Weekly Energy Update (September 1, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(The Weekly Energy Update will not be published next week.  The report will return on September 15.)

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.3 mb compared to a 2.5 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 3.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 6.4 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.2 mbpd to 12.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.8 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 93.8% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although the past months’ inventory changes are more consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2003.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.69.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

(Source:  Bloomberg)

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

       (Source:  Axios)

    • One factor driving the price of EVs higher is the goal of giving the cars the same range as a gasoline powered vehicle. However, when “fill up” of electricity can be done daily in one’s garage, an EV with a much smaller range might be more practical for everyday use and be cheaper to make.
    • We remain bullish on metals required in the conversion away from fossil fuels because it doesn’t appear that the demand is impossible to fill. At the same time, miners continue to find that local opposition is delaying the building of new mines for the materials required for batteries.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Agricultural Commodities in the Evolving Geopolitical Blocs (August 29, 2022)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

As regular readers of this report will know, Confluence has long predicted that as the United States steps back from its traditional role as global hegemon, the world will become much less globalized and countries will coalesce into at least two rival geopolitical and economic blocs—one led by the U.S. and one led by China.  In our report from May 9, 2022, we described the results of our recent study that aimed to predict which countries will end up in each of the evolving blocs.  Following that, in our report from June 6, 2022, we showed how key mineral commodities are unevenly distributed among the evolving blocs, and what that might mean for geopolitics and investment strategy.

In this report, we dive even deeper into the differences between the evolving blocs by looking closely at the international trade in key agricultural commodities within and between the groups.  We explore what those differences and relationships might mean for geopolitics going forward, especially regarding the rivalry between the U.S. and China.  We conclude with a discussion of the implications for investors.

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Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Business Cycle Report (August 25, 2022)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index declined for the third consecutive month. The latest report showed that seven out of 11 benchmarks are in expansion territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.6364 to +0.3939 but remains above the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Poor economic data weighed on financial market indicators
  • Goods production slowed due to a labor shortage and a decrease in business sentiment.
  • Labor conditions remain strong but show signs of softening.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (August 25, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.3 mb compared to a 2.5 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 8.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 11.4 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.2 mbpd to 12.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.8 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 93.8% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although the past two weeks are consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2003.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.51.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

 (Source:  Strategas)

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

(Source:  Adam Tooze)

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Inflation Surprise (August 22, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

July inflation came in below expectations.  On a yearly basis, the market expected an overall rate of 8.7%, while the actual reading was 8.5%.  For core CPI, the actual was 5.9% compared to expectations of 6.1%.  Perhaps the most bullish part of the report was the monthly change, where the overall rate was unchanged compared to June and the core rose by 0.3% compared to expectations of a 0.5% rise.  This was the first monthly reading for the overall rate that was zero or less since May 2020.

The reaction of financial markets was swift and bullish.  The S&P 500 rose over 2% on Wednesday, August 10.  The dollar fell, commodities mostly rose, and the short end of the yield curve rallied.  Why the strong reaction?  The July data was the first time in months we have seen a modest rise in inflation and there is hope that we may be past “peak inflation.”  This hope may be fulfilled.  It’s clear the U.S. economy is slowing and there is evidence that supply chains are slowly improving.

Is this optimism justified?  Although the news on inflation was positive, comparing the policy rate relative to CPI and unemployment suggests the FOMC still has a long way to go before achieving a neutral rate.

In the above chart, the independent variable is CPI less the unemployment rate.  The blue line shows the difference from the model’s estimation of what the policy rate should be based on the difference between CPI and unemployment.  Since 1957, the Federal Reserve has never conducted a policy this easy.  Although recent tightening has somewhat narrowed the gap, the FOMC needs to see either a rise in unemployment or a sharp drop in inflation.

Financial markets, in contrast, are anticipating an end to this tightening cycle.  Comparing the implied interest rate from the Eurodollar futures market, two years into the future, suggests the Fed will be easing in the coming months.

Eurodollar futures are already projecting a lower rate over the next two years.  We have not reached the extremes of earlier tightening cycles, but another rate hike of 50 bps will push the deviation into easing territory.

So, why the difference in the two models?  The financial markets are anticipating a change in economic conditions, either falling inflation, rising unemployment, or both.  Why?  In part, it’s because the financial markets are anticipating recessionary conditions.  For example, the yield curve has inverted.   The chart below depicts a study that looks at 10 different Treasury yield curves.  History shows that when more than six of these curves invert, a recession occurs, on average, in 15 months.  In July, eight of the curves inverted.  As an aside, note that it is common for these curves to steepen after the inversion but before the recession develops.  One should not take any comfort in fewer yield curves inverting once we exceed six.

