Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Turkish Experiment (February 28, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, now available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

The Turkish economy is being roiled by spiking inflation and a sharp decline in the Turkish lira (TRY).  The orthodox response to such a macroeconomic crisis is austerity.  Fiscal and monetary policy become tight; taxes are raised, or spending is cut, or both occur and interest rates are increased.  The goal is to depress domestic demand because the root cause of these problems is usually a persistent current account deficit.  Reducing domestic demand usually leads to a reduction in the current account deficit.

Turkish President Erdogan has adopted a heterodox response to the current crisis.  He has fired numerous officials of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) over the past two years who insisted on raising interest rates to address the aforementioned problems.  Since July 2019, when Erdogan relieved Murat Cetinkaya of the governorship of the CBRT, he has installed three governors in less than three years.  Erdogan believes that increasing interest rates leads to higher inflation on the idea that increased borrowing costs will be applied to prices.  This position is at odds with the normal prescription for addressing an inflation and currency crisis.

In this report, we will begin with a review of the basic economics of savings balances and how current account deficits are created and funded.  From there, we will provide an examination of Turkey’s current economic situation.  The next section will deal with the government’s response.  We will close with market ramifications.

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2022 Outlook: Update #1 (February 18, 2022)

by Mark Keller, CFA, Bill O’Grady, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

In our 2022 Outlook: The Year of Fat Tails, we outlined a forecast with a higher likelihood of events outside the norm. To compensate for the unusual level of uncertainty, we promised to provide frequent updates to the forecast. This report is the first of the year. One of our contentions in the forecast was that the FOMC would not raise interest rates this year. In light of developments, this position is untenable. Therefore, in this update, we will discuss four potential outcomes from the upcoming rate hike cycle and the potential effects on financial markets.

Monetary Policy
Over the past three months, we have seen a dramatic shift in expectations surrounding monetary policy. One way to observe them is by the behavior of the two-year deferred three-month Eurodollar futures implied yields.

In early November, the deferred Eurodollar futures were projecting steady policy for the next two years. In a mere three months, we have seen a rapid shift to nearly four rate hikes of 25 bps each.  Although similar shifts have occurred in the past, we note that when such shifts occur, the likelihood of recession does increase.

With tighter monetary policy looming, we would argue there are four likely terminal paths.  They are as follows:

  • Path #1: Policy is rapidly tightened, leading to a recession.
  • Path #2: Policy is tightened too slowly, causing a debasement crisis.
  • Path #3: Policy tightening triggers a financial crisis, leading to a rapid easing of policy.
  • Path #4: A soft landing occurs.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Ukraine: Key Questions (February 14, 2022)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA, and Bill O’Grady | PDF

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, now available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

For the past two months, Russia has been mobilizing around Ukraine, leading to fears that Moscow is planning to invade.  The U.S. has warned Russia against such action, lining out extensive sanctions and other potential responses.

Given the fluid nature of the situation in Ukraine, it is difficult to create a report detailing current events.  After all, they are changing so rapidly that this element is best left to the media.  Instead, we want to give some context to the current situation formatted in a series of questions with responses from both of us, Bill and Patrick.  As always, we will close with market ramifications.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Two Power Plays in Kazakhstan (January 31, 2022)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA, and Bill O’Grady | PDF

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, now available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Over the past month, unrest has developed in Kazakhstan.  The unrest began as protests against rising fuel prices, but it soon blossomed into broader, more widespread, and violent civil disorder that had the appearance of an inter-elite conflict.  Although Central Asia doesn’t usually garner the world’s attention, instability in the region could affect larger countries, such as China, Russia, and India.  The volatility in Kazakhstan was also something of a surprise as the country has tended to be stable during its period of independence since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Despite being often overlooked by the Western media, Kazakhstan is an important country.  It’s a major oil producer and the world’s dominant supplier of uranium.  Oil prices, already elevated, rose further on fears that the Kazakh disorder would lead to additional supply disruptions.  Uranium and associated equities also rose in price on the reports.  In this report, we begin with some background on Kazakhstan, including a short history and a discussion of the region’s role in Russia’s imperial behavior.  We next delve into the reasons for the January unrest and the way it played out for Kazakh and Russian leaders.  As always, we conclude with market ramifications.

