Daily Comment (December 18, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] | PDF

Good morning and happy Friday!  Although Congress remains in session and Brexit could interfere with the MP’s Christmas, the rest of the world is winding down for the holidays.  U.S. equity futures are mostly steady this morning.  One thing to watch—Tesla (TSLA, USD, 655.90) joins the S&P 500 Index today.  It is the largest firm by market value to be added to the index, so we could see some distortions.  Adding to the “excitement” is that it’s a quadruple witching day, meaning stock index futures, options on those futures, regular stock options, and single stock futures all expire today.

We begin our coverage with the Russian hack; we don’t know much yet, but it looks widespread. We take a quick look at the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy.  Policy and economics follow.  China news is next; a battle between populists and the establishment regarding China policy is brewing.  Pandemic news follows, and then an update on the EU and Brexit.  Being Friday, the Asset Allocation Weekly, the last of 2020, is available, along with the associated podcast and chart book.  As a reminder, starting in January, in a bid to shorten this report, we will no longer publish the AAW at the bottom of the Daily.  It will be available only as a stand-alone report but linked within the Daily CommentAnd, the Daily Comment will go on holiday hiatus starting Dec. 23 and return on Jan. 4.  Here are the details:

 The Hack:  We are still in the early stages of this event, but it is shaping up to be significant.  First, as we learn more, it is becoming clear this was a very sophisticated attack.  Currently, it looks like at least 18 thousand companies and government agencies have been compromised, including Homeland Security and the Pentagon.  Although SolarWinds (SWI, USD, 17.60) was a key path to inserting malicious software, it wasn’t the only tactic deployed.  Second, researchers are expressing surprise at the degree of effort involved.  The attackers focused on U.S. technology, which avoids the red flag of foreign origin.  They didn’t reuse code, which is also a way that cyber analysts detect breaches.  Third, there is a potentially great risk to infrastructure.  At this point, we don’t know if the goal was merely to gather information or to disrupt operations.  It may take years to discover the full depth of this intrusion.

The term “act of war” is starting to show up in the media.  Although we don’t use this term loosely, this event has the characteristics of state conflict.  We have been thinking about the entire notion of war for some time.  Clausewitz postulated that the point of war was to convince an opponent’s civilian population that resistance is futile; cooperating with the aims of the victorious foreign power is the only alternative.  Although militaries still matter, propaganda and cyberwar can directly affect the civilian population and may be an alternative to direct military conflict.  For example, if a foreign power can control news flow or critical infrastructure, e.g., electricity, water, etc., the need to wage a military conflict may lessen.  Given the U.S. dominance in military affairs, focusing on direct non-military intervention on civilians seems reasonable.  The trick for a country being attacked is the response.  The U.S. has ample cyber capabilities.  We will be watching for retaliation.  Where this situation leads remains unknown.

The BOJ:  Meetings of Japan’s central bank tend to be interesting because the country has been something of a harbinger of where the rest of the world has moved.  Despite massive expansions of the balance sheet, Japan has been completely stymied in its attempts to raise price levels.  Today, the bank announced a policy review to look at its current policies to reflate the economy.  Given our expectations of JPY appreciation, we will be watching to see just how radical the bank will go (What is most radical?  Buying U.S. Treasuries to expand the balance sheet.)

Policy and economics:  Congress continues to negotiate on a stimulus package; the latest wrinkle is an attempt by GOP lawmakers to restrict the Fed from restarting its emergency credit facilities that expire at year’s end.  The worry among lawmakers is that a future Congress could use the Fed’s balance sheet for fiscal stimulus, removing lawmakers from such decisions.[1]  As we have noted before, lawmakers have to exercise great care in how they approach this issue.  On the one hand, there is a risk that the Fed could take a bond-buying program and use it to facilitate spending.  It isn’t hard to imagine a muni bond backstop evolving into a program that supports the borrowing efforts of state and local governments.  At the same time, there is a difference between directly lending to support spending and providing a market backstop.  For a financial system that is dominated by shadow banking, there is a need for the Fed to act as a dealer of last resort.  Shadow banking is essentially a carry trade—to use the colloquial, it’s “grabbing nickels in front of steamrollers.”  2008 proved it is impossible to know beforehand where the risks lie.  Therefore, if a certain instrument has become repo’d to the point where the inability to make a market leads to a financial crisis, only the Fed can provide a two-sided market to maintain liquidity.  These programs need to be readily available; although it may be ok to let them lapse in the short run, policymakers must understand that they may be needed at a moment’s notice.  The risk is that Congress won’t act quickly enough.  It would probably be preferable to leave the programs in place with Congressional oversight to ensure the central bank is only providing a backstop.

