drive Economic Events. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Business Cycle Report (January 26, 2023)
by Thomas Wash | PDF
The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities. The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis. Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.
The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in December. The latest report showed that seven out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.091 to -0.03, below the recession signal of +0.2500.
- Hawkish Fed policy weighed on financial indicators
- Most of the manufacturing indicators have dipped into contraction territory
- The labor market remains tight despite a slowdown in hiring

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.
Weekly Energy Update (January 26, 2023)
by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF
Crude oil prices appear to have based but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)
Crude oil inventories rose 0.5 mb compared to a 3.0 mb draw forecast. The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd. Exports rose 0.8 mbpd, while imports fell 1.0 mbpd. Refining activity rose 0.8% to 86.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)
The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories. Last week’s mostly steady injection is consistent with last year and seasonal patterns. We expect this year to mostly follow last year, meaning that the usual rise in inventories isn’t likely.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories. For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001. Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.07.
Market News:
- We are just over 11 months into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At this juncture, we don’t know what the outcome of the war will be. Ukraine has proven itself to be a formidable opponent and is clearly leveraging its “home field advantage.” At the same time, Russia is a larger nation and still has ample resources to throw at the conflict. But even with this uncertainty, it looks like global energy markets are unlikely to return their pre-war state.
- Europe now knows that Russia is an unreliable supplier of energy. Moscow would need to discount prices heavily to retake the European market share. After all, Russia used to supply 40% of EU natural gas, but now that number is down to 14.4%.
- Putin obviously wagered that the EU would not be willing to absorb the pain from the loss of Russian oil and natural gas. He might have been right, but in a fascinating twist of fate, a mild winter has allowed Europe to see a sharp drop in natural gas prices. Russia, for centuries, has relied on winter as its ultimate defense against invaders. Now, winter has, at best, postponed Russia’s leverage over Europe. As supply chains adjust, Moscow’s leverage may be permanently reduced.
- Russian oil has to go somewhere, and it has mostly flowed to India and China in a clear benefit to those nations. This has, however, reduced market share for Middle Eastern oil producers, and we wait to see their response.
- Even with these expanded markets, it is highly likely that Russia will lose market share on global markets and eventually be forced to shut-in production. Complicating matters further is that that the price cap is beginning to reduce Russia’s revenues. Washington’s goal with the price cap was this reduction in revenues, but it was also meant to keep oil supplies ample. Thus, it set a price high enough to keep Russia producing, but low enough to “hurt.” It’s quite possible that the price is set too low.
- On February 5, the EU will begin a price capping system on Russian oil products, along with an outright ban on Russian diesel. However, the actual setting of the caps hasn’t been resolved.
- Although the U.S. still imports crude oil and products, the net figure is increasingly positive, meaning that the U.S. is a net exporter of oil and products. As exports increase in importance, the goals of domestic energy security will clash with the oil industry’s revenue and profitability.
- OPEC+ is expected to keep production targets unchanged when it meets next Tuesday. The cartel is taking a “wait and see” approach to the crosscurrents of China’s reopening and a looming global slowdown.
- There are increasing reports that drilling activity is beginning to increase as high prices may finally be triggering a supply response. The DOE is forecasting that U.S. production will average 12.4 mbpd this year and 12.8 mbpd next year.
- Freeport LNG has announced its plant repairs are complete and the company is preparing to restart operations. Last year, the plant suffered a major accident which reduced operations for several months. The return of this liquification plant is a bullish factor for U.S. natural gas prices.
- China’s electricity officials warn that economic recovery in the post-COVID era will boost electricity needs. This will lift demand for coal and LNG.
- China oil trading firm Unipec, the trading arm of Sinopec (6000028, CNY, 4.54), is reported to be aggressively buying crude oil. It isn’t clear if it is buying the crude for China or merely reselling it. In 2022, China’s oil imports declined from the previous year, but with COVID restrictions being lifted, we may be seeing Chinese firms prepare for higher consumption. Imports from Malaysia have recently hit a new record.
- Japan’s oil imports have increased for the first time in a decade.
