Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The 2023 Geopolitical Outlook (December 12, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady & Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(This is the last BWGR of 2022; the next report will be published on January 9, 2023.)

As is our custom, in mid-December, we publish our geopolitical outlook for the upcoming year.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for 2023.  It is not designed to be an exhaustive list; instead, it focuses on the big-picture conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: The Big Picture

Issue #2: The Expanding, Strengthening State and Populism

Issue #3: China Learns to Lead a Bloc

Issue #4: The Race for Space

Issue #5: The Brittleness of Authoritarianism

Read the full report

The associated podcast episode for this report will be available next week.

Weekly Energy Update (December 8, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices continue to come under pressure on worries over economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 5.2 mb compared to a 3.9 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 2.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 7.3 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 12.2 mbpd.  Exports fell 1.5 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 95.5% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs in early Q4.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s draw takes inventories further below the seasonal average, though perhaps the most important takeaway is that the usual seasonal pattern in inventory is breaking down.

Shortly after the war started, we stopped reporting on our basic oil model that uses commercial inventory and the EUR for independent variables.  We have updated that model, which puts fair value at $73.60 per barrel.  We are currently trading near fair value for the first time since the war began.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.07.

The CapAt long last, the EU has finally agreed on a price cap plan for Russian oil, pending Poland’s approval tomorrow.  The cap price is $60 per barrel, and since the current Urals price is around that level, it’s possible that not much will change.  The price was below what the Eastern Europeans were pushing for—Poland wanted a $30 price.  The U.S., however, was afraid that a price that low, which would effectively ban Russian oil exports, would trigger a major price rally and harm the world (and U.S.) economy.  The current price won’t really stop Russian exports if Russia wants to sell the oil.  Russia’s initial reaction is to refuse to sell oil to nations using the price cap.  We also note that, effective last Monday, the EU and U.K. will stop seaborne oil imports from Russia, which will have a more material impact on the oil markets.  The most likely market reaction is volatility.  The initial reaction to the cap and the OPEC+ decision was a sharp rise in oil prices, but that reaction faded earlier this week.

Market News:

  • The White House is seeking to halt SPR sales in the coming years. Congress has tended to use the SPR as a sort of budget “piggy bank” to allow for funding of various projects.  Thus, various sales have already been authorized for future years.  However, with the SPR being drained by the sales completed due to the war in Ukraine, the administration now wants to halt those future sales.  So far, we are not seeing any programs put in place to refill the reserve, but this action does suggest growing concern about the sales.
  • Recent data suggests that U.S. drilling activity remains lackluster. Due to regulatory and investment constraints, the U.S. oil and gas industry thus far has not reacted strongly to high oil prices.  We expect that to continue.
  • The fertilizer market has been a major concern since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both nations are major producers of fertilizers and feedstock for the product.  The UN says that it is near a deal that would allow Russia to export ammonia via a Ukrainian pipeline.  Ammonia is a key element for the economy and resuming this supply is important.  We note that fertilizer prices have been falling recently as markets adjusted to high prices, and the UN news will likely support further price declines.
  • One of our firm’s positions is that the unwinding of U.S. hegemony will lead to supply disruptions and trigger hoarding. Confirming this assertion is an announcement that Japan is building a strategic reserve for natural gas.  Japan gets nearly all of its natural gas from LNG and has faced higher prices as European demand for LNG has soared due to the war.
  • High prices and weak economic activity have reduced EU natural gas demand.
  • If China continues to ease COVID restrictions, oil prices should benefit.
  • Saudi Arabia announced it has discovered two new natural gas fields.
  • A 2019 study by the NBER showed that lower heating costs prevent winter deaths. The study suggested that the shale gas revolution likely saved 11k lives in the U.S.  If the study is correct, high heating prices may lead to higher mortality rates in Europe this winter.
  • Ethanol blending has hit new records.
  • Mild temps are bearish for natural gas prices. Meanwhile, U.S. LNG projects are being funded rapidly, although there are concerns that the industry won’t be able to find enough gas to match these projects.
  • Glencore (GLNCY, $13.31) is planning to accelerate coal mine closures. The closures have little to do with profitability but are instead being done to meet emissions targets.  The IEA is forecasting that renewables will overtake coal by 2025.
  • Russia and China have completed a pipeline to Shanghai.
  • New England authorities are warning that if the weather is unusually cold, rolling blackouts might occur. Some of the problem is tied to the Jones Act.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  View PDF

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Forecasting Financial Stress (December 5, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be delayed until 12/12. Also, this report will go on holiday hiatus following today’s report; the next report will be published on January 16, 2023.]