China:  There is a classic establishment versus populist dual setting up within the administration.  Representing the establishment is the Treasury, seeking to limit the scope of President Trump’s executive order banning U.S. investors from purchasing equities of Chinese companies with links to the PLA.  On the other side is the State Department and the Pentagon, who want to include affiliates and subsidiaries, thus widening the breadth of the order.  Although there are obvious elements of the business v. the security organs, we also would frame this as establishment v. populists.  The establishment supports globalization, and thus, wants to reduce the impact of investment limitations on China.  The populists oppose globalization and want to expand restrictions.  This current battle will end with a new president, but we will be watching to see how the Biden administration handles this issue.  LWP will be just as opposed to a narrow reading as RWP.  Early indications hint that the Biden administration leans more towards the establishment.

COVID-19:  The number of reported cases is 75,096,337 with 1,665,211 fatalities.  In the U.S., there are 17,215,045 confirmed cases with 310,801 deaths.  For illustration purposes, the FT has created an interactive chart that allows one to compare cases across nations using similar scaling metrics.  The FT has also issued an economic tracker that looks across countries with high-frequency data on various factors.   The Rt data continues to show improvement, suggesting that the current surge in infections is peaking.  Currently, 17 states have a reading of less than 1, compared to last week’s eight, suggesting a falling infection rate.  Wyoming has the lowest reading, and Maine has the highest.  Over the past seven days, the infection rate in the U.S. is 0.45% or one in 200.

Virology

The EU and BrexitChina and the EU are working on an investment deal.  If it does get done, it will be interesting to see the U.S. reaction.  The Brexit talks have it a new snag; PM Johnson is arguing that the recently passed EU stimulus should not be exempt from the level playing field discussions.  The GBP has eased on the reports.

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[1] MMT proponents have argued for similar ideas, such as the creation of a Fed-like body that would make fiscal spending decisions without the need for Congressional approval.

Asset Allocation Weekly (December 18, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

(N.B.  Due to the upcoming holiday season, this report will be the last Asset Allocation Weekly for 2020.  The next report will be published on January 8, 2021.)

While 2020 was a year in which the word “unprecedented” has been used a lot, there are many areas where the term is appropriate.  One area of interest is in the growth of liquidity.  The chart below is one we have featured often, showing retail money market fund levels (RMMK) and the S&P 500.

The gray bars show recessions, while the orange bars show periods where RMMK fell below $920 billion.  Our position has been that when we are in the orange parts of the chart, there is a dearth of liquidity and equity markets tend to stall.  On the other hand, periods of rapid RMMK accumulation have tended to be periods of equity weakness.

In 2018, as the trade war escalated, RMMK began to rise sharply.  It continued to rise throughout 2019 into 2020.  The pandemic led to another leg higher in RMMK.  The level of RMMK has fallen from the highs set earlier in the year but it remains elevated.  As noted above, when RMMK rises sharply, equities tend to suffer.  We did see some evidence of that in 2018, but last year equities continued to trend higher despite the rise in RMMK.  Pandemic worries and a brewing financial crisis led to a sharp selloff in the S&P 500, but the market turned as policymakers moved quickly to support the economy.

It is clear that the level of RMMK is high, but the difficulty is determining “how high.”  For that, analysts usually try to scale the data to make it comparable across periods.  A logical scale variable may be in comparing the level of RMMK to household financial assets.  The problem with that variable is that it is very sensitive to the level of equities; in other works, cash levels seem to rise coincident with a fall in equity values.  Most of the decline occurs due to the fall in equity values, not to cash accumulation.  The other problem with scaling is finding the answer to the question at hand.  What we want to know is if RMMK levels fall, will the funds go to stocks or elsewhere?  We assume that RMMK is the closest asset to equities of fixed income; in other words, demand or savings deposits probably represent the desire to hold cash, whereas RMMK is where liquidated financial assets go before they are placed elsewhere.

The chart on the left shows the asset allocation of the top 10% of households.  Note that about 50% of this income group’s assets are in equities.  That is far larger than the middle income group (89% to 51%), which holds 25% in equities, and the bottom 50%, which has equity holdings of 10%.  The chart on the right shows that the RMMK holdings for the top 10% group rose from 15% to near 20% from 2018 to 2020, coinciding with the rise in RMMK shown in the first chart.

These charts suggest that most of the RMMK accumulation occurred in an income group most inclined to buy equities.  Accordingly, the elevated level of RMMK should be supportive for equities.  At the same time, in 2008, RMMK held by the top 10% reached nearly 30%.  Thus, we may not see as large of a recovery as we saw during 2009-11.  Still, there does appear to be ample liquidity available for stocks, and given the low level of interest rates, flows should continue to be supportive for equities.