- China has a large, but mostly inefficient, refining industry. Unlike most areas of the world, it is increasing its refining capacity, which could mean China will become a critical source of refined products. Meanwhile, U.S. refining margins are rising, in part due to the continued slow recovery from the late December cold snap.
Geopolitical News:
- Pakistan and Russia, Cold War enemies, are looking at an agreement where Russia would supply Pakistan with oil. Pakistan has suffered from being outbid by Europe for oil and LNG. Russia would not only supply oil to the country but has also hinted that it would take payment in a “friendly” currency, likely CNY. As U.S./Pakistan relations have cooled, the country has suffered a dollar shortage. However, Pakistan appears to want Russian oil under the price cap regime, which may not appeal to Moscow. This deal highlights the emerging blocs that we have been discussing over the past year.
- The U.S. has added additional sanctions on elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for the body’s suppression of recent protests. The U.S. is also increasing pressure on China to end its purchases of Iranian oil. We doubt China will comply, but the pressure might cap the amount of oil China purchases from Iran.
Alternative Energy/Policy News:
- There are reports that wind turbines are falling over as structural problems are emerging.
- This chart shows the impact of France’s nuclear power on fossil fuel consumption. It shows that, at least for electricity, nuclear power can displace fossil fuels.

- The U.S. is extending the life of its aging nuclear power plants.
- Recently, there was a reported breakthrough in fusion energy. Although we think the new information is interesting, it will be a long time before such power could be commercialized. However, the U.S. is offering subsidies for firms working on this potential power source, and European companies are considering moving to the U.S. to capture this support.
- Although the U.S. and other nations are taking steps to build a domestic auto battery industry, in reality, China is expected to maintain its dominant position.
- Another metal that has been overlooked in battery production is graphite. It comes from two sources—man made and mined. The former is produced from oil, mostly in China (again!), while mined sources have mostly been underdeveloped. There is growing interest in the mined sources, which are in short supply.
- Lithium miners remain optimistic about demand and future earnings.
- In response to the Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA) green energy subsidy measures, EU industries are asking for similar subsidies. This is partly in response to U.S. governors wooing European green energy firms to build factories in the U.S. to take advantage of the subsidies in the act.
- An interesting political sidelight to the IRA is that much of the green industry subsidies are benefiting Republican-controlled states. It’s simply a matter of geography as ample wind and solar resources are found across the southern tier, which are mostly GOP states. Although the GOP coalition includes extractive industries, the green subsidies may stay in place even with a change in government in the White House since the affected states won’t want to lose the support.
- The IRA also has generous subsidies for EV buyers, but they are limited to domestically produced cars and batteries. There has been growing pressure on Washington to ease these restrictions, but Manchin (D-WV) is opposing such changes and is pushing to delay the implementation of the subsidies.
Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The New German Problem (January 23, 2023)
Thomas Wash | PDF
When times are tough, you discover who your real friends are, just ask the European Union. From 1860 to 1945, Germany struggled to keep the peace with its neighbors. Commodity-deprived and lacking natural barriers, Germany has sought to impose its will throughout Europe to protect itself from being invaded or cut off from mineral resources. The European Union (EU) and the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were eventually set up to mitigate this problem, but Germany’s unusual size and export needs created other issues.
Germany’s integration into the EU was designed to ensure that German interests were aligned with the West. However, things didn’t necessarily turn out that way. A decade ago, during the European debt crisis, the Germans lambasted southern European countries for being unable to repay the money they had loaned them. Germany built the Gazprom 2 pipeline with Russia against the wishes of the U.S., and its decision to sell a major port to China has drawn the ire of France. In short, Germany never truly committed itself to the European project.
The war in Ukraine has made Germany’s ambivalence unpalatable to its Western allies as the group gears up to take on a rising China and an aggressive Russia. Although it appears that Germany is attempting to maintain its neutrality, it isn’t clear whether this is possible, given the country’s size and influence. This report begins with a discussion on Germany’s conflicting loyalties, reviewing the country’s attempts to manage its relationships with its Western allies as well as China and Russia. Next, we consider how Germany has adapted to the changing geopolitical landscape, and we conclude with market ramifications.