What is unknown is how fast inflation will fall or unemployment will rise.  Our concern is that the financial markets are anticipating a rapid adjustment in the first chart’s indicator that may not be borne out by the data.  If that outcome occurs, the FOMC may tighten more than the market expects and maintain that tightness longer than anticipated.  That outcome would likely be negative for equities, but for now, hopes of falling inflation and an easing response from policymakers have lifted risk assets.  If this positive outcome fails to materialize, a downturn in risk assets is likely.

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Weekly Energy Update (August 18, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 7.1 mb compared to a 0.3 mb build forecast.  The SPR declined 3.4 mb, meaning the net draw was 10.2 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports rose 2.9 mb, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity dipped 0.8% to 93.5% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although this week’s outsized decline is consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2004.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $104.45.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

  • With the Inflation Reduction Act now signed into law, a backlash against economists for pushing for a carbon tax is developing. To some extent, this makes sense as using other tools can be more politically popular.  However, from an efficiency standpoint, a carbon tax would still be a superior policy, but obviously, if you can’t get it passed, holding on to that policy to the exclusion of all others makes little sense.  What the bill is really all about is industrial policy.  Government shaping the economy is nothing new but is generally considered legitimate only in cases of clear market failure.  Since a carbon tax was never implemented, it really hasn’t been proven that a market failure exists.
  • There is great excitement in the environmental community over the new measures but one potential concern is the lack of workers to build out the plan.
  • Germany is extending the life of its three remaining nuclear power plants.
  • Any commodity activity disturbs something. Whether its drilling, ranching, farming, or mining, something or someone gets disturbed.  As demand for lithium rises, opposition to mining or brining has emerged.  Although such opposition may be overcome, higher costs are likely to result.
  • As we noted last week, the price of EVs continues to climb. Ford’s (F, $16.18) announcement of substantial price increases on its F-150 “Lightning” EV pickup is the most recent example of this issue.
  • There is growing evidence that the Arctic is warming faster than other parts of the world. The impact is difficult to estimate, but we would expect greater weather variability from this situation.
  • Much of the Midwest, parts of the Southwest, Florida, and the Atlantic coast could become subject to extreme heat events in the coming decades. But the real worry is heat in areas unprepared. The linked map shows the areas of installed air conditioning.
  • Hot weather just isn’t an inconvenience. The drought and warm weather is affecting industrial activity in Germany.  In China, power shortages, caused by hot weather, are causing car and battery plants to suspend operations.  Tech firms have also temporarily shut down.
  • Delays of utility-scale solar projects are steadily rising. These delays may be tied to trade restrictions which have recently been eased.
  • California looks ready to extend the life of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant that was scheduled for decommissioning.
  • Increasingly, we are seeing an “all of the above” strategy in energy investment. Investing in renewables doesn’t necessarily preclude investing in fossil fuels.
  • Although wood burning is not necessarily environmentally friendly, it appears Germans are considering it in the face of rising fossil fuel prices. Wood pellets are also seeing rising demand in Europe and Asia.
  • This recent report from the Peterson Institute details China’s dominance in rare earths processing.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Devil Is in the Details (August 8, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

U.S. policymakers used deregulation and globalization to corral inflation from 1966 to 1982.  Unfortunately, that policy was at odds with America’s superpower role, which required the U.S. to act as global importer of last resort.  If the U.S. didn’t consume all the goods the world wanted to sell to Americans, the world economy would face a liquidity crisis.  Policymakers addressed the issues of containing inflation and providing global liquidity by deregulating financial services, which made it easier for households to borrow money.  Although deregulation and globalization slowed real income growth, the ability to borrow allowed households to absorb global imports, holding the international system together.  After 1995, this lending was increasingly attached to residential real estate, which was considered safe.  Sadly, one of the key economic imbalances that was revealed during the Great Financial Crisis was excessive household debt.  Since the crisis, the economy has been trying to address this debt overhang.  There has been some progress as household debt peaked at 129.4% of after-tax income in Q1 2008 but fell to 84.4% in Q1 2021.  Since then, it has risen to 96.5%.

Although policymakers haven’t targeted this issue, we believe that addressing this debt situation is not only key to improving the health of the economy, but the austerity required to reduce debt may be a factor behind political polarization.  The last time the U.S. had a similar debt issue was in the late 1920s when the Great Depression was the resolution, although the situation wasn’t fully addressed until WWII.  From a financial perspective, WWII finally resolved the private sector debt problem by placing that debt on the public balance sheet.  The debt relative to the size of the economy was reduced on the public balance sheet through financial repression.

One of the difficulties in discussing debt is proper scaling; in other words, how do we know when debt is “too high”?  Economists often use nominal GDP or some sort of income measure to scale debt.  The problem is that both GDP and income are “flow” data, meaning that they measure a quantity calculated over a period of time, while debt is “stock” data, which is a level at a specific time.  In terms of debt, income or GDP may or may not tell us much about the ability to service the debt.