One of the challenges of market strategy is the problem of financial stress.  In colloquial terms, the “Fed raises rates until something breaks.”  The problem is that the “something-breaks” event is difficult to predict in terms of when.  There are numerous financial stress and conditions indices that suggest rising financial tensions.  These tell us when conditions are such that problems might develop, but they don’t help us much with when a problem is likely to emerge.

This chart shows the Chicago FRB’s National Financial Conditions Index (CNFCI).  A reading of zero shows normal conditions, while any number less than zero implies favorable conditions.  Before mid-year 1998, financial conditions were highly correlated to the fed funds rate.  Since 1998, the two series have become almost entirely uncorrelated.  In 1998, the U.S. passed the Financial Services Modernization Act, often named for its authors, Senators Gramm, Leach, and Bliley.  This act changed the nature of the financial system as it was mostly bank-financed prior to this legislation.  The 1998 act allowed other financial participants to engage in lending and other bank-like activities.  Essentially, the U.S. financial system became money market-financed after 1998.

This change was designed to improve the efficiency of the financial system, but it also changed the “lender of last resort” function of the Federal Reserve.  Before 1998, if the FOMC raised rates, financial conditions deteriorated, but that problem could be easily addressed with rate cuts.  But note that after 1998, the fed funds rate became ineffective in either improving or weakening financial conditions.  The 2004-09 period is the best example of this problem as the FOMC raised rates with little impact on financial conditions.  Once a crisis developed (shown as a jump in the CNFCI), it took very aggressive rate cuts and promises to keep rates low for a long period of time before conditions improved.  Something similar developed in 2020 around the pandemic.

Currently, we are in a tightening cycle.  The CNFCI has increased but remains below zero. However, the worry remains that if the FOMC keeps raising rates, “something will break” which is represented by a spike in the index.  The notion of the “Fed pivot” is based on the expectation that as conditions deteriorate, the Fed will rapidly reverse policy tightening, which would be bullish for financial assets.  If something breaking is a prerequisite for the pivot, it would be useful to have some idea of when that might occur.

One way we attempt to determine when a tightening cycle may be poised to end is to compare the fed funds target to the implied three-month LIBOR rate from the Eurodollar futures market.

LIBOR rates represent funding costs for money market lending.  In general, because this collateral or the counterparties are not necessarily guaranteed by the government, it is reasonable to expect that the LIBOR rate should exceed the fed funds target.  And, as the top line of the chart indicates, most of the time it does.  However, on occasion, the spread inverts.  We have placed vertical lines on the above chart showing when these inversions have occurred.  Inversion suggests that the financial markets have assessed that the FOMC has raised rates enough and should either stop raising rates or consider cutting them.  In the 1990s, during the Greenspan Fed, rates were cut quickly when this spread inverted.  And, for the most part, he supervised a long expansion and even the 2001 recession was considered rather mild.  Contrast that with the Bernanke Fed’s decision to hold rates steady for an extended period even though the Eurodollar/fed funds spread had become inverted.  The recession that followed was very deep and was accompanied by a financial crisis.

To further analyze the impact of the spread of the implied LIBOR rate to fed funds, we created the below chart.

The lower part of this chart shows the fed funds/implied LIBOR spread.  We have placed a purple line at the -40 bps level, and when this level is penetrated, it has tended to signal that a financial accident is more likely.  In the past two events, an inversion below the -40 bps line was followed by a crisis six to 12 months later.  We are not at that point yet, but if the FOMC moves the fed funds target up by 50 bps in mid-December, the chances increase that we will see the spread invert below this level.

