Business Cycle Report (January 26, 2023)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in December. The latest report showed that seven out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.091 to -0.03, below the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Hawkish Fed policy weighed on financial indicators
  • Most of the manufacturing indicators have dipped into contraction territory
  • The labor market remains tight despite a slowdown in hiring

 

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (January 26, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to have based but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80-$82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 0.5 mb compared to a 3.0 mb draw forecast.  The SPR was unchanged.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.8 mbpd, while imports fell 1.0 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 0.8% to 86.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Last week’s mostly steady injection is consistent with last year and seasonal patterns.  We expect this year to mostly follow last year, meaning that the usual rise in inventories isn’t likely.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.07.

Market News:

  • We are just over 11 months into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At this juncture, we don’t know what the outcome of the war will be.  Ukraine has proven itself to be a formidable opponent and is clearly leveraging its “home field advantage.”  At the same time, Russia is a larger nation and still has ample resources to throw at the conflict.  But even with this uncertainty, it looks like global energy markets are unlikely to return their pre-war state.
    • Europe now knows that Russia is an unreliable supplier of energy. Moscow would need to discount prices heavily to retake the European market share.  After all, Russia used to supply 40% of EU natural gas, but now that number is down to 14.4%.
    • Putin obviously wagered that the EU would not be willing to absorb the pain from the loss of Russian oil and natural gas. He might have been right, but in a fascinating twist of fate, a mild winter has allowed Europe to see a sharp drop in natural gas prices.  Russia, for centuries, has relied on winter as its ultimate defense against invaders.  Now, winter has, at best, postponed Russia’s leverage over Europe.  As supply chains adjust, Moscow’s leverage may be permanently reduced.
    • Russian oil has to go somewhere, and it has mostly flowed to India and China in a clear benefit to those nations. This has, however, reduced market share for Middle Eastern oil producers, and we wait to see their response.
    • Even with these expanded markets, it is highly likely that Russia will lose market share on global markets and eventually be forced to shut-in production. Complicating matters further is that that the price cap is beginning to reduce Russia’s revenues.  Washington’s goal with the price cap was this reduction in revenues, but it was also meant to keep oil supplies ample.  Thus, it set a price high enough to keep Russia producing, but low enough to “hurt.”  It’s quite possible that the price is set too low.
  • On February 5, the EU will begin a price capping system on Russian oil products, along with an outright ban on Russian diesel. However, the actual setting of the caps hasn’t been resolved.
  • Although the U.S. still imports crude oil and products, the net figure is increasingly positive, meaning that the U.S. is a net exporter of oil and products. As exports increase in importance, the goals of domestic energy security will clash with the oil industry’s revenue and profitability.
  • OPEC+ is expected to keep production targets unchanged when it meets next Tuesday. The cartel is taking a “wait and see” approach to the crosscurrents of China’s reopening and a looming global slowdown.
  • There are increasing reports that drilling activity is beginning to increase as high prices may finally be triggering a supply response. The DOE is forecasting that U.S. production will average 12.4 mbpd this year and 12.8 mbpd next year.
  • Freeport LNG has announced its plant repairs are complete and the company is preparing to restart operations. Last year, the plant suffered a major accident which reduced operations for several months.  The return of this liquification plant is a bullish factor for U.S. natural gas prices.
  • China’s electricity officials warn that economic recovery in the post-COVID era will boost electricity needs. This will lift demand for coal and LNG.
  • China oil trading firm Unipec, the trading arm of Sinopec (6000028, CNY, 4.54), is reported to be aggressively buying crude oil. It isn’t clear if it is buying the crude for China or merely reselling it.  In 2022, China’s oil imports declined from the previous year, but with COVID restrictions being lifted, we may be seeing Chinese firms prepare for higher consumption.  Imports from Malaysia have recently hit a new record.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • There are reports that wind turbines are falling over as structural problems are emerging.
  • This chart shows the impact of France’s nuclear power on fossil fuel consumption. It shows that, at least for electricity, nuclear power can displace fossil fuels.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The New German Problem (January 23, 2023)

Thomas Wash | PDF

When times are tough, you discover who your real friends are, just ask the European Union. From 1860 to 1945, Germany struggled to keep the peace with its neighbors. Commodity-deprived and lacking natural barriers, Germany has sought to impose its will throughout Europe to protect itself from being invaded or cut off from mineral resources. The European Union (EU) and the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were eventually set up to mitigate this problem, but Germany’s unusual size and export needs created other issues.