The associated podcast episode for this report will be available later this week.
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – #90 “The Master of Surprise” (Posted 1/20/23)
Weekly Energy Update (January 20, 2023)
by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF
Crude oil prices are trying to base but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)
Crude oil inventories rose 8.4 mb compared to a 2.0 mb draw forecast. The SPR was unchanged, the first time since the reporting week of May 20, 2022. The unusually large build was caused by slower than expected recovery in refinery operations.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd. Exports rose 1.7 mbpd, while imports rose 0.5 mbpd. Refining activity rose 1.2% to 85.3% of capacity. The Christmas cold snap closed in a significant level of refining activity, and the industry is slowly recovering.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)
The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories. Last week’s jump in inventory means we are starting the year off with well above average inventory injections. The chart does show that the usual seasonal pattern was not followed last year. This is because the average still reflects the restrictions on U.S. oil exports whereas there isn’t much of a discernable pattern to this data now that exports are allowed.
Th chart below shows the sharp drop and partial recovery in refining operations. Usually, we do see some refinery maintenance this time of year, which will end in early February. Thus, we may not see a full recovery in refinery operations until later in the quarter.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories. For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001. Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.07.
Market News:
- As the government’s SPR sales begin to wind down, the potential for higher prices has increased. We do expect a resumption of sales if oil prices threaten $100 per barrel, but it is unlikely that we will see another large sale just because prices are high. We believe that the SPR sale was an underappreciated bearish factor last year, and if we are correct, an end to selling will likely be more bullish than expected.
- It is our position that the SPR will never be refilled to its +600 mb level last seen before the recent sales. The structure that the Biden administration has put in place to buy oil makes it very unlikely that purchases will occur.
- The IEA is warning that the reopening of China will lift global oil demand to a new record.
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is kicking off investment into the mining sector, likely to diversify its economy away from oil and gas just in case demand for these products fall as green energy expands. The $15 billion starter fund should boost mining investment and will likely support the sector.
- Saudi Arabia, due to cost structure and low emissions from production, believes it will be the last oil producer standing, even as the world moves away from fossil fuels.
- In another effort to diversify its energy sources, one that will be most controversial, the KSA has indicated that it will use its domestic uranium to complete the nuclear fuel cycle. In theory, doing so could give the country the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons. Given the advanced status of Iran’s program coupled with uncertainty surrounding the U.S. security guarantee, this claim could further raise risks in the region.
- The history of oil is littered with “we are running out” narratives. Daniel Yergin’s The Prize is perhaps the best history of the industry, and at several junctures, the accepted wisdom was that the age of oil was ending because all the fields had been tapped. What history shows is that supply shortages lift prices, increasing not just exploration activity but also new technologies. Since oil was discovered in 1859, this cycle has been in place. Thus, when the Financial Times runs a story about the end of shale, we take it with a bit of skepticism. In some respects, the story might be right if current conditions remain in place, but, those conditions probably won’t last. The FT story and the EIA’s short-term forecast for production are predicated on prices staying about where they are. However, as we have noted, if we assume around a 200 mb decline in commercial stockpiles, which would have occurred had it not been for the SPR draw, we would be looking at $135 per barrel for crude oil. Prices at that level will probably change behaviors. Supply issues, such as the lack of workers, capital constraints, regulatory constraints, etc., remain, but all these can be overcome with higher prices.
- There is an old adage in markets that “nothing cures high prices like high prices.” In market theory, price is a signal, and high prices tell consumers to conserve, but more importantly, they reward suppliers who bring product to market. As prices rise, especially in Europe, we are seeing a notable increase in exploration and development activity in the eastern Mediterranean. Large natural gas fields are being discovered in a difficult geopolitical environment. Offshore fields south of Cyprus have brought the involvement of Turkey, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, and even indirectly, Hamas. Although there has been some degree of cooperation, deep divisions remain; for example, Turkish and Greek vessels routinely threaten each other. Government instability can also upend agreements, but high prices will make it more likely that these obstacles will be overcome and will improve the supply situation in Europe and the Middle East.
