2023 Outlook: A Recession Year (December 21, 2022)

by Mark Keller, CFA, Bill O’Grady, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Summary of Expectations:

  • A recession is highly probable in 2023. Our base case is a garden-variety recession.
  • Three factors could trigger a deep recession: a. Falling nominal home prices; b. A financial crisis; c. A geopolitical event
  • One factor that could mitigate the downturn is investment spending, especially on manufacturing plants and equipment. Manufacturing has been depressed for over three decades and the prospect for reshoring and building redundancies could support the economy. We suspect this factor will tend to be longer term in nature, but it could begin next year.
  • We expect inflation to ease in 2023, but the Federal Reserve’s preferred narrative on inflation control and how inflation was quelled in the 1970s could increase the odds of a policy mistake.
  • Long-duration Treasuries are signaling faith that the FOMC will curtail inflation even at the cost of a deep recession. This faith has led to a deep inversion of the yield curve. Credit spreads are expected to remain well behaved. This good behavior is mostly a function of the short business cycle, which has not been long enough to support the usual deterioration of credit standards.
  • Increasing concerns about market liquidity are a risk to the Treasury market. The liquidity issues may signal that the size of the deficit is too large for the current auction distribution system. Either the system needs to be reformed or the deficit reduced.
  • Strictly based on our modeling, our S&P 500 operating earnings forecast for 2023 is $179.61 with a year-end multiple of 17.1x. However, remaining excessive liquidity and the usual rise in the multiple during recessions increase the odds that the multiple will offset the expected decline in earnings. Depending on the depth of the recession, a decline in the market to 3520-3071 is possible, and as we note below, from there, a recovery to the 4100-4300 range is likely. Obviously, the key to equity market behavior is the timing of the recession and Fed behavior. We expect small caps to outperform, although this outperformance will likely be tempered by the recession. Value is expected to outperform Growth. Although U.S. markets may outperform in the first half of 2023, the relative outperformance of U.S. stocks will occur in the very late innings. We look for dollar weakness to develop over 2023, which will tend to be supportive for foreign stocks.
  • Although we are bullish long-term on commodities, it is common, even in secular bull markets, for prices to decline during recessions. We expect to maintain modest positions in commodities, but as the dollar weakens next year, commodities should benefit. An economic recovery will support commodities as well. Again, the timing of the downturn is important.

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Weekly Energy Update (December 15, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(This will be the last report of 2022; we will resume publication on January 12, 2023.)

Crude oil prices continue to come under pressure on worries over economic growth.  There was likely some bullish positioning in front of the Russian price cap which is probably being liquidated.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories jumped 10.2 mb compared to a 3.8 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 4.7 mb, meaning the net build was 5.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.1 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports and imports rose 0.9 mbpd.  Refining activity fell 3.3% to 92.2% of capacity.  Pipeline issues caused the drop in refinery activity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data reversed the recent contra-seasonal pattern of the past few weeks, most likely due to the drop in refinery activity caused by pipeline issues.

Shortly after the war started, we stopped reporting on our basic oil model that uses commercial inventory and the EUR for independent variables.  We have now updated that model, which puts fair value at $73.60 per barrel.  We are currently trading near fair value for the first time since the war began.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $104.10.

Market News:

  • We are continuing to watch how the Russian price cap is working. As we noted last week, the first reaction was that shipping was disrupted around the Black Sea.  Russia’s fiscal situation could suffer as well, and although Russia’s breakeven is thought to be around $20 per barrel, fiscally it needs $70 per barrel to balance its budget.  We still don’t know if the price cap is low enough to curtail Russian output, but the disruptions have cut exports.
  • The Keystone pipeline has suffered a rupture in Kansas, leaking 14,000 barrels worth of oil. The leak will disrupt oil flows to at least two refining centers.  We may see a drop in production in the coming weeks if the outage persists.
  • Up until now, Europe has been helped by mild weather. That string of good fortune appears to be fading, which will likely lift oil and gas demand, and therefore, prices as well.
  • Amos Hochstein, the White House international energy envoy, described the U.S. shale industry as “un-American.” He wants the industry to expand production, even though the government has sent rather clear signals that the future of oil demand is in doubt, in part due to policies of the same government.  If the goal is to encourage the industry to lift output, name-calling probably won’t have the desired effect.  At the same time, to be fair to Mr. Hochstein, his “beef’ is mainly with Wall Street, who is demanding a focus on shareholder returns rather than output.  Even with that emphasis, we note that production is rising in the shale patch, although the pace isn’t exactly rapid.
  • Germany is making remarkable progress in building out its LNG infrastructure.
  • With South Korean ship builders at capacity, orders for new LNG tankers are being sent to China.
  • Europe has tentatively passed a carbon tariff. When a nation implements environmental rules of any type, it usually increases the costs of production.  This change puts domestic producers at a disadvantage relative to foreign producers who are likely not under similar restrictions.  In some sense, it is a form of protectionism, but for social goals.  The ability of the tax to level the playing field for European industry is still uncertain.  The levy is designed to be placed on the carbon content emitted during the production of the product, which may not be all that precise.  If the levy is too low, it will still be cheaper to buy it from the “dirty” foreign producer.  If it’s high enough to prevent the import, it will increase costs.
  • The IEA is warning that oil markets will likely tighten next year.
  • Infrastructure matters—we note that natural gas prices in the Permian Basin have fallen to $0.05 per MMBTU due to the lack of pipeline infrastructure.