Germany’s integration into the EU was designed to ensure that German interests were aligned with the West. However, things didn’t necessarily turn out that way. A decade ago, during the European debt crisis, the Germans lambasted southern European countries for being unable to repay the money they had loaned them. Germany built the Gazprom 2 pipeline with Russia against the wishes of the U.S., and its decision to sell a major port to China has drawn the ire of France. In short, Germany never truly committed itself to the European project.

The war in Ukraine has made Germany’s ambivalence unpalatable to its Western allies as the group gears up to take on a rising China and an aggressive Russia. Although it appears that Germany is attempting to maintain its neutrality, it isn’t clear whether this is possible, given the country’s size and influence. This report begins with a discussion on Germany’s conflicting loyalties, reviewing the country’s attempts to manage its relationships with its Western allies as well as China and Russia. Next, we consider how Germany has adapted to the changing geopolitical landscape, and we conclude with market ramifications.

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The associated podcast episode for this report will be available later this week.

Weekly Energy Update (January 20, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices are trying to base but so far have failed to break above resistance at around $80 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 8.4 mb compared to a 2.0 mb draw forecast.  The SPR was unchanged, the first time since the reporting week of May 20, 2022.  The unusually large build was caused by slower than expected recovery in refinery operations.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports rose 1.7 mbpd, while imports rose 0.5 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.2% to 85.3% of capacity.  The Christmas cold snap closed in a significant level of refining activity, and the industry is slowly recovering.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Last week’s jump in inventory means we are starting the year off with well above average inventory injections.  The chart does show that the usual seasonal pattern was not followed last year.  This is because the average still reflects the restrictions on U.S. oil exports whereas there isn’t much of a discernable pattern to this data now that exports are allowed.

Th chart below shows the sharp drop and partial recovery in refining operations.  Usually, we do see some refinery maintenance this time of year, which will end in early February.  Thus, we may not see a full recovery in refinery operations until later in the quarter.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.  For the next few months, we expect the SPR level to remain steady, so changes in total stockpiles will be driven solely by commercial adjustments.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.07.

Market News:

  • As the government’s SPR sales begin to wind down, the potential for higher prices has increased. We do expect a resumption of sales if oil prices threaten $100 per barrel, but it is unlikely that we will see another large sale just because prices are high.  We believe that the SPR sale was an underappreciated bearish factor last year, and if we are correct, an end to selling will likely be more bullish than expected.
    • It is our position that the SPR will never be refilled to its +600 mb level last seen before the recent sales. The structure that the Biden administration has put in place to buy oil makes it very unlikely that purchases will occur.
  • The IEA is warning that the reopening of China will lift global oil demand to a new record.
  • The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is kicking off investment into the mining sector, likely to diversify its economy away from oil and gas just in case demand for these products fall as green energy expands. The $15 billion starter fund should boost mining investment and will likely support the sector.
    • Saudi Arabia, due to cost structure and low emissions from production, believes it will be the last oil producer standing, even as the world moves away from fossil fuels.
    • In another effort to diversify its energy sources, one that will be most controversial, the KSA has indicated that it will use its domestic uranium to complete the nuclear fuel cycle. In theory, doing so could give the country the wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons.  Given the advanced status of Iran’s program coupled with uncertainty surrounding the U.S. security guarantee, this claim could further raise risks in the region.
  • The history of oil is littered with “we are running out” narratives. Daniel Yergin’s The Prize is perhaps the best history of the industry, and at several junctures, the accepted wisdom was that the age of oil was ending because all the fields had been tapped.  What history shows is that supply shortages lift prices, increasing not just exploration activity but also new technologies.  Since oil was discovered in 1859, this cycle has been in place.  Thus, when the Financial Times runs a story about the end of shale, we take it with a bit of skepticism.  In some respects, the story might be right if current conditions remain in place, but, those conditions probably won’t last.  The FT story and the EIA’s short-term forecast for production are predicated on prices staying about where they are.  However, as we have noted, if we assume around a 200 mb decline in commercial stockpiles, which would have occurred had it not been for the SPR draw, we would be looking at $135 per barrel for crude oil.  Prices at that level will probably change behaviors.  Supply issues, such as the lack of workers, capital constraints, regulatory constraints, etc., remain, but all these can be overcome with higher prices.
  • There is an old adage in markets that “nothing cures high prices like high prices.” In market theory, price is a signal, and high prices tell consumers to conserve, but more importantly, they reward suppliers who bring product to market.  As prices rise, especially in Europe, we are seeing a notable increase in exploration and development activity in the eastern MediterraneanLarge natural gas fields are being discovered in a difficult geopolitical environment.  Offshore fields south of Cyprus have brought the involvement of Turkey, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, and even indirectly, Hamas.  Although there has been some degree of cooperation, deep divisions remain; for example, Turkish and Greek vessels routinely threaten each other.  Government instability can also upend agreements, but high prices will make it more likely that these obstacles will be overcome and will improve the supply situation in Europe and the Middle East.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • The IEA has issued its annual report on the state of energy technology, which skews toward green energy production. There are a number of takeaways but the one that caught our attention is China’s dominance in the production of components for these products.  If the West is going to develop these energy sources, a massive level of investment will be required.
  • Sweden announced it has discovered a large deposit of rare earths. Rare earths are not really all that rare, although finding concentrated deposits can be a challenge.  The mining of such products, however, is environmentally difficult and the processing even more so.  Thus, the challenge of overcoming China in this area is, to some degree, tied to either making the process cleaner (and likely more expensive) or accepting the environmental degradation.
  • China’s dominance in lithium is seen in the chart below.

(Source:  IEA)

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Keller Quarterly (January 2023)

Letter to Investors | PDF

A new year is underway, and we wish you and yours all the best in 2023! The stock market certainly seems to be optimistic about the new year: the S&P 500 is up 4.1% through its first full two weeks of 2023 and it’s up 14.5% from the 52-week low on October 13. Without repeating too much of my October letter, you know that we believe a recession is likely in the current year. In fact, that seems to be the consensus among Wall Street economists. So, why the positive market behavior?

Financial markets are not independent entities, but rather represent the collective behaviors of thousands of participants, each of whom is making their best guess about the future. When most of those participants expect the same thing to occur, guess what? It’s “in the market,” as we say; that is, the event is almost certainly reflected in market prices. In my opinion, the stock market spent the middle six months of last year discounting the probability of a 2023 recession.

It remains to be seen whether this recession will be shallow, normal, or deep. Our expectation is that it will be shallow-to-normal, which seems to concur with the consensus view, judging by the market’s behavior. Why is that? The U.S. consumer appears to be in better shape than usual at this point in the cycle. Relatively low unemployment rates mean that most people who want a job have one, consumer debt relative to household cash and income is relatively low, and the banking system appears to be in very good shape relative to past cycles. One reason for this good condition is that the last recession was just three years ago (2020), meaning there hasn’t been a lot of time for businesses and consumers to over-extend themselves. In addition, the extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus the economy received in the wake of the pandemic-induced recession allowed many to reduce their debts and “get their houses in order.”

On the other hand, could the recession be deeper? Yes, it is possible that the Fed will raise the fed funds rate beyond what the market presently expects (that is, more than 5.0% to 5.5%), which might cause a worse recession. Geopolitical factors, especially those involving Russia or China, could intervene and deepen a recession. But, at this point, we believe those are lower probability events. The stock market tends to look six to 12 months into the future and, in our opinion, the market is presently looking past the recession to what late 2023 and even 2024 might look like. Our crystal ball gets cloudy that far out, but, as we noted last quarter, we see other trends in place today that will likely continue for many years.