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Weekly Energy Update (December 17, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

A note to readers: The Weekly Energy Update will go on holiday hiatus following today’s report and will return on January 7, 2021.  From all of us at Confluence Investment Management, we want to wish you a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!  See you in 2021!

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  Prices are taking another leg higher on hopes of stronger demand.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories fell 3.1 mb, in line with the 3.0 mb draw forecast.  The SPR was unchanged; there is still 3.1 mb of storage in excess of the 635.0 mb that existed before the pandemic.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.1 mbpd to 11.0 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.8 mbpd, while imports declined 1.1 mbpd.  Refining activity fell 0.8%.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data showed a decline in crude oil stockpiles, which is normal.  Inventories usually decline into year-end.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $40.30; using the euro/price model, fair value is $69.70.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $53.42.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.  This week’s jump in oil inventories led to a large decline in the oil model forecast, while the weaker dollar boosted the EUR model forecast.  Overall, the dollar probably has a greater impact on oil prices and thus should keep the market elevated despite high levels of supply.

The IEA report for December continued to paint a bleak outlook for oil as demand remains weak.  For 2021, the group projects demand at 96.9 mbpd, still below the 100.1 mbpd seen pre-pandemic.  At the same time, supply is creeping higher as U.S. production recovers, Libya comes back on-line, and OPEC begins retaking market share.  Still, as we note above, the weaker dollar is a strong catalyst for higher prices and may overcome otherwise soft fundamentals.

Natural gas producers are becoming increasingly adept at adjusting production to market conditions.  If this practice becomes widespread, it could lead to stable natural gas prices.  Simply put, instead of prices adjusting, supply adjusts.

In geopolitical news:

Here is the roundup of climate and alternative energy news:

  • Exxon (XOM, USD, 43.04) announced a series of carbon reduction measures.  The company is promising to reduce emissions intensity (carbon per unit of production) rather than a full cut.  In other words, if intensity falls but production rises, the overall output of carbon will continue to rise.  Exxon is facing growing pressure from the investor community to reduce its carbon emissions.  This is a factor affecting the energy sector; although we have seen a rise in equity values recently, it may be a mere recovery bounce.
    • This brings us to a broader issue.  How should investors treat the oil and gas sector?  A case can be made that the future for oil and gas is in peril.  Oil and gas are being hit from all sides between technology that reduces the need for travel, the electrification of transportation, the growing likelihood of a carbon tax, and investor pressure to reduce carbon.  And yet, in the here and now, it is clear that we still need oil and gas.  The last three months have seen a strong recovery; the question now is how long will this last?
    • A key point to remember is that equity markets are anticipatory markets, whereas commodity markets are not.  In other words, the value of a stock is ultimately based on future cash flows; if the future is “cloudy,” investors tend to reduce the value of cash flows into that unclear future.  On the other hand, commodities don’t really pay a future stream of cash (despite academic studies that suggest one can generate cash from futures roll yield, it can just as easily turn into a cost depending on the shape of the futures curve) and the value of commodities is (a) the value of processing it into a product, and (b) changes in price between now and the future.  In this situation, we could very easily see oil and gas equities underperform the commodity; in fact, this has been a feature of the market for the past few years.
    • Industries in decline can still be investible.  Tobacco proves that one can make money in a pariah group.  On the other hand, coal has been a destroyer of capital.  The difference is complicated, but industry concentration plays a role as does the ability to shape regulation.  Tobacco did a masterful job, e.g., eventually turning the states into supporters of smoking.  Coal did not.  If the oil and gas sector takes steps to address climate change and carbon mitigation (e.g., support a carbon tax,[1] invest heavily in carbon capture, branch into alternative energy), the sector might do fine.  If it fails to manage the situation, oil and gas could resemble the path of coal equities.
  • China is promising to reduce its carbon intensity (see above) by 65% by the end of the decade.  We take these promises with a grain of salt.  China is still the world’s largest consumer of coal, a fuel with a high carbon content, and the country is continually expanding its coal-fired electricity capacity.  We view this as mostly a public relations move.
    • At the same time, as we have noted in recent Daily Comments, China has been seeing a spate of corporate defaults, especially in the SOE sector.  However, we note that the Xi government did rescue Tianqi Lithium (002466, CNY, 31.38) when it was facing a deadline on a bank loan.  The company is the world’s largest lithium producer, and this move by the state suggests it is being treated as a national champion.  The recent plunge in lithium prices has undermined the company’s ability to manage the default.
    • One of the emerging themes is that the energy world is moving from oil and gas to metals.  In other words, alternative energies and electrification of transportation will require lots more metal (e.g., lithium, cobalt, nickel, aluminum, copper) and much less oil and gas.  Since the turn of the last century, oil has been a primary factor in geopolitics.  That may not be the case in the future; instead, the pivot will be mines.
  • Although electric cars are still in the forefront, fuel cell vehicles, powered by hydrogen, may end up being the winner.  Hydrogen can be produced from fossil fuels (gray), natural gas (blue), or electricity (green).  Green hydrogen comes from generating electricity from a non-fossil fuel source (hydro, solar, wind, nuclear) and splitting water to get the hydrogen.  A fuel cell takes the hydrogen, and its waste product is water.
    • This is where nuclear comes in.  Since the Three-Mile Island/Chernobyl/Fukushima disasters, nuclear power has been considered a pariah by environmentalists.  However, we are starting to see a reassessment among this group that reducing carbon emissions is probably impossible without nuclear power.  Like everything, the decision to use nuclear is a tradeoff; as the above referenced events show, nuclear power can be dangerous.  At the same time, rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is also considered a danger.
    • The nuclear industry has been building smaller modular reactors that could be used to make green hydrogen.  Modular technology could make permitting easier (once the model is approved, it can be replicated without another permit) and established where needed.  If these reactors become commonplace, it could bring a renaissance to the nuclear industry.