 Geopolitical News:

  • President Xi made a state visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) last week. The two nations inked a “strategic partnership” but, in reality, if the KSA is threatened by its neighbors, we doubt its first call will be to Beijing.  Still, the visit does highlight a drift in the KSA’s relations with the U.S.
    • Fin-Twitter was ablaze with commentary concerning reports that the KSA and China were about to begin settling oil sales in CNY. The fear is that pricing oil in a currency other than USD would undermine the reserve role of the greenback and lead to all sorts of potential ramifications.  However, the change might not be as groundbreaking as it is portrayed.  First, the KSA runs a modest trade surplus with China.  If the KSA is okay with accepting CNY instead of USD, we suspect Riyadh will find investments in China that will be acceptable.  Chinese financial markets are not as deep as U.S. ones, and as the real estate situation shows, in a workout agreement, Chinese investors are given preference.  At the same time, the treatment of USD reserves held by Russia and Iran have to give any nation pause as clearly getting “offside” with the U.S. can have a potentially bad outcome.  So, diversifying away from the dollar would make sense for the KSA, whose relations with the U.S. have become rather strained.
    • The “big deal” would be if the KSA demanded CNY for all oil sales. That would drive up demand to run trade surpluses with China in order to acquire CNY.  Given China’s reluctance to run large trade deficits (and incur the negative impact on employment), we doubt this action will spread beyond the bilateral relationship.
    • China is a newcomer to the region’s geopolitics, and it is getting a feel for just how fraught the region can be. During President Xi’s visit to the UAE, he agreed to a statement supporting the Emirates’ claims that the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa should be submitted to some sort of international adjudication.  These three islands were part of the UAE when it was formed following the British withdrawal in 1971.  Iran decided to take advantage of the British leaving and seized the islands.  The UAE has wanted them back ever since, but Tehran has no interest in acquiescing.  Either the Chinese diplomats are siding with the UAE in this dispute, or they more likely walked into a conflict.  Iran was quite upset with the communiqué following the China/UAE meeting and is demanding an explanation.
    • Iran and China have had a longstanding relationship as the latter has helped Iran evade Western sanctions. It is worth noting, however, that the relationship may be more transactional than anything else.  As China is acquiring more oil from Russia, its overall trade with Iran is declining.
  • Iran’s economy continues to suffer, but that sluggish economy has not led the state to ease its repression. At the same time, Russia and Iran are deepening their military relationship, a situation that will complicate the security of nations aligned against Tehran.
  • A hack of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps documents details some of the discussions tied to the renewal of the 2015 nuclear deal. Although the veracity of the reports isn’t confirmed, the information provided does suggest that the two sides were always far apart.
  • We note that gold purchases by central banks have been rising rapidly, with most of the purchases coming from emerging market central banks. It is quite possible that these banks are worried that the U.S. could reduce the value of their foreign exchange reserves as Washington did to Russia and Iran.  It should be noted that gold has other uses for central banks.  Iran has been trading fuel to Venezuela in return for gold.  Both nations have been under sanctions and have used gold to evade those sanctions.
  • The KSA warns that if Iran develops/acquires a nuclear weapon, then “all bets are off,” which suggests a nuclear arms race in the region is likely.
  • The U.S. made an outreach to Africa this week as part of a broader program to secure rare earths and other minerals critical to the energy transition. It is not obvious if the African nations will find the American effort useful, however.  Ultimately, Africa needs infrastructure investment (in which China tends to excel) and market access (which the U.S. is reducing from all nations), so this may turn out to be more rhetoric than reality.  Still, the U.S. is promising funding as part of the meeting, which will likely be welcomed.