The Fed has two formal mandates and one universal mandate.  Its two formal mandates are full employment and low inflation.  These are legislated by Congress and defined by the Fed, but all central banks exist to support the functioning of financial markets.  We are seeing conditions evolve to a point where the FOMC may need to stop tightening or even ease in order to address the universal mandate.  However, that may force the Fed to ease before it contains inflation.  We suspect that the Fed will probably attempt to bring down inflation while hoping to avoid a financial problem.  In fact, the recent signal that the pace of hikes will slow may be designed to avoid an “accident.”  By moving less aggressively, we surmise that the FOMC hopes it can still bring down inflation and avoid a financial crisis. Nevertheless, the chances of a financial accident appear poised to grow in the coming months.

View PDF

Weekly Energy Update (December 1, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices have been falling on fears of weaker Chinese demand due to COVID issues.  We note that the futures market structure has moved into contango, where the deferred contracts trade at a premium to the spot.  This is a bearish market structure.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 12.6 mb compared to a 3.1 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 1.4 mb, meaning the net draw was 14.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.1 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.7 mbpd, while imports fell 1.0 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.3% to 95.2% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw takes inventories below the seasonal average, though perhaps the most important takeaway is that the usual seasonal pattern in inventory is breaking down.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $108.94.

 Refinery runs are elevated as refiners take advantage of favorable crack spreads.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

 Market News:

  • This is a major week for global oil markets. On December 5, the EU is expected to implement its sanctions on Russian oil exports, specifically targeting the insurance and financing infrastructure of the oil trade.  Tied to these sanctions is U.S. support for a price cap.  The goal of the EU sanctions is to cut Russian oil from world markets and undermine Russia’s ability to conduct the war in Ukraine.  The goal of the price cap is to allow some level of Russian oil flows but at reduced prices.  So far, Moscow says it won’t sell oil under the price cap system.  In addition, the EU hasn’t been able to decide on a price since more hawkish nations want a low price, while others, who are less hawkish, want something closer to the market price.
    • The consensus is that the price cap won’t work because, generally speaking, a consumer can’t usually dictate what the price of a product will be. As consumers, we may decide not to buy at a given price, but we can’t go to the seller and simply set the price.  After all, if we could do that, it would literally be a “free world”!  However, if a buyer has market power, then they can influence the price that sellers can get for their product.  OPEC+ is worried that the price cap mechanism will be turned on them, and that the cap could evolve into a “buyer’s cartel.”  That is a risk, but we doubt that will occur.  In this specific case, however, Russia is deeply vulnerable to the sanctions and cap.  Why?  Russia is dependent on foreign tankers and especially foreign insurance and financing to move oil.  Russian ports can’t handle the largest crude carriers and the supply of smaller vessels is tight. Also, despite its best efforts, Russia has not been able to duplicate the existing insurance and financing system for oil sales, which reduces the number of tankers available to carry Russian oil.  That doesn’t mean there are not rogue carriers, but they are not big enough to matter much.
    • The U.S. wants the cap because it fears that the EU plan will result in a spike in oil prices. It wants to keep Russian oil flowing but reduce the revenue Russia receives.  If Russia holds to the policy that it won’t honor the price cap, it could easily find itself in a situation where it is forced to close in production, and once shut in, that production may be lost indefinitely.  If that occurs, oil prices could jump.
    • It should be noted that Russia is finding fewer takers of its oil, and the Urals benchmark price has fallen to around $52 per barrel. So, even without a cap, the expectations of one seem to be having an impact.
  • Although OPEC+ was making noises about cutting production in the face of weak prices, it looks like the cartel is more likely to maintain current production targets.
  • Tensions within the ruling coalition have led Norway to delay any new oil and gas leases until 2025, a blow to European energy supplies.
  • As diesel prices soar, the “magic” of markets is starting to work. Consumption is easing, and refining operations are increasing, causing inventories to lift.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