Notably, we expect the average rate of inflation over the next 10 years to be meaningfully higher than the last 10 years. Inflation is “too much money chasing too few goods.” Politicians and economists talk incessantly about the “too much money” part of that definition. Thus, they obsess over money supply and monetary stimulus. What they forget is that the “too few goods” side of the definition is usually the key determinant of inflation. When ever-increasing globalization was dramatically increasing the supply of goods and lowering their cost (from approximately 1980 to 2015), inflation trended lower and stayed there. Once globalization peaked, however, the trend began to change. Throw in the disruptions due to a pandemic and a war and you have a real supply problem, otherwise known as inflation. While the pandemic is winding down and the war will eventually end, deglobalization is here to stay.

As a result, we expect inflation to average 4% or more for the long-term, about double the prior long-term rate. That’s what we’re factoring into our thinking. It is a headwind for investment returns, to be sure, but, as we’ve communicated in prior letters, this is not an environment unknown to us. Our investment strategies and security selection processes were all developed with higher inflation in mind because we are old enough to have experienced it before.

We appreciate your confidence in us.

 

Gratefully,

Mark A. Keller, CFA
CEO and Chief Investment Officer

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Master of Surprise (January 17, 2023)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be delayed until Friday, January 20.]

They don’t call Haruhiko Kuroda the “Master of Surprise” for nothing. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor lifted the yield cap on 10-year Japanese government bonds (JGB) by 25 bps last month. The bank will now allow the 10-year yield to fluctuate between -0.50% and +0.50% before intervening in the market. The move jolted markets as it paved the way for possible future monetary tightening. Because Japan is the world’s largest creditor, an increase in Japanese yields could attract capital from abroad back to the mainland. As a result, the policy change could lead to an overall increase in borrowing costs for other countries, including the U.S., and could also affect exchange rates.

The JPY surged as much as 5% against the dollar on the day following the BOJ’s surprising decision. This was the JPY’s largest gain since the New York Fed and BOJ joined forces to prop up the currency in 1998. The rise in the currency reflects investor sentiment that the BOJ is getting ready to tighten its monetary policy. The central bank has intervened in bond markets to keep its bond-yield rates around 0%. Attempts by speculators to push the BOJ to adjust its policy prematurely have typically ended in tears as the bank defended its caps aggressively and burnished the short JGB trade as “the widow-maker in the process.

Although the BOJ maintains that the move was not designed to alter future monetary policy, it is difficult to discern another motive. The latest meeting summary showed that BOJ officials raised their cap to address issues within their bond market. Days before the decision, a BOJ survey revealed that investors’ perceptions of bond market functionality fell to a record low. Additionally, the 10-year JGB failed to trade for four straight days at one point between the October and December meetings, signaling a decline in liquidity. However, the lack of telegraphing, especially given the bank’s sizable bond holding, suggests that the decision may have been more nuanced.

BOJ Governor Kuroda’s term ends on April 8. The two front-runners to succeed him are former BOJ Deputy Governor Hiroshi Nakaso and current Deputy Governor Masayoshi Amamiya. The latter is seen as more of a dove, but both are expected to tighten policy. By raising the yield cap, Kuroda gave his successor more wiggle room to navigate a way forward without rattling markets. The policy adjustment allows the future head of the BOJ to chart their own path forward without the cloud of their predecessor.

The biggest obstacle preventing further tightening is the country’s substantial debt burden. Japan has the largest government debt-to-GDP ratio among advanced economies at 206%. It has been able to manage this burden through its yield-curve control. Japan’s effective interest was 0.6% in 2021, much lower than many of its peers. In contrast, the effective interest rate on Italian debt was 2.3% in 2021, while the U.S. paid 1.6% during that period. Given the size of the debt, a small increase in interest rates could still lead to a sizable jump in debt payments. Although manageable in the long term, a 100-bps rise in interest rates would add 3% to the government debt-to-GDP ratio by 2025, according to Fitch Ratings Agency.