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[1] And the level of the tax.

Weekly Geopolitical Report – The 2021 Geopolitical Outlook (December 14, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady & Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(This is the last report of 2020; the next report will be published on January 11, 2021.)

As is our custom, in mid-December, we publish our geopolitical outlook for the upcoming year.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for 2021.  It is not designed to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on the “big picture” conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: The Establishment Strikes Back

Issue #2: Anti-China Alliance Building

Issue #3: The Middle East

Issue #4: North Korea

Issue #5: Inflation Up, Real Yields Down

Read the full report

2021 Outlook: The Recovery Year (December 14, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady & Mark Keller | PDF

Summary:

  1. The economy is in recovery, but the expansion phase of the cycle (where economic output exceeds its prior peak) isn’t likely to begin until 2022. We look for weak first quarter growth followed by more notable strength for the remaining three quarters as the COVID-19 vaccines are distributed.
  2. Monetary policy has made a historic shift:
    1. Volcker’s policy of pre-emption to prevent the return of inflation expectations has ended. Thus, policy tightening won’t occur until there is clear evidence of sustainable inflation.
    2. The Fed is actively taking steps to prevent asset runs across the non-bank financial system. This policy will stabilize the financial system at the cost of creating moral hazard.
    3. To address inequality, the Fed will actively try to extend the business cycle.
  3. The liquidity injection into the economy is unprecedented. Determining the flow of this liquidity is the key element to forecasting the economy and asset markets.
  4. Inflation may rise in H2 2021 if vaccine distribution triggers pent-up spending. But we don’t expect a rise to exceed 3% of core PCE and it won’t bring a reversal in monetary policy.  We also don’t expect the rise to be sustained due to the underlying factors dampening inflation.
  5. Our forecast for 2021 S&P 500 earnings is $147.84 with a multiple of 26.5x. The forecast range for the index is 3918-4050.
    1. Given the level of liquidity, there is a substantial likelihood of exceeding this forecast.
    2. We favor small and mid-caps over large caps.
    3. The growth/value ratio is at an extreme, favoring the former. If the economy improves as we expect, a reversal of this ratio is likely, although it may not favor the entire spectrum of value stocks.  Cyclical stocks should perform well.
    4. Our expectation of dollar weakness should support international stocks for dollar-based investors.
  6. In fixed income, we favor investment-grade corporates. High yield appears fully valued and duration risk should be avoided.
  7. Commodities should be supported by better economic growth and a weaker dollar.  Oil prices will likely lag, holding in the low $50s for WTI.  We favor other commodities, and view gold as attractive at current levels.

Read the full report

Asset Allocation Weekly (December 11, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

After peaking at $2,063 in early August, gold prices fell to $1,760 at the end of November.  This is a notable decline and, because our asset allocation models have included precious metals since 2018, it makes sense to see if anything has changed.  We have several different ways to examine the price of gold.  In general, the outlook is mixed; the underlying fundamentals remain solid, but competition for investment flows is putting a damper on gold prices.

Based on our gold model, prices are attractive at current levels.  The model uses real two-year Treasury yields, the EUR/USD exchange rate, the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and the U.S. fiscal account scaled to GDP.  As the chart suggests, current prices are below the model’s forecast.