Accounting often creates ratios that measure stock or flows.  For example, assets divided by liabilities are two stock numbers that give us some idea about the balance sheet of a firm or household.  Clearly, if the assets exceed liabilities, it suggests solvency.

From 1970 to 1990, American households had more cash than debt.[1]  After 1990, household leverage rose, peaking with debt exceeding cash to the tune of nearly $6.0 trillion.  The difference narrowed after the Great Financial Crisis by more than 50%.  The huge injection of fiscal aid to households during the COVID-19 pandemic finally led to cash exceeding debt for the first time in three decades.

So, have we resolved the household debt problem?  Perhaps, but the Federal Reserve’s Distributional Financial Accounts, which examines household balance sheets by income, suggests that the debt situation hasn’t necessarily been fixed.

We divide households into three groups: the top 10%, the middle 40%, and the bottom 50%.  The top 10% has seen its cash levels rise relative to debt for most of this century, but this difference widened dramatically during the pandemic.  Since the upper income brackets were mostly excluded from direct cash payments, it’s likely that this group liquidated appreciated assets.  We do note that all three classes took on more debt, but in the case of the top 10%, the cash accumulation far exceeded these new liabilities.  The middle 40% saw cash rise relative to debt into Q1 2021, but over the past year, liabilities grew modestly relative to debt.  However, for the bottom 50%, net debt continued to rise even with the influx of pandemic transfer payments.

We don’t have a data series by income prior to 1989, so we can’t compare what occurred during and after WWII, but, given the high marginal tax rates of that period, we suspect that the lower income classes saw their balance sheets improve.  What can we take away from the above chart?  First, as interest rates rise, consumption may fall since the bottom 50% increased their leverage during the pandemic.  Consumption will then have to come from the upper 50%.  Second, given the massive cash balances of the top 10%, asset prices could find support in the coming months.  Although higher cash yields from rising interest rates might keep this cash on the sidelines, we suspect this level of cash will eventually find its way into the equity, commodity, and debt markets.  This flow may depend on signs that the FOMC is near the end of its tightening cycle, but once such a catalyst emerges, the conditions for a strong financial market recovery are in place.  The great unknown, of course, is which market the potential flows will favor.

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[1] This dataset, from the FRB’s Financial Accounts of the U.S., includes households plus non-profits that service households.  Thus, strictly speaking, this isn’t just households, but data suggests the non-profit contribution is relatively minor.

Weekly Energy Update (August 4, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Prices are testing long-term support near $90 per barrel for crude oil.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 4.5 mb compared to a 1.5 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 4.7 mb, meaning the net draw was 0.2 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.1 mbpd.  Exports fell 1.0 mb, while imports rose 1.2 mbpd.  Refining activity declined 1.2% to 91.0% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels.  The fact that we are not seeing the usual seasonal decline is a bearish factor for oil prices.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2004.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $104.04.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $65 per barrel, so we are seeing about $30 of risk premium in the market.

Gasoline Prices

One of the challenges in determining “how high” gasoline prices truly are is to find the proper scaling variable.  The most common metric is to deflate the current price by some price index.  Although that method is sound (it compares gasoline prices to other items), it doesn’t, in our opinion, capture the centrality of gasoline prices.  After all, a commuter often has limited ability to substitute either a fuel (cars tend to only use gasoline) or a travel method (car sharing requires coordination, public transportation varies by locale).

As an alternative to using a price index, we take the nominal hourly wage for a non-supervisory worker and divide into that wage the current average national price of gasoline.  This measure calculates how many gallons of gasoline a worker can purchase for an hour’s worth of work.  The scaling method isn’t perfect as it doesn’t take into account taxes and benefit costs, for example, but it does allow us to compare the current price to history.

The below chart shows that calculation along with the Presidential Approval Ratings.  On the left axis, the higher the number, the more gallons one can buy with an hour’s worth of work.  So, the higher the reading, the better off the worker is.  Over time, the average is 8.6 gallons.  As the chart shows, we are well below that level at present.  It’s also clear that Presidential Approval Ratings and the number of gallons one can buy “rhyme.”  The two variables are not perfectly correlated.  There are several spikes in approval tied to wars or other geopolitical events that sometimes occur with lower gallon per hour readings.  But, overall, President Biden’s low approval ratings is not being helped by falling gallon per hour numbers.

 

Market news:

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Political Crises for Top U.S. Allies (August 1, 2022)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

It’s been a hot summer for some of the United States’ key allies, and we don’t just mean the weather.  We’ve seen a major political assassination in Japan, the scandal-driven ouster of a prime minister in the United Kingdom, and a failed vote of confidence that led to the resignation of the prime minister in Italy.  Since all these political crises happened in such a short amount of time, we decided to explain each of them in this report and discuss their common features and geopolitical implications.  As always, we end with a discussion of the ramifications for investors.

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Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google