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The 2023 Geopolitical Outlook (December 12, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady & Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(This is the last BWGR of 2022; the next report will be published on January 9, 2023.)

As is our custom, in mid-December, we publish our geopolitical outlook for the upcoming year.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for 2023.  It is not designed to be an exhaustive list; instead, it focuses on the big-picture conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: The Big Picture

Issue #2: The Expanding, Strengthening State and Populism

Issue #3: China Learns to Lead a Bloc

Issue #4: The Race for Space

Issue #5: The Brittleness of Authoritarianism

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The associated podcast episode for this report will be available next week.

Weekly Energy Update (December 8, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices continue to come under pressure on worries over economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 5.2 mb compared to a 3.9 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 2.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 7.3 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 12.2 mbpd.  Exports fell 1.5 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 95.5% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs in early Q4.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s draw takes inventories further below the seasonal average, though perhaps the most important takeaway is that the usual seasonal pattern in inventory is breaking down.

Shortly after the war started, we stopped reporting on our basic oil model that uses commercial inventory and the EUR for independent variables.  We have updated that model, which puts fair value at $73.60 per barrel.  We are currently trading near fair value for the first time since the war began.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.07.

The CapAt long last, the EU has finally agreed on a price cap plan for Russian oil, pending Poland’s approval tomorrow.  The cap price is $60 per barrel, and since the current Urals price is around that level, it’s possible that not much will change.  The price was below what the Eastern Europeans were pushing for—Poland wanted a $30 price.  The U.S., however, was afraid that a price that low, which would effectively ban Russian oil exports, would trigger a major price rally and harm the world (and U.S.) economy.  The current price won’t really stop Russian exports if Russia wants to sell the oil.  Russia’s initial reaction is to refuse to sell oil to nations using the price cap.  We also note that, effective last Monday, the EU and U.K. will stop seaborne oil imports from Russia, which will have a more material impact on the oil markets.  The most likely market reaction is volatility.  The initial reaction to the cap and the OPEC+ decision was a sharp rise in oil prices, but that reaction faded earlier this week.

Market News:

  • The White House is seeking to halt SPR sales in the coming years. Congress has tended to use the SPR as a sort of budget “piggy bank” to allow for funding of various projects.  Thus, various sales have already been authorized for future years.  However, with the SPR being drained by the sales completed due to the war in Ukraine, the administration now wants to halt those future sales.  So far, we are not seeing any programs put in place to refill the reserve, but this action does suggest growing concern about the sales.
  • Recent data suggests that U.S. drilling activity remains lackluster. Due to regulatory and investment constraints, the U.S. oil and gas industry thus far has not reacted strongly to high oil prices.  We expect that to continue.
  • The fertilizer market has been a major concern since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both nations are major producers of fertilizers and feedstock for the product.  The UN says that it is near a deal that would allow Russia to export ammonia via a Ukrainian pipeline.  Ammonia is a key element for the economy and resuming this supply is important.  We note that fertilizer prices have been falling recently as markets adjusted to high prices, and the UN news will likely support further price declines.
  • One of our firm’s positions is that the unwinding of U.S. hegemony will lead to supply disruptions and trigger hoarding. Confirming this assertion is an announcement that Japan is building a strategic reserve for natural gas.  Japan gets nearly all of its natural gas from LNG and has faced higher prices as European demand for LNG has soared due to the war.
  • High prices and weak economic activity have reduced EU natural gas demand.
  • If China continues to ease COVID restrictions, oil prices should benefit.
  • Saudi Arabia announced it has discovered two new natural gas fields.
  • A 2019 study by the NBER showed that lower heating costs prevent winter deaths. The study suggested that the shale gas revolution likely saved 11k lives in the U.S.  If the study is correct, high heating prices may lead to higher mortality rates in Europe this winter.
  • Ethanol blending has hit new records.
  • Mild temps are bearish for natural gas prices. Meanwhile, U.S. LNG projects are being funded rapidly, although there are concerns that the industry won’t be able to find enough gas to match these projects.
  • Glencore (GLNCY, $13.31) is planning to accelerate coal mine closures. The closures have little to do with profitability but are instead being done to meet emissions targets.  The IEA is forecasting that renewables will overtake coal by 2025.
  • Russia and China have completed a pipeline to Shanghai.
  • New England authorities are warning that if the weather is unusually cold, rolling blackouts might occur. Some of the problem is tied to the Jones Act.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Forecasting Financial Stress (December 5, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be delayed until 12/12. Also, this report will go on holiday hiatus following today’s report; the next report will be published on January 16, 2023.]