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Keller Quarterly (January 2022)

Letter to Investors | PDF

As I write this letter, stock markets around the world have spent much of the last three weeks selling off sharply.  After peaking on January 4, the S&P 500 has fallen over 12% from that high. This, after it returned over 28% last year (including dividends).  In fact, most indices were up double-digits last year and many, like the S&P, were up well over 20%.  How can investors bounce from optimism to pessimism so quickly?  It’s actually very common.  Remember, the market doesn’t require all investors to turn pessimistic to go down sharply.  Less than 5% of shareholders deciding to sell at the same time is enough to induce a sharp decline in stock prices.  That decline is enough for the other 95% to wonder, “Maybe I should sell too?” and away you go.  Before you know it, the market is down 10% and all the media is in a tizzy.

At times like this, it’s important to evaluate the realities of the market and the economy; in other words, what we know about the present versus what we don’t know about the future.  What we know is that the economies in the U.S. and developed countries around the world are continuing to expand from the pandemic-induced global recession of two years ago.  This expansion will naturally slow over the next few years but will most likely continue.  The delta variant of COVID, which was receding at the time we wrote our October letter, has been replaced by the omicron variant, which has once again frightened much of the public and policymakers.  At this point, omicron appears to be following the standard trend of virus evolution: it is more contagious and less lethal than prior variants.  It’s still very dangerous, of course, but this is the pattern we have previously discussed, and we expect it to persist as COVID continues to mutate.  Each variant will scare the markets as worries of economic slowdown emerge, but we expect these cycles will simply produce a “wave action” to economic progress.

We discussed inflation last quarter, namely, that we expected it to degrade over time as production and transportation problems are slowly repaired.  That is still our view.  We have seen such post-recession supply problems before, notably back in the mid-1980s, and they do eventually get better.  The labor shortages will not improve as quickly, which is why we expect inflation to normalize at around 3% per annum when all is said and done, rather than the 2% (or less) rate we’ve seen in the last decade.  But the economy and the markets can adjust to that rate rather easily without much damage to financial assets.  And, as we noted last quarter, it’s not a bad sign that there are unfilled jobs around.  That’s the sign of a strong economy, not a weak one. It may mean that corporate profit margins are reduced somewhat, but we note that they’re at all-time highs anyway, and that corporate profits this year should be at record levels.  More people working and making more money isn’t a bad thing; it’s the lifeblood of any economy.

What is new is that the Fed has decided to become an inflation-fighter.  (At least they’re saying they are.)  People are always worrying about Washington and politics.  Mostly, they’re worrying about the wrong things.  Their primary worry out of Washington almost always should be the Fed.  This is one of those years where the Fed’s action should be considered a key risk factor.

The problem is that the Fed really can’t do anything to fix the fundamental inflation problem, which is restricted supply.  All they can do is dampen demand, which would also hurt economic growth.  The stock market sold off recently, in our opinion, because it feared that an overly aggressive Fed might just come up with a “cure” for inflation that “kills the patient.”  Our best guess of Fed behavior in the year ahead is that they will raise rates a few times, the financial markets will sell off, and they will stop.  As we noted above, we think it’s likely that inflation will cool with or without Fed tightening.

But the Fed is always under pressure to “do something,” which means we are probably going to see a fair amount of volatility this year as the market worries about what the Fed might do.  But with the economy expanding nicely and corporate profits strong, we think the wise course of action is to remain optimistic for the year and beyond.  In fact, years of higher than normal volatility often give us good buying opportunities, especially when the underlying economy is strong (which is the case now).

One more thing: years of higher-than-normal volatility are often years of higher-than-normal emotions for investors.  This is dangerous.  As we’ve advised many times, investing should not be an emotional endeavor, but a rational one.  In fact, emotions are the enemies of successful long-term investing.  As COVID, Fed actions, and other factors create gyrating markets, we can all benefit by striving to keep our emotions in check.

We appreciate your confidence in us.

 

Gratefully,

Mark A. Keller, CFA
CEO and Chief Investment Officer

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