Geopolitical News:
- The oil price cap is having a modest impact on Russian oil revenue. It is estimated that Russia has lost $172 million of revenue per day, cut from the typical $688 million per day. So, the loss is notable, but as designed, is not enough to completely cut off oil supplies.
- India remains an aggressive buyer of Russian crude oil. Chinese shippers are moving Russian oil to Asia.
- At Davos, participants are worried that it may be next to impossible to run the global economy without access to Russian oil, gas, and basic minerals. Without Russia, prices for these commodities will be much higher.
- Italy announced an effort to develop energy ties to Africa. In some respects, this is nothing new as Eni (E, $31.44), Italy’s energy champion, has had ties to Africa, especially to Libya. However, the company is now planning to expand ties to numerous other African nations in a bid to move away from Russia as an energy source.
- China and Australia have been at odds over the latter’s call for an international investigation over the origins of COVID-19. The dispute led to a decline in Chinese imports of Australian commodities. However, there does appear to be a softening of Beijing’s stance as China has lifted its ban on coal imports.
- Conoco-Phillips (COP, $120.16) is in talks to sell Venezuelan oil in the U.S. to recoup losses tied to Caracas’s decision to expropriate the company’s assets in 2007. We do note that Venezuela has halted oil exports (likely a temporary situation) as it tries to gain control over its exports. To avoid sanctions, Caracas has used numerous intermediaries to sell oil. One of the problems with using such resources is that they can be either unreliable or costly. As Venezuela “comes out of the cold,” it is trying to end its use of intermediaries, which should mean more revenue for the Maduro regime.
- For a number of reasons, Iranian oil exports are rising. We suspect that the U.S. has been quietly easing up on sanctions, but the biggest reason for the rise in exports is the simple fact that the world needs the oil.
- Iran has been a key supporter of the Assad regime. The Syrian government is dominated by Alawites, which could be considered an offshoot of Shiite Islam, making Assad a sympathetic figure. In addition, to the degree Iran can influence Iraq, the so-called “Shiite arc” ranging from Iran to Lebanon needs to include Syria in order for the arc to be completed. And so, Iran has not just supplied Syria with military support, it has also provided economic support as well. However, there are always limits to friendship. As Iran is able to sell more oil on the world market at higher prices, it has ended its practice of selling deeply discounted oil to Syria, leading to further problems for the Syrian economy.
- In a move that will not sit well in Tehran, the Iraqi PM Mohammed al-Sudani, wants an “indefinite” U.S. troop presence, ostensibly, to counter ISIS.
- Iran executed a British citizen accused of spying. Tehran’s decision has angered Westminster.
- The Iranian government is issuing new rules on the hijab. The regime wants to leave the rule in place but soften the penalties.
Alternative Energy/Policy News:
- The IEA has issued its annual report on the state of energy technology, which skews toward green energy production. There are a number of takeaways but the one that caught our attention is China’s dominance in the production of components for these products. If the West is going to develop these energy sources, a massive level of investment will be required.
- Sweden announced it has discovered a large deposit of rare earths. Rare earths are not really all that rare, although finding concentrated deposits can be a challenge. The mining of such products, however, is environmentally difficult and the processing even more so. Thus, the challenge of overcoming China in this area is, to some degree, tied to either making the process cleaner (and likely more expensive) or accepting the environmental degradation.
- China’s dominance in lithium is seen in the chart below.

(Source: IEA)
- As this chart shows, China’s dominance in processing rare earths and lithium is a much bigger issue than the mining of ores.
- The U.S. government is supporting lithium mining in the U.S.