One of the challenges of market strategy is the problem of financial stress.  In colloquial terms, the “Fed raises rates until something breaks.”  The problem is that the “something-breaks” event is difficult to predict in terms of when.  There are numerous financial stress and conditions indices that suggest rising financial tensions.  These tell us when conditions are such that problems might develop, but they don’t help us much with when a problem is likely to emerge.

This chart shows the Chicago FRB’s National Financial Conditions Index (CNFCI).  A reading of zero shows normal conditions, while any number less than zero implies favorable conditions.  Before mid-year 1998, financial conditions were highly correlated to the fed funds rate.  Since 1998, the two series have become almost entirely uncorrelated.  In 1998, the U.S. passed the Financial Services Modernization Act, often named for its authors, Senators Gramm, Leach, and Bliley.  This act changed the nature of the financial system as it was mostly bank-financed prior to this legislation.  The 1998 act allowed other financial participants to engage in lending and other bank-like activities.  Essentially, the U.S. financial system became money market-financed after 1998.

This change was designed to improve the efficiency of the financial system, but it also changed the “lender of last resort” function of the Federal Reserve.  Before 1998, if the FOMC raised rates, financial conditions deteriorated, but that problem could be easily addressed with rate cuts.  But note that after 1998, the fed funds rate became ineffective in either improving or weakening financial conditions.  The 2004-09 period is the best example of this problem as the FOMC raised rates with little impact on financial conditions.  Once a crisis developed (shown as a jump in the CNFCI), it took very aggressive rate cuts and promises to keep rates low for a long period of time before conditions improved.  Something similar developed in 2020 around the pandemic.

Currently, we are in a tightening cycle.  The CNFCI has increased but remains below zero. However, the worry remains that if the FOMC keeps raising rates, “something will break” which is represented by a spike in the index.  The notion of the “Fed pivot” is based on the expectation that as conditions deteriorate, the Fed will rapidly reverse policy tightening, which would be bullish for financial assets.  If something breaking is a prerequisite for the pivot, it would be useful to have some idea of when that might occur.

One way we attempt to determine when a tightening cycle may be poised to end is to compare the fed funds target to the implied three-month LIBOR rate from the Eurodollar futures market.

LIBOR rates represent funding costs for money market lending.  In general, because this collateral or the counterparties are not necessarily guaranteed by the government, it is reasonable to expect that the LIBOR rate should exceed the fed funds target.  And, as the top line of the chart indicates, most of the time it does.  However, on occasion, the spread inverts.  We have placed vertical lines on the above chart showing when these inversions have occurred.  Inversion suggests that the financial markets have assessed that the FOMC has raised rates enough and should either stop raising rates or consider cutting them.  In the 1990s, during the Greenspan Fed, rates were cut quickly when this spread inverted.  And, for the most part, he supervised a long expansion and even the 2001 recession was considered rather mild.  Contrast that with the Bernanke Fed’s decision to hold rates steady for an extended period even though the Eurodollar/fed funds spread had become inverted.  The recession that followed was very deep and was accompanied by a financial crisis.

To further analyze the impact of the spread of the implied LIBOR rate to fed funds, we created the below chart.

The lower part of this chart shows the fed funds/implied LIBOR spread.  We have placed a purple line at the -40 bps level, and when this level is penetrated, it has tended to signal that a financial accident is more likely.  In the past two events, an inversion below the -40 bps line was followed by a crisis six to 12 months later.  We are not at that point yet, but if the FOMC moves the fed funds target up by 50 bps in mid-December, the chances increase that we will see the spread invert below this level.

The Fed has two formal mandates and one universal mandate.  Its two formal mandates are full employment and low inflation.  These are legislated by Congress and defined by the Fed, but all central banks exist to support the functioning of financial markets.  We are seeing conditions evolve to a point where the FOMC may need to stop tightening or even ease in order to address the universal mandate.  However, that may force the Fed to ease before it contains inflation.  We suspect that the Fed will probably attempt to bring down inflation while hoping to avoid a financial problem.  In fact, the recent signal that the pace of hikes will slow may be designed to avoid an “accident.”  By moving less aggressively, we surmise that the FOMC hopes it can still bring down inflation and avoid a financial crisis. Nevertheless, the chances of a financial accident appear poised to grow in the coming months.