At the same time, a model based on the amount of gold held by exchange-traded products (ETPs) suggests gold isn’t attracting investment flows relative to its fundamental attractiveness.

Although optimism surrounding equities is likely diverting funds that may have gone into gold, the price action in bitcoin may also be having an impact.  Bitcoin remains a controversial topic; its value appears to be ephemeral (in theory, one can create scarcity of anything, but it has little value without demand for it).  Its initial construction suggested it was a digital currency designed for transactions.  It has mostly failed in that endeavor, at least for legal transactions, but it has shown to have store-of-value characteristics.  As such, it has similar characteristics to gold without the same issues of storage.[1]  Recently, we have seen a sharp rise in bitcoin prices, which may be siphoning off demand that would usually go to gold.

Since late 2014, gold and bitcoin prices are positively correlated at the 70.9% level.  In 2017, we saw a spike in bitcoin that collapsed.  The key question is whether we are seeing a repeat in the current situation or something different.  It is difficult to tell, but the most likely situation is that bitcoin isn’t replacing gold but is a complement.  Currently, bitcoin appears a bit expensive compared to gold (a simple model suggests bitcoin should be closer to 12,000), but it had been running below gold for most of this year.  Thus, we view the recent rally as more corrective in nature, although the recent spike suggests bitcoin is now excessively valued.  Another item of note is that when we had a financial crisis in February into late March, bitcoin plunged while gold maintained its value.  The financial system was in a perilous position in late Q1 and bitcoin was not the safety asset of choice when there were high levels of fear.  At the same time, we cannot discount the attractiveness of bitcoin and, if investable products are eventually created, it may have a place in portfolios.

Overall, we remain bullish on gold.  The underlying fundamentals, as shown in our base model, are very attractive and suggest current prices are undervalued.  We do think bitcoin has taken some of the luster from gold, but in the long run we believe the two assets are complementary.  With monetary and fiscal policy remaining expansive, the case for commodities, in general, and gold, in particular, is favorable.

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[1] Both assets require storage, but one is quite physical whereas the other has, in theory, unlimited storage capacity.  For example, if one is trying to live in a failing state, gold may have little value due to its weight but a cryptocurrency that can be easily transferred is attractive.

Weekly Energy Update (December 10, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  Prices are consolidating after the late November rally.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories unexpectedly jumped 15.2 mb when a 1.0 mb draw was expected.  The SPR fell 0.1 mb; there is still 3.1 mb of storage in excess of the 635.0 mb that existed before the pandemic.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 11.1 mbpd.  Exports fell 1.6 mbpd, while imports rose 1.1 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.7%.  The unusual build appears to be a combination of rising imports and falling exports.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data shows the large rise in crude oil stockpiles, which is clearly contraseasonal.  Inventories are past their second seasonal peak and usually decline into year’s end.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $39.28; using the euro/price model, fair value is $69.41.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $52.68.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.  This week’s jump in oil inventories led to a large decline in the oil model forecast, while the weaker dollar boosted the EUR model forecast.  Overall, the dollar probably has a greater impact on oil prices and thus should keep the market elevated despite the increase in supply.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows refinery utilization.  Although run rates rose, they remain nearly 15 percentage points below average, reflecting weak demand.

In case you missed it, check out this interactive chart of U.S. energy consumption.  Starting in 1800, it shows the shift from biomass to fossil fuels.  It’s a chart you will want to keep.  And, here is a primer on Cushing, OK, the delivery point for the NYMEX oil futures contract, a little town in Oklahoma that is a web of pipelines and a sea of storage facilities.

In Middle East news, two Iraqi oil wells in the Khabbaz field in Kirkuk were set ablaze by explosions carried out by Islamic State.  Although the attack had only a modest effect on prices, Islamic State has been intensifying its efforts in this area, reflecting the lack of security in Iraq.   Although Kuwait has an ample sovereign wealth fund, the emirate is facing a cash crunch as weak oil prices have reduced revenue and the economic slowdown has increased spending.  Moody’s downgraded Kuwait’s debt in September over these concerns.

We have been documenting the decline in product demand due to the pandemic.  Although recessions tend to be bearish for energy demand in general, this one has led to a sharp decline in mobility and has crimped gasoline demand.  We are starting to see a ripple effect through the refining industry.  Refiners have struggled with margins for years and the drop in demand has led to the closure of some refining operations.  These closures have been especially pronounced in the West, where many of the facilities are small and old and thus more costly to operate.  In Asia, there has been an increase in refining capacity and it is likely that, in the future, the West will be importing product from Asia.

On the alternative energy front:

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