- The China-based solar panel firm JA Solar (002459, CNY, 64.10) announced it will build a factory in Phoenix. The factory will produce two gigawatts of panels a year, adding to the 4.5 GW capacity already in place in the U.S. The fact that a Chinese firm is making an investment in the U.S. does indicate that Beijing is trying to keep market access to the U.S. open. Japan did something similar in the late 1980s
- One of the well-known problems of wind and solar power is its intermittency. As evidence, Chinese officials are ordering rooftop solar panels to be shut off during the Chinese New Year celebrations. The holiday will reduce demand and there are fears that solar panels will produce more power than needed.
- As part of the Inflation Reduction Act, the U.S. is supporting subsidies to EV firms. European car makers have been upset about this development, and the EU is complaining that U.S. officials are trying to woo European firms to expand their operations in the U.S. in order to acquire the subsidies. Now, Germany announced that it would support EU-wide subsidies to counter the U.S. action, something the German automakers have been calling for. In a sense, EV development is being imbedded into the industrial policies of the U.S. and EU.
- Although EVs get lots of attention in terms of reducing oil consumption in transport, efficiency gains far outpace electrics in terms of cutting demand.
- Changes in farming practices could reduce carbon in the atmosphere. Essentially, farmland could become a “carbon sink” where CO2 would be captured by plants and held in the ground. Although agriculture firms are trying to help farmers acquire carbon credits, farmers argue that the benefits from the credits are not enough yet to merit changing farm practices.
Keller Quarterly (January 2023)
Letter to Investors | PDF
A new year is underway, and we wish you and yours all the best in 2023! The stock market certainly seems to be optimistic about the new year: the S&P 500 is up 4.1% through its first full two weeks of 2023 and it’s up 14.5% from the 52-week low on October 13. Without repeating too much of my October letter, you know that we believe a recession is likely in the current year. In fact, that seems to be the consensus among Wall Street economists. So, why the positive market behavior?
Financial markets are not independent entities, but rather represent the collective behaviors of thousands of participants, each of whom is making their best guess about the future. When most of those participants expect the same thing to occur, guess what? It’s “in the market,” as we say; that is, the event is almost certainly reflected in market prices. In my opinion, the stock market spent the middle six months of last year discounting the probability of a 2023 recession.
It remains to be seen whether this recession will be shallow, normal, or deep. Our expectation is that it will be shallow-to-normal, which seems to concur with the consensus view, judging by the market’s behavior. Why is that? The U.S. consumer appears to be in better shape than usual at this point in the cycle. Relatively low unemployment rates mean that most people who want a job have one, consumer debt relative to household cash and income is relatively low, and the banking system appears to be in very good shape relative to past cycles. One reason for this good condition is that the last recession was just three years ago (2020), meaning there hasn’t been a lot of time for businesses and consumers to over-extend themselves. In addition, the extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus the economy received in the wake of the pandemic-induced recession allowed many to reduce their debts and “get their houses in order.”
On the other hand, could the recession be deeper? Yes, it is possible that the Fed will raise the fed funds rate beyond what the market presently expects (that is, more than 5.0% to 5.5%), which might cause a worse recession. Geopolitical factors, especially those involving Russia or China, could intervene and deepen a recession. But, at this point, we believe those are lower probability events. The stock market tends to look six to 12 months into the future and, in our opinion, the market is presently looking past the recession to what late 2023 and even 2024 might look like. Our crystal ball gets cloudy that far out, but, as we noted last quarter, we see other trends in place today that will likely continue for many years.
Notably, we expect the average rate of inflation over the next 10 years to be meaningfully higher than the last 10 years. Inflation is “too much money chasing too few goods.” Politicians and economists talk incessantly about the “too much money” part of that definition. Thus, they obsess over money supply and monetary stimulus. What they forget is that the “too few goods” side of the definition is usually the key determinant of inflation. When ever-increasing globalization was dramatically increasing the supply of goods and lowering their cost (from approximately 1980 to 2015), inflation trended lower and stayed there. Once globalization peaked, however, the trend began to change. Throw in the disruptions due to a pandemic and a war and you have a real supply problem, otherwise known as inflation. While the pandemic is winding down and the war will eventually end, deglobalization is here to stay.