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Weekly Energy Update (December 1, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices have been falling on fears of weaker Chinese demand due to COVID issues.  We note that the futures market structure has moved into contango, where the deferred contracts trade at a premium to the spot.  This is a bearish market structure.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 12.6 mb compared to a 3.1 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 1.4 mb, meaning the net draw was 14.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.1 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.7 mbpd, while imports fell 1.0 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.3% to 95.2% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw takes inventories below the seasonal average, though perhaps the most important takeaway is that the usual seasonal pattern in inventory is breaking down.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $108.94.

 Refinery runs are elevated as refiners take advantage of favorable crack spreads.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

 Market News:

  • This is a major week for global oil markets. On December 5, the EU is expected to implement its sanctions on Russian oil exports, specifically targeting the insurance and financing infrastructure of the oil trade.  Tied to these sanctions is U.S. support for a price cap.  The goal of the EU sanctions is to cut Russian oil from world markets and undermine Russia’s ability to conduct the war in Ukraine.  The goal of the price cap is to allow some level of Russian oil flows but at reduced prices.  So far, Moscow says it won’t sell oil under the price cap system.  In addition, the EU hasn’t been able to decide on a price since more hawkish nations want a low price, while others, who are less hawkish, want something closer to the market price.
    • The consensus is that the price cap won’t work because, generally speaking, a consumer can’t usually dictate what the price of a product will be. As consumers, we may decide not to buy at a given price, but we can’t go to the seller and simply set the price.  After all, if we could do that, it would literally be a “free world”!  However, if a buyer has market power, then they can influence the price that sellers can get for their product.  OPEC+ is worried that the price cap mechanism will be turned on them, and that the cap could evolve into a “buyer’s cartel.”  That is a risk, but we doubt that will occur.  In this specific case, however, Russia is deeply vulnerable to the sanctions and cap.  Why?  Russia is dependent on foreign tankers and especially foreign insurance and financing to move oil.  Russian ports can’t handle the largest crude carriers and the supply of smaller vessels is tight. Also, despite its best efforts, Russia has not been able to duplicate the existing insurance and financing system for oil sales, which reduces the number of tankers available to carry Russian oil.  That doesn’t mean there are not rogue carriers, but they are not big enough to matter much.
    • The U.S. wants the cap because it fears that the EU plan will result in a spike in oil prices. It wants to keep Russian oil flowing but reduce the revenue Russia receives.  If Russia holds to the policy that it won’t honor the price cap, it could easily find itself in a situation where it is forced to close in production, and once shut in, that production may be lost indefinitely.  If that occurs, oil prices could jump.
    • It should be noted that Russia is finding fewer takers of its oil, and the Urals benchmark price has fallen to around $52 per barrel. So, even without a cap, the expectations of one seem to be having an impact.
  • Although OPEC+ was making noises about cutting production in the face of weak prices, it looks like the cartel is more likely to maintain current production targets.
  • Tensions within the ruling coalition have led Norway to delay any new oil and gas leases until 2025, a blow to European energy supplies.
  • As diesel prices soar, the “magic” of markets is starting to work. Consumption is easing, and refining operations are increasing, causing inventories to lift.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