Higher interest rates in Japan could also lift borrowing costs for other countries. An increase in the yield on Japanese sovereigns incentivizes Japanese investors to bring capital home, leading to higher interest rates for the rest of the world. The U.S. is particularly vulnerable. Higher yields on JGB will attract interest from Japanese investors, who are the largest holders of U.S. Treasuries outside of America itself. As a result, the increase in Japanese interest rates could also lead to an increase in U.S. rates.

Although the markets anticipate that the BOJ will tighten policy more in 2023, they are not completely certain. We suspect that Japan’s decision to raise its yield cap by 25 bps had more to do with giving Kuroda’s successor more flexibility to conduct policy. That said, it appears that either candidate expected to take over, Hiroshi Nakaso or Masayoshi Amamiya, is likely to tighten. If correct, this should help boost financial sector equities internationally as it makes it easier for banks to profit from lending.

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Weekly Energy Update (January 12, 2023)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices continue to come under pressure on worries over economic growth, although there is some evidence that prices may be basing between $72 and $82 per barrel.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories jumped 19.0 mb compared to a 3.0 mb draw forecast.  The SPR delined 0.8 mb, meaning the net build was 18.2 mb.  The unusually large build was caused by a large drop in exports, a rise in imports, and continued depressed refinery operations due to the deep cold snap late last year.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 12.2 mbpd.  Exports fell 2.1 mbpd, while imports rose 0.6 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 4.3% to 84.1% of capacity.  The Christmas cold snap closed in a significant level of refining activity, and the industry is slowly recovering.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Because we are starting the new year, we only have one datapoint for 2023.  The chart does show that the usual seasonal pattern was not followed last year.  This is because the average still reflects the restrictions on U.S. oil exports whereas there isn’t much of a discernable pattern to this data now that exports are allowed.

This chart shows the sharp drop and partial recovery in refining operations.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.08.

Market News:

  • As China reopens from its COVID-19 lockdowns, it is increasing its oil import quotas. This decision is likely bullish for crude oil prices.  China is expected to buy a significant amount of Russian crude for this reopening, which should be available as the EU price cap has reduced Russian exports.
  • OPEC+ production rose modestly in December.
  • The DOE is forecasting lower oil prices in 2023 and 2024. For 2023, it is expecting Brent to average $83 per barrel, with $78 per barrel in 2024.  Expectations of rising output are behind the lower price forecast.
  • We discussed proposed rules for U.S. refiners last year. Further analysis suggests that the costs of the new rules could lead to about a 700 kbpd loss of gasoline production as older refineries become unprofitable.  Although we could see some “grandfathering,” refining issues remain a concern.
  • As we went into winter, the worry for the EU was that a cold winter would lead to a shortage of natural gas and therefore higher prices. Instead, Europe is being blessed with a historically mild winter.  Although these mild temperatures have helped Europe avoid a price crisis this winter, it could portend a hot, dry summer, which could lift natural gas prices later this year.  Last year’s dry summer caused havoc in Europe, affecting river travel and reducing nuclear power production, which was adversely affected by the water being too warm and too scarce to cool reactors.  Although summer remains a secondary demand season for natural gas, rising temperatures will lift natural gas-fired-electricity demand and may disrupt the inventory cycle, increasing the price risk when the eventual cold winter does occur.

(Source)

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – How China Will Manage Its Evolving Geopolitical Bloc (January 9, 2023)

Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

In mid-2022, we published a report showing that as the United States begins to step back from its traditional role as the global hegemon, the world is fracturing into relatively separate geopolitical and economic blocs.  Our study looked at almost 200 countries around the world and aimed to objectively predict which bloc each of those countries would end up in, i.e., the evolving U.S.-led bloc, the China-led bloc, the blocs that lean one way or the other, and a neutral bloc.  The study predicted that this global fracturing would have major effects on the world’s economy and financial markets, for example, by boosting commodity prices, inflation, and interest rates.

In this report, we deepen the analysis to examine how the U.S. and China will lead their respective blocs, and what that might mean for the global economy and financial markets.  We pay especially close attention to the implications for the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan as well as the broader implications for investors.

Read the full report

The associated podcast episode for this report will be available next week.