As a result, we expect inflation to average 4% or more for the long-term, about double the prior long-term rate. That’s what we’re factoring into our thinking. It is a headwind for investment returns, to be sure, but, as we’ve communicated in prior letters, this is not an environment unknown to us. Our investment strategies and security selection processes were all developed with higher inflation in mind because we are old enough to have experienced it before.
We appreciate your confidence in us.
Gratefully,
Mark A. Keller, CFA
CEO and Chief Investment Officer
Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Master of Surprise (January 17, 2023)
by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF
[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be delayed until Friday, January 20.]
They don’t call Haruhiko Kuroda the “Master of Surprise” for nothing. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor lifted the yield cap on 10-year Japanese government bonds (JGB) by 25 bps last month. The bank will now allow the 10-year yield to fluctuate between -0.50% and +0.50% before intervening in the market. The move jolted markets as it paved the way for possible future monetary tightening. Because Japan is the world’s largest creditor, an increase in Japanese yields could attract capital from abroad back to the mainland. As a result, the policy change could lead to an overall increase in borrowing costs for other countries, including the U.S., and could also affect exchange rates.

The JPY surged as much as 5% against the dollar on the day following the BOJ’s surprising decision. This was the JPY’s largest gain since the New York Fed and BOJ joined forces to prop up the currency in 1998. The rise in the currency reflects investor sentiment that the BOJ is getting ready to tighten its monetary policy. The central bank has intervened in bond markets to keep its bond-yield rates around 0%. Attempts by speculators to push the BOJ to adjust its policy prematurely have typically ended in tears as the bank defended its caps aggressively and burnished the short JGB trade as “the widow-maker” in the process.
Although the BOJ maintains that the move was not designed to alter future monetary policy, it is difficult to discern another motive. The latest meeting summary showed that BOJ officials raised their cap to address issues within their bond market. Days before the decision, a BOJ survey revealed that investors’ perceptions of bond market functionality fell to a record low. Additionally, the 10-year JGB failed to trade for four straight days at one point between the October and December meetings, signaling a decline in liquidity. However, the lack of telegraphing, especially given the bank’s sizable bond holding, suggests that the decision may have been more nuanced.
BOJ Governor Kuroda’s term ends on April 8. The two front-runners to succeed him are former BOJ Deputy Governor Hiroshi Nakaso and current Deputy Governor Masayoshi Amamiya. The latter is seen as more of a dove, but both are expected to tighten policy. By raising the yield cap, Kuroda gave his successor more wiggle room to navigate a way forward without rattling markets. The policy adjustment allows the future head of the BOJ to chart their own path forward without the cloud of their predecessor.
The biggest obstacle preventing further tightening is the country’s substantial debt burden. Japan has the largest government debt-to-GDP ratio among advanced economies at 206%. It has been able to manage this burden through its yield-curve control. Japan’s effective interest was 0.6% in 2021, much lower than many of its peers. In contrast, the effective interest rate on Italian debt was 2.3% in 2021, while the U.S. paid 1.6% during that period. Given the size of the debt, a small increase in interest rates could still lead to a sizable jump in debt payments. Although manageable in the long term, a 100-bps rise in interest rates would add 3% to the government debt-to-GDP ratio by 2025, according to Fitch Ratings Agency.
Higher interest rates in Japan could also lift borrowing costs for other countries. An increase in the yield on Japanese sovereigns incentivizes Japanese investors to bring capital home, leading to higher interest rates for the rest of the world. The U.S. is particularly vulnerable. Higher yields on JGB will attract interest from Japanese investors, who are the largest holders of U.S. Treasuries outside of America itself. As a result, the increase in Japanese interest rates could also lead to an increase in U.S. rates.
Although the markets anticipate that the BOJ will tighten policy more in 2023, they are not completely certain. We suspect that Japan’s decision to raise its yield cap by 25 bps had more to do with giving Kuroda’s successor more flexibility to conduct policy. That said, it appears that either candidate expected to take over, Hiroshi Nakaso or Masayoshi Amamiya, is likely to tighten. If correct, this should help boost financial sector equities internationally as it makes it easier for banks to profit from lending.