  • However, this good news may still not be enough for New England to escape high prices and shortages.
  • Europeans have been complaining that the U.S. is profiting from the war in Ukraine[1] by pointing at the massive price differential between U.S. and EU gas prices. However, it turns out the profiteers are European.  Most LNG sold by the U.S. is based on the Henry Hub price, the benchmark for the CME futures contract.  Currently, that’s set at 115% plus $3.00 of the benchmark price.  However, the actual price in Europe is far higher; for example, a $6.00 per MMBTU price at the Henry Hub translates to a €32.59 MWH price.  European utilities are buying at that price and reselling the gas at nearly €119 MWH.
  • As global demand weakens and supply chains begin to improve, freight rates are falling rapidly, but that isn’t the case with oil tanker rates. High demand and the scramble to secure transportation before EU sanctions on Russian oil are in place are sending rates to record levels.
  • Japan is warning that global LNG supplies are sold out “for years,” but what they mean is that most LNG is sold on long-term contracts. That’s how the infrastructure for LNG is usually financed — a project aligns buyers on long-term contracts at a set price to pay for the build-out of the project and then sends the gas to the buyers regardless of the spot price.  Japanese buyers report that there are no long-term contracts available before 2026, meaning that the “marginal molecule” is being sold at spot rates.
  • Germany and Qatar have agreed to a 15-year supply deal for LNG.
  • There is growing evidence that the Middle East has reached oil capacity limits and shale oil production has not reacted to high oil prices as it has in the past. However, one bright spot for additional barrels is coming from deep-water offshore projects such as Brazil and Guyana.
  • Western Canada is seeing a jump in natural gas production and could become a significant supplier of LNG to the Asia-Pacific region.
  • Despite having what appears to be ample generating capacity, China suffers from regular blackouts. The reasons are complicated but involve the lack of market pricing and  regional distrust, which then leads to excess capacity construction.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:


[1] Among other general complaints.

[2] In fact, French President Macron is visiting the U.S. this week and subsidies are expected to be discussed.

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Business Cycle Report (November 29, 2022)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in October. The latest report showed that five out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.1515 to +0.091, below the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Hawkish Fed expectations weighed on financial indicators
  • Production indicators are weakening due to a decline in business sentiment
  • Hiring is slowing but the labor market remains strong

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (November 17, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(The Weekly Energy Update will not be published next week due to Thanksgiving.  The report will return on December 1.)

 Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 5.4 mb compared to a 1.9 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 4.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 9.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.2 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports declined 0.41 mbpd, while imports rose 0.3 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.5% to 92.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw is takes inventories back to the seasonal average.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.63.

 

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • For the most part, we view COP-27 as environmental theater since without an enforcement mechanism, environmental promises are just that. However, we do note that there has been some movement to reduce coal usage in power production.
  • California voters did not support a measure to fund EV charging stations by raising taxes on high-income citizens. Without this funding, it isn’t clear how the state will prepare to shift from gasoline to electric vehicles.
  • Meanwhile, China’s share of the global EV market continues to grow.
    • BMW (BMWYY, $29.46) is building a $1.4 billion operation to expand battery production in China.
  • As biofuel research expands, there is a growing concern that without regulatory guidance, the potential for the fuel source will be hampered by inconsistent standards.
  • Separating hydrogen from water creates a clean (“green”) product. Unfortunately, it is also energy intensive and expensive.  Four U.S. nuclear power reactors are part of a study to see if nuclear power can be used to generate green hydrogen.  Meanwhile, a raft of startups are trying to develop other ways to bring down the cost of green hydrogen.
  • The U.S. has blocked 1,000 shipments of solar energy components from China on grounds that the products were made by slave labor. There have been rising tensions between the solar installation industry and the non-Chinese solar component industry.  The former wants the cheapest product it can find, while the latter wants to compete with China, the world’s low-cost producer.  As U.S./Chinese relations deteriorate, the non-Chinese production industry is seeing an opportunity.
  • Leaded fuel was used to counter engine knock, though, unfortunately, lead is highly toxic so it was phased out of gasoline in the U.S. over three decades ago. However, small aircraft were excluded from the move to unleaded fuels but are finally making the switch.
  • One of the problems of solar and wind energy is that it’s unreliable, so as it expands, utilities must still keep conventional capacity available for periods when the power generated from wind or solar is lacking. The expansion of wind and solar in the western U.S. is leading to reliability issues.
  • We are still in the early stages of battery technology. The current industry standard for EVs, the lithium-ion battery, has some flaws as it’s prone to fires, it’s expensive to produce, and it doesn’t have a long life.  But, in its favor, it does recharge quickly and is lightweight.  The next new thing may be the sodium-ion battery.  It’s a bit heavier than the lithium-ion battery, and not as energy dense. New technology, though, is showing rapid improvement.  If it flies, it would dramatically reduce the cost of EVs and have much faster recharging capabilities.  Better and cheaper batteries are likely the key to widespread EV adoption.
    • Asian battery producers have been reluctant to invest in Australian mining that would provide raw materials for batteries, putting the makers at risk of supply shortages.
    • EV makers are looking to vertically integrate their operations with miners of key battery materials and with battery manufactures to create secure supply chains.
    • China uses lithium-iron-phosphate batteries which are cheaper but have less range than batteries that use nickel.

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