  • However, this good news may still not be enough for New England to escape high prices and shortages.
  • Europeans have been complaining that the U.S. is profiting from the war in Ukraine[1] by pointing at the massive price differential between U.S. and EU gas prices. However, it turns out the profiteers are European.  Most LNG sold by the U.S. is based on the Henry Hub price, the benchmark for the CME futures contract.  Currently, that’s set at 115% plus $3.00 of the benchmark price.  However, the actual price in Europe is far higher; for example, a $6.00 per MMBTU price at the Henry Hub translates to a €32.59 MWH price.  European utilities are buying at that price and reselling the gas at nearly €119 MWH.
  • As global demand weakens and supply chains begin to improve, freight rates are falling rapidly, but that isn’t the case with oil tanker rates. High demand and the scramble to secure transportation before EU sanctions on Russian oil are in place are sending rates to record levels.
  • Japan is warning that global LNG supplies are sold out “for years,” but what they mean is that most LNG is sold on long-term contracts. That’s how the infrastructure for LNG is usually financed — a project aligns buyers on long-term contracts at a set price to pay for the build-out of the project and then sends the gas to the buyers regardless of the spot price.  Japanese buyers report that there are no long-term contracts available before 2026, meaning that the “marginal molecule” is being sold at spot rates.
  • Germany and Qatar have agreed to a 15-year supply deal for LNG.
  • There is growing evidence that the Middle East has reached oil capacity limits and shale oil production has not reacted to high oil prices as it has in the past. However, one bright spot for additional barrels is coming from deep-water offshore projects such as Brazil and Guyana.
  • Western Canada is seeing a jump in natural gas production and could become a significant supplier of LNG to the Asia-Pacific region.
  • Despite having what appears to be ample generating capacity, China suffers from regular blackouts. The reasons are complicated but involve the lack of market pricing and  regional distrust, which then leads to excess capacity construction.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:


[1] Among other general complaints.

[2] In fact, French President Macron is visiting the U.S. this week and subsidies are expected to be discussed.

  View PDF

Business Cycle Report (November 29, 2022)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in October. The latest report showed that five out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.1515 to +0.091, below the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Hawkish Fed expectations weighed on financial indicators
  • Production indicators are weakening due to a decline in business sentiment
  • Hiring is slowing but the labor market remains strong

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

Read the full report

Weekly Energy Update (November 17, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(The Weekly Energy Update will not be published next week due to Thanksgiving.  The report will return on December 1.)

 Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 5.4 mb compared to a 1.9 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 4.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 9.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.2 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports declined 0.41 mbpd, while imports rose 0.3 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.5% to 92.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw is takes inventories back to the seasonal average.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.63.

 

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • For the most part, we view COP-27 as environmental theater since without an enforcement mechanism, environmental promises are just that. However, we do note that there has been some movement to reduce coal usage in power production.
  • California voters did not support a measure to fund EV charging stations by raising taxes on high-income citizens. Without this funding, it isn’t clear how the state will prepare to shift from gasoline to electric vehicles.
  • Meanwhile, China’s share of the global EV market continues to grow.
    • BMW (BMWYY, $29.46) is building a $1.4 billion operation to expand battery production in China.
  • As biofuel research expands, there is a growing concern that without regulatory guidance, the potential for the fuel source will be hampered by inconsistent standards.
  • Separating hydrogen from water creates a clean (“green”) product. Unfortunately, it is also energy intensive and expensive.  Four U.S. nuclear power reactors are part of a study to see if nuclear power can be used to generate green hydrogen.  Meanwhile, a raft of startups are trying to develop other ways to bring down the cost of green hydrogen.
  • The U.S. has blocked 1,000 shipments of solar energy components from China on grounds that the products were made by slave labor. There have been rising tensions between the solar installation industry and the non-Chinese solar component industry.  The former wants the cheapest product it can find, while the latter wants to compete with China, the world’s low-cost producer.  As U.S./Chinese relations deteriorate, the non-Chinese production industry is seeing an opportunity.
  • Leaded fuel was used to counter engine knock, though, unfortunately, lead is highly toxic so it was phased out of gasoline in the U.S. over three decades ago. However, small aircraft were excluded from the move to unleaded fuels but are finally making the switch.
  • One of the problems of solar and wind energy is that it’s unreliable, so as it expands, utilities must still keep conventional capacity available for periods when the power generated from wind or solar is lacking. The expansion of wind and solar in the western U.S. is leading to reliability issues.
  • We are still in the early stages of battery technology. The current industry standard for EVs, the lithium-ion battery, has some flaws as it’s prone to fires, it’s expensive to produce, and it doesn’t have a long life.  But, in its favor, it does recharge quickly and is lightweight.  The next new thing may be the sodium-ion battery.  It’s a bit heavier than the lithium-ion battery, and not as energy dense. New technology, though, is showing rapid improvement.  If it flies, it would dramatically reduce the cost of EVs and have much faster recharging capabilities.  Better and cheaper batteries are likely the key to widespread EV adoption.
    • Asian battery producers have been reluctant to invest in Australian mining that would provide raw materials for batteries, putting the makers at risk of supply shortages.
    • EV makers are looking to vertically integrate their operations with miners of key battery materials and with battery manufactures to create secure supply chains.
    • China uses lithium-iron-phosphate batteries which are cheaper but have less range than batteries that use nickel.

  View PDF

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Impossible Trinity (November 14, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

The U.S. Dollar Index hit a 20-year high in September as the greenback gained against other global currencies. The climb in the U.S. dollar (USD) began in the post-pandemic recovery. Investors flocked to the greenback for safety as the U.S. economy outgrew its peers in the OECD. Aggressive policy tightening by the Federal Reserve accelerated the appreciation as U.S. dollar-denominated assets have become even more attractive for foreign investors. The strong pick-up in demand for the USD intensified inflationary pressures globally and could push other countries into recession.

With limited options, central banks and governments were forced to take extreme actions to prevent their currencies from depreciating. Throughout 2022, investors have penalized countries that failed to prioritize fiscal and monetary austerity to contain inflation. Examples include a controversial tax plan in the U.K., the European Central Bank’s stealth quantitative easing to maintain sovereign spreads within the eurozone, and Japan’s insistence on yield-curve control, which led to nosedives in those countries’ respective currencies. The resulting depreciation has made dollar-denominated imports more expensive, adding to price pressures. As a result, inflation rose to an all-time high in the eurozone and to multi-decade highs in Japan and the U.K.

The exchange rate volatility reflects the limitations of central banks and governments when conducting monetary and fiscal policy. Typically, policymakers have three options with macroeconomic policy: fixed exchange rates, sovereign central bank policy, or open capital markets. It is impossible to do all three simultaneously as it creates a phenomenon known as the impossible trinity, or the policy trilemma. In other words, policymakers can opt for a fixed exchange rate only by either giving up monetary sovereignty or restricting capital flows.[1]  Post-Bretton Woods, most developed economies chose to solve the predicament by opting for floating exchange rates. This choice allowed policymakers to have open capital markets and monetary sovereignty.

The problem with the post-Bretton Woods arrangement is that exchange rate levels affect macroeconomic policy goals. For example, a weak exchange rate can be inflationary, while a strong exchange rate can act as unwelcome policy tightening. Thus, extreme moves in exchange rate levels may become counterproductive to policy goals and may require a response to change the trend in an exchange rate. Unfortunately for policymakers, this is where the impossible trinity becomes a problem. During currency crises, emerging nations are notorious for implementing capital controls. However, developed economy policymakers have generally shied away from such controls, and this reluctance leaves them with only one policy option: they must cede sovereignty. For instance, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the European Central Bank have all accelerated their respective paces of rate hikes to keep up with the Federal Reserve. As a result, the decision to raise rates in line with the Federal Reserve has calmed the nerves of investors while simultaneously hurting economic growth.

Although the impossible trinity does describe the problem facing policymakers in a single country, there are multinational solutions to resolve the issue. The 1985 Plaza Accord, the 1987 Louvre Accord, and the 1995 Halifax Accord are all examples of international cooperation to address exchange rate divergences. The Plaza Accord was an agreement to address dollar strength. European and Japanese policymakers were reluctant to follow Federal Reserve policy rates as the Fed was addressing a serious inflation problem, while the other central banks were not facing the same issue.[2] However, the Fed’s monetary policy led to capital inflows and the rapid appreciation of the dollar. By the mid-1980s, the dollar’s strength was making U.S. manufacturing uncompetitive and was lifting foreign inflation. And so, in September 1985, the G-5 nations agreed to a coordinated policy response to weaken the dollar. In addition to direct intervention to weaken the dollar, the Fed cut policy rates as the other countries’ central banks raised policy rates. The dollar then reversed its trend.

One could argue that the trilemma was not really resolved but simply managed during these accords. In the Louvre Accord, for example, the policy actions of the Plaza Accord were reversed to halt the dollar’s depreciation. In a sense, policymakers agreed to a certain policy direction and worked in concert to achieve a particular goal, which was a change in the trend in exchange rates. Strictly speaking, all the central banks sacrificed sovereignty to resolve an exchange rate issue.

Policymakers, therefore, resolved the trilemma by allowing exchange rates to float within unspecified boundaries. When those boundaries are hit, central bankers are forced to give up monetary sovereignty until the exchange rates adjust to acceptable levels. The question facing markets now is if there is consensus among developed-market policymakers that the USD is too strong. So far, that consensus hasn’t emerged, but it is clear that Japanese authorities are not happy with the yen’s exchange rate but are continuing to maintain monetary sovereignty through selective intervention. History suggests such unilateral actions slow the “direction of travel” but don’t reverse the trend. If the Europeans are unhappy with the euro rate, they haven’t yet made it public. And, with U.S. policymakers mostly concerned with inflation reduction, there is little incentive to pressure the FOMC to cut rates.

That doesn’t mean there isn’t collateral damage coming from the exchange rate markets. The USD’s rise slashed an estimated $10 billion from corporate earnings for Q3 2022. Much of this pain was concentrated on U.S. firms with foreign revenue exposure, specifically in the tech sector. But so far, weakness in the tech sector has not been enough of an issue to support a policy change. Until U.S. policymakers think they have inflation under control, foreign policymakers  have to choose whether to allow their exchange rates to weaken further or adopt the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. Given the persistence of U.S. inflation, dollar strength is likely to continue.


[1] Bretton Woods, which was a system of fixed exchange rates, solved the problem through restricting capital flows.

[2] In the early 1980s, German CPI was around 5%, while U.S. CPI was 14.5%.

View PDF

Weekly Energy Update (November 10, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 3.9 mb compared to a 0.3 mb build forecast.  The SPR declined 3.6 mb, meaning the net build was 0.3 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.2 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports declined 0.41 mbpd, while imports rose 0.3 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.5% to 92.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $105.36.

 

 Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • Cop-27 is underway this week. We won’t have much to say because we doubt anything binding will emerge.  We do note that the U.S. is proposing a system of carbon credits that can be purchased by firms.  Although the idea makes some sense, it should be noted that no accreditation process has been created, which means it could be merely a form of greenwashing.
  • Canada has ordered three Chinese firms to exit the lithium mining sector, citing national security concerns.
  • U.S. spending for wind and solar power has been weak this year.
  • Geoengineering is the process of directly acting to offset various climate issues. For example, one way to cool the planet is to inject aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect sunlight back into space.  Geoengineering is controversial because the potential side effects are hard to predict, and those side effects might be “levied” against those who don’t benefit from the action.  Despite the controversy, DARPA is quietly funding various projects probably because the government wants to know how they would work if we were to reach a situation where such measures became necessary.
  • There are a number of new nuclear technologies being developed. Here is a primer on molten salt reactors.
  • Researchers claim a breakthrough related to creating renewable jet fuel.
  • Similarly, researchers in Singapore note that they have made the process of pulling hydrogen out of water more efficient by using a procedure involving light. Meanwhile, researchers at Rice University have devised a way to pull hydrogen from hydrogen sulfide (rotten egg gas), which is an unwanted byproduct of desulfurization in refining and natural gas processing.
  • One of the problems with expanding solar and wind power is that it takes up lots of space and the least costly place to acquire that space is rural areas. However, residents are cooling to these facilities, worried about the impact on farming, ranching, and property values.
  • U.S. automakers are lobbying for the Treasury to widen the nations for which EV components can be imported and thus be eligible for subsidies. We suspect this is to leave room for China to participate.
  • The EU is growing increasingly upset with the Inflation Reduction Act’s EV subsidy rules that restrict payments to consumers only if they buy vehicles mostly constructed in the U.S. European automakers wanted carve outs so they could participate, but the U.S. countered with “make your own subsidies.”  We could see an EU trade retaliation, but we doubt this will change U.S. policy.
  • Last week, we noted that the EU voted to end the sale of internal combustion engines in Europe by 2035. As regulators tally up the potential job losses, there are new calls to delay that transition.

